Causal Semantics for BPP Nets with Silent Moves

BPP nets, a subclass of finite Place/Transition Petri nets, are equipped with some causal behavioral semantics, which are variations of fully-concurrent bisimilarity [3], inspired by weak [28] or branching bisimulation [12] on labeled transition systems. Then, we introduce novel, efficiently decidable, distributed semantics, inspired by team bisimulation [17] and h-team bisimulation [19], and show how they relate to these variants of fully-concurrent bisimulation.

Causality and aspect in ability, actuality, and implicativity

Past-tense ability ascriptions (e.g., "was able") alternate between pure, potentially unrealized ability and an interpretation which actualizes the ability. The alternation extends to abilitative uses of possibility modals, with actualized readings strengthening to actuality entailments under perfective aspect in aspect-marking languages (Bhatt 1999). These interpretations resist explanation on accounts which seek to derive them in the composition of modality and aspect. I build on causal analyses of implicative inferences (from lexical implicatives like "manage" as well as 'variably-implicative' "enough" comparatives; Baglini & Francez 2016, Nadathur 2016, 2017) to propose a new approach to actuality inferences, grounded in a causal semantics for ability predicates. This account derives both pure ability and actuality readings, and explains parallels between implicative "manage" and actualized ability on the basis of shared (presuppositional) causal structure. "Manage" and ability differ in asserted content, but the difference is neutralized – producing actuality entailments – under a perfective operator which selects for eventive predicates, and combines with stative ability attributions only via aspectual coercion.

A Causal Semantics of IS Generics

The felicity, or acceptability, of IS generics, i.e. generic sentences with indefinite singulars, is considerably more restricted compared to BP generics, generics with bare plurals. The goal of this paper is to account for the limited felicity of IS generics compared to BP generics, on the one hand, while preserving the close similarity between the two types of generics, on the other. We do so by proposing a causal analysis of IS generics, and show that this corresponds closely with a probabilistic analysis of BP generics.

Modus of necessity and modus of assumption in causal structures of the text

This article explores causal relations complicated by modus saturation. As examples, the author selected the modus of necessity with modal predicate must, and modus of assumption with modal work perhaps. The goal of this work consists in examination of causal semantics in modus formations of various type and mark out a demarcation that is important in analyzing causal semantics and logics of similar relations in a sentence and text. The following methods are applies in the course of this research component analysis, propositional analysis, and contextual analysis. The work is conducted within the framework of semantic syntax and logics of language. The main conclusion consists in determination of the primary role of the modus of necessity in the texts with causal semantics, as well as potential of a modus to form the semantics of cause and effect in the texts. The relevance of this article us substantiated by reference to such modern linguistic directions as the logics of language, semantic syntax, and syntax of text.

Causal Legal Semantics: A Critical Assessment

A provision’s legal meaning is thought by many to be a function of its literal meaning. To explain the appearance that lawyers are arguing over a provision’s legal meaning and not just over which outcome would be more prudent or morally preferable, some legal literalists claim that a provision’s literal meaning may be causally, rather than conventionally, determined. I argue, first, that the proposed explanation is inconsistent with common intuitions about legal meaning; second, that explaining legal disagreement as a function of the causally determined meanings of moral terms requires, but lacks, a causal semantics which is clearly consistent with the scope of moral disagreement. Finally, I suggest that an element of the theory of language invoked by ‘causal’ legal literalists might be better deployed as part of an intentionalist account of legal practice.