Use the best, ignore the rest: How heuristics allow to tell a lie from the truth

Could a simple rule of thumb help to find the truth? People struggle with integrating many putative cues to deception into an accurate veracity judgement. Heuristics simplify difficult decisions by ignoring most of the information and relying instead only on a few but highly diagnostic cues (’Use the best, ignore the rest’). We examined whether people would be able to tell lie from truth when instructed to make decisions based on a single, diagnostic cue (verifiability and richness in detail). We show that these simple judgements by lay people allowed to discriminate dishonest from honest statements. These judgements performed at or above state-of-the-art, resource-intensive content analysis by trained coders. For a tech- and training-free approach, heuristics were surprisingly accurate, and hold promise for practice.

Facilitation of object encoding in infants by the observation of giving

We propose that humans are prepared to interpret giving as a diagnostic cue of reciprocal–exchange relations from infancy. A prediction following from this hypothesis is that infants will represent the identity of an object they see being given, because this information is critical for evaluating potential future reciprocation. Across three looking-time experiments we tested whether the observation of a transfer action induces 12-month-olds to encode the identity of a single object handled by an agent. We found that infants encoded the object identity when the agent gave the object (Experiment 1), but not when she took it (Experiment 2), despite being able to represent the goal of both actions (Experiments 1 and 3). Consistent with our hypothesis, these results suggest that the infants’ representation of giving comprises information necessary for comparing the value of transferred goods across sharing episodes.

Is that Clint Eastwood or an old person? Assessing the speed of extracting group versus person information from faces

The human face is a key source of social information. In particular, it communicates a target’s personal identity and some of their main group memberships. Different models of social perception posit distinct stages at which this group-level and person-level information is extracted from the face, with divergent downstream consequences for cognition and behavior. This paper presents four experiments that explore the time-course of extracting group and person information from faces. In Experiments 1 and 2, we explore the effect of chunked versus unchunked processing on the speed of extracting group versus person information, as well as the impact of familiarity in Experiment 2. In Experiment 3, we examine the effect of the availability of a diagnostic cue on these same judgments. In Experiment 4, we explore the effect of both group-level and person-level prototypicality of face exemplars. Across all four experiments, we find no evidence for the perceptual primacy of either group or person information. Instead, we find that chunked processing, featural processing based on a single diagnostic cue, familiarity, and the prototypicality of face exemplars all result in a processing speed advantage for both group-level and person-level judgments equivalently. These results have important implications for influential models of face processing and impression formation, and can inform — and be integrated with — an understanding of the process of social categorization more broadly.