Interactive Information Design

We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the behavior of a set of agents. When each designer can choose information policies from a compact set of statistical experiments with countable support, such games always admit subgame-perfect equilibria. When designers produce public information, every equilibrium of the simple game in which the set of messages coincides with the set of states is robust in the sense that it is an equilibrium with larger and possibly infinite and uncountable message sets. The converse is true for a class of Markovian equilibria only. When designers produce information for their own corporation of agents, robust pure-strategy equilibria exist and are characterized via an auxiliary normal-form game in which the set of strategies of each designer is the set of outcomes induced by Bayes correlated equilibria in her corporation.

Cichoń’s diagram and localisation cardinals

We reimplement the creature forcing construction used by Fischer et al. (Arch Math Log 56(7–8):1045–1103, 2017. 10.1007/S00153-017-0553-8. arXiv:1402.0367 [math.LO]) to separate Cichoń’s diagram into five cardinals as a countable support product. Using the fact that it is of countable support, we augment our construction by adding uncountably many additional cardinal characteristics, sometimes referred to as localisation cardinals.

PRESERVATION OF SUSLIN TREES AND SIDE CONDITIONS

We show how to force, with finite conditions, the forcing axiom PFA(T), a relativization of PFA to proper forcing notions preserving a given Suslin tree T. The proof uses a Neeman style iteration with generalized side conditions consisting of models of two types, and a preservation theorem for such iterations. The consistency of this axiom was previously known using a standard countable support iteration and a preservation theorem due to Miyamoto.

A Sacks real out of nowhere

There is a proper countable support iteration of length ω adding no new reals at finite stages and adding a Sacks real in the limit.

Decisive creatures and large continuum

For f, g ∈ ωω let be the minimal number of uniform g-splitting trees (or: Slaloms) to cover the uniform f-splitting tree, i.e., for every branch v of the f-tree, one of the g-trees contains v. is the dual notion: For every branch v, one of the g-trees guesses v(m) infinitely often.It is consistent that for ℵ1 many pairwise different cardinals κ∊ and suitable pairs (f∊, g∊).For the proof we use creatures with sufficient bigness and halving. We show that the lim-inf creature forcing satisfies fusion and pure decision. We introduce decisiveness and use it to construct a variant of the countable support iteration of such forcings, which still satisfies fusion and pure decision.

Preserving preservation

We prove that the property “P doesn't make the old reals Lebesgue null” is preserved under countable support iterations of proper forcings, under the additional assumption that the forcings are nep (a generalization of Suslin proper) in an absolute way. We also give some results for general Suslin ccc ideals.