The Evolutionary Dynamics of Negative Existentials in Indo-European

Where in earlier work diachronic change is used to explain away exceptions to typologies, linguistic typologists have started to make use of explicit diachronic models as explanations for typological distributions. A topic that lends itself for this approach especially well is that of negation. In this article, we assess the explanatory value of a specific hypothesis, the Negative Existential Cycle (NEC), on the distribution of negative existential strategies (“types”) in 106 Indo-European languages. We use Bayesian phylogenetic comparative methods to infer posterior distributions of transition rates and parameters, thus applying rational methods to construct and evaluate a set of different models under which the attested typological distribution could have evolved. We find that the frequency of diachronic processes that affect negative existentials outside of the NEC cannot be ignored—the unidirectional NEC alone cannot explain the evolution of negative existential strategies in our sample. We show that non-unidirectional evolutionary models, especially those that allow for different and multiple transitions between strategies, provide better fit. In addition, the phylogenetic modeling is impacted by the expected skewed distribution of negative existential strategies in our sample, pointing out the need for densely sampled and family-based typological research.

A contextualist treatment of negative existentials

In this paper, I want to vindicate the contextualist treatment that is typically applied by artefactualists on fictional entities (ficta) both to general and to singular negative existentials. According to this treatment, the truth value of a negative existential, whether general or singular, changes according to whether the existential quantifier or the first-order existence predicate is contextually used as respectively ranging over and applying to a restricted or an unrestricted domain of beings. In (2003), Walton has criticized this treatment with respect to singular negative existentials in particular. First of all, however, as (Predelli, Stefano. 2002. ‘Holmes’ and Holmes. A Millian analysis of names from fiction. Dialectica 56. 261–279) has shown, this treatment can be applied to singular predications in general, independently of the existential case. Moreover, not only does applying it to singular negative existentials explain why we may contextually use the quantifier restrictedly in general negative existentials, but also it accounts for why comparative negative existentials, both singular and general, may have different truth values as well depending on the comparison group they mobilize.

Something from Nothing

It strikes many as obvious that negative facts—such as that Justin Trudeau is not a woman—are not fundamental: negative facts must ultimately be explained in terms of positive facts (for instance, that Justin Trudeau is a man). Amijee focuses on a particular class of negative facts: contingent negative existentials (such as that there are no 10ft tall humans). If contingent negative existentials are not fundamental, then they must be explained. But the intuition that contingent negative existentials are explained is in tension with the widely held view that any universal generalization can be explained by its instances together with a totality fact. This is because a totality fact is itself a negative existential, and equivalent to a universal generalization. If the explanation for any contingent negative existential must appeal to another contingent negative existential, then not all contingent negative existentials can be non-fundamental.

Empty Names and Negative Existentials

Empty Names and Negative Existentials

Sometimes Some Things Don’t (Really) Exist: Pragmatic Meinongism and the Referential Sub-Problem of Negative Existentials

To solve the referential sub-problem of negative existentials one must explain why we interpret uses of, e.g., ‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ as saying something coherent and intuitively true, even though the speaker purports to refer to something. Pragmatic Meinongism solves this problem by allowing ‘does not exist’ to be pragmatically modulated to express an inclusive sense under which it can be satisfied by something. I establish three points in defense of pragmatic Meinongism: (i) it is superior to Russell-inspired solutions; (ii) it is supported by independent evidence of pragmatic modulation; and (iii) it requires no dubious ontological commitments.

Negative existence statements: Kripke, Strawson, and topic noun phrases

The paper focuses on the treatment of existential statements (including negative existentials), and critically engages Kripke's recent (2013) volume of John Locke lectures. It discusses Kripke's views, reaches some obvious conclusions about their theoretical adequacy, and contrasts Kripke's analysis with that of Atlas, comparing their adequacy as theories of the linguistic phenomena.

Negative Existentials

This chapter presents a critical discussion of the problem of negative existentials in the tradition of analytic philosophy of language. Firstly, it presents the problem as a compelling argument in support of the counterintuitive conclusion that sentences such as ‘Pegasus does not exist’ cannot be used to make true and informative assertions. Then, seven influential proposals for solving the problem are considered, each of which is construed as a response to this argument. The proposals considered are Russell’s (1905) theory of descriptions, Quine’s (1948) prescribed elimination of names, Donnellan’s (1974) ‘historical block’ view, Kripke’s (1973/2013) ‘no such proposition’ view, Salmon’s (1998) fictional entities view, Braun’s (1993) gappy proposition view, and Katz’s (1990) pure metalinguistic descriptivism. Though the official stance with regard to these proposals is neutral, the chapter concludes with a brief reactive summary that endorses a general pragmatic approach to the problem.

Against Kripke’s solution to the problem of negative existentials

In this paper, I try to show that Kripke’s proposed solution to the problem of negative existentials fails. I try to show that Kripke’s proposal fails because it entails that anybody who has (or had) good reasons to believe that there are no propositions has (or had) also good reasons to believe that he or she does not exist. However, there were philosophers (most notably Quine) who had good reasons to believe that there are no propositions even though they didn’t have good reasons to believe that they do not exist. I conclude that Kripke’s proposed solution to the problem of negative existentials fails.

Negative existentials

Negative existentials containing empty NPs are understood colloquially as representing how things stand in the world. Moreover, utterances of such sentences seem to express propositions or thoughts that are informative and true. Standard static semantic theories cannot provide a straightforward account of these intuitive phenomena. In such frameworks, sentences with empty NPs are considered as being unable to express truth-evaluable contents. This paper investigates two alternative theories of negative existentials. A common feature of these theories is that they adopt a dynamic approach to meaning. I will argue that neither of these alternatives provides a reassuring solution to the apparent truth-conditional problem generated by the utterances of negative existentials.