The Language of Ontology

Metaphysical and ontological debates—debates about what exists and the nature of reality—have long been among the most discussed topics in philosophy. However, some argue that ontological debates are non-substantive, pointless, trivial, incoherent, or impossible. Debates about whether tables exist, or about the nature of reality, are taken to be defective in some way. This has led to a burgeoning literature studying the nature of metaphysical and ontological disputes themselves. A prominent line of argument has focused on questions concerning the language in which metaphysical disputes are conducted. Is there a ‘fundamental’ or ‘best’ language for ontology, or does the nature of language render metaphysical and ontological disputes non-substantive? This volume brings together new work from established and emerging authors on questions relating to the relationship between language and ontology. More specifically, essays in this volume consider such topics as whether there can be an ‘objectively best’ or privileged language of ontology; how we might compare languages to see which is the language of ontology; whether positing an ‘objectively best’ language is required of a substantive realist metaphysics; whether metaphysical debates are meaningless; the role of existence and truth in ontological theorizing; whether metaphysical claims should be interpreted as attempts to express truths about the nature of reality; and the relationship between natural language and theoretical metaphysics. Collectively, these essays advance a range of debates in metametaphysics and metaontology, and will be an invaluable resource for students and academics interested in the relationship between metaphysics and language.

Ontology by Stipulation

In previous work the author suggested that many ontological disputes can be viewed as merely verbal, in that each side can be charitably interpreted as speaking the truth in its own language. Critics have objected that it is more plausible to view the disputants as speaking the same language, perhaps even a special philosophy-room language, sometimes called Ontologese. This chapter suggests a different kind of deflationary move, in a way more extreme (possibly more Carnapian) than the author’s previous suggestion. The chapter supposes we encounter an ontological dispute between two sides, the A-side and the B-side, and we assume that they are speaking the same language so that (at least) one of them is mistaken (perhaps the common language is Ontologese). The author’s suggestion is that we can introduce by stipulation two languages, one for each side, such that in speaking the A-side stipulated language we capture whatever facts might be expressed in the A-side’s position, and in speaking the B-side stipulated language we capture whatever facts might be expressed in the B-side’s position. In this way we get whatever facts there might be in this ontological area without risking falsehood. A further part of the argument consists in explaining why the stipulation maneuver applies to questions of ontology but not to questions of mathematics (such as the Goldbach conjecture). One basic point is that mathematics has application to contingencies in a way that ontology doesn’t.

The Eventful Character of Bibikhin's Philosophical Thought

The article deals with the event-related aspects of V.V. Bibikhin's philosophical activities on the material of his lectures, texts and communication with contemporaries (S.S. Horuzhy, S.S. Averintsev and A.V. Akhutin). The eventfulness of the transfer of knowledge from teacher to student, as well as the unity of thought, word and life are the principles of teaching philosophy derived from the pedagogical experience of V.V. Bibikhin. He was a follower of A.F. Losev and M. Heidegger focusing his thoughts on clarifying ontological problems. Ontological thought is paradoxical in its own nature. This is revealed in the reading and interpretation of Bibikhin's writings, as well as in the evidence of his polemical communication with colleagues. One of the brightest ontological disputes of recent times is the discussion of V.V. Bibikhin and S.S. Horuzhy about the concept of energy which is an essential ontological category. These prominent Russian thinkers had a long-term friendship that included an element of intellectual rivalry. The author calls such communication “friendship in struggle” which has a paradoxical character. The philosophical definition of friendship presented in the book “The Pillar and Statement of Truth” by P.A. Florensky which has an antinomic character is used in the text. The paradoxical event and the polemic nature of V.V. Bibikhin's thought manifests itself in his works and correspondence with friends. The article provides illustrative examples of these moments of his intellectual creativity. V.V. Bibikhin is one of those thinkers who preserve the Russian philosophical tradition in the context of its disputes with other national traditions.

Why Composition Matters

Many say that ontological disputes are defective because they are unimportant or without substance. In this paper, we defend ontological disputes from the charge, with a special focus on disputes over the existence of composite objects. Disputes over the existence of composite objects, we argue, have a number of substantive implications across a variety of topics in metaphysics, science, philosophical theology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Since the disputes over the existence of composite objects have these substantive implications, they are themselves substantive.

Minimal Substantivity

This chapter defends a notion of “minimal substantivity” for ontological disputes, focusing on persistence and composition as case-studies. Deflationists argue that these disputes are defective: they are merely verbal, or epistemically underdetermined. Anti-Deflationists emphasize the substantivity of these controversies, either in Quinean terms, or in terms of fundamentality. This chapter aims at striking a mid-way between these approaches, thus outlining a Minimal Anti-Deflationism. First, it is shown that even if these ontological disputes are merely verbal, they can be recast as non-verbal metalinguistic disputes. These exchanges have in turn an ontological substantivity if we understand them as disputes about which ontological commitments we should undertake. This substantivity is however minimal, because it need not be articulated either naturalistically or in terms of fundamentality. In closing, an illustration is provided of the fruitfulness of the minimal substantivity notion for cases of conceptual engineering.