“The Middle” as a Methodological Tool for Studying Social Reality

The article considers the possibility of interpreting the meaning of the “middle” as a methodological tool for studying social reality. Various types of “middle” are analyzed. “The Middle” J. P. Sartre/V. S. Bibler has liberal Cartesian roots. Through the principle of “I am responsible for my being-for- Other, but I am not its foundation,” it is aimed at the mastery and control of the Other by the Self. This type of “middle” allows the unity of the Self with the Other while maintaining the independence of the subjects from each other. This unity of subjects involves the regulation of relations between them through a change in the subject of dialogue (the interpolar “middle”) and the transition from dialogue as a one-time act to a process of multi-level dialogue. Examples of the Westphalian peace treaty between Catholics and Protestants (1649) and the Brest- Lithuanian peace treaty between Russia and Germany (1918) are given as examples of a successful change in the subject of dialogue. “Middle” M. M. Bakhtin/B. A. Lectorsky has social-democratic/ Christian-democratic roots. Through the principle of “I am for the Other from the point of view of the Other/Other for me from my point of view”, she aims to form a common foundation of the brotherly culture of I and the Other. This type builds the unity of the Self with the Other as a result of the inner need of both to serve each other. “For each other” and “from each other” can be reduced to identity in the idea of the “middle” of R. S. Grinberg on the basis of public-private partnerships. In this “middle” version, independence (the “from” tool) and ministry (the “for” tool) generate the “for / from” tool as a “middle” methodology. It is also proposed to consider the logic of the evolution of culture through the transition from the idea of a one-shot dialogue to the idea of multi-level dialogue: “thesis-antithesis chaos (the middle is struggling within itself between internal opposites) — thesis- antithesis…”.

Baryalay

This chapter follows Baryalay, a college-educated man in his early thirties who hails from, and still lives in, a volatile rural village in Nangarhar province, marred by the conflict between the insurgent Taliban, the Islamic State, and the Afghan government. The chapter introduces the concept of self-representation, as the locus where different, even conflicting, self-images and subjective states find coherence and eventually lead to the “illusion” of the unity of the self. Baryalay in fact has to struggle between his concurrent identifications as a pacha (a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad), and as a Pashtun, which hold at times contrasting social requirements in terms of appropriate masculinity. Additionally, via the analysis of the personal experiences that Baryalay had in a geographical area of intense violent conflict and intimate danger, the chapter also elaborates on the way in which forty years of continuous war have considerably changed the understanding and performance of masculinity among Pashtun men.

The Way into Transcendental Philosophy from the Argument in Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination

This paper presents a phenomenological analysis of the argument in The First Discourse of Part 2 of Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination. Specifically, this argument is considered with regard to temporal extension of its logos, i.e., the succession of logical steps. Contrary to traditional views of Suhrawardī as a Neoplatonizing proponent of the primacy of essence over existence, the steps of his argument convey a much more nuanced picture in which ligh t emerges as the main metaphysical principle. First, Suhra wardī explicates full evidentiality in visible light (which is the most patent, ’aẓhar, from the Arabic root ẓ-h-r = ‘to appear, be [made] manifest’): this light gives us the world as “this-there”; and second, as self-evidentiality (ẓuhūru-hu, ‘being obvious to itself by itself’) in the first-person consciousness of the knower. Suhrawardī accesses these modes by reduction(s) which liberate the transcendental character of light. The correlation in the evidential mode of light between the knower and the objects serves as a ground for the claims of transcendental unity of the self and the world, and as a condition of possibility for knowledge. A juxtaposition of this approach with phenomenological philosophy suggests that in Suhrawardī’s analysis, the evidentiality of visual light plays a role of a new universal a priori. I show that under the phenomenological reduction, this a priori participates in constitution of ontological validities; and within the transcendental empiricism of the physics of light, this a priori underlies the construction of causality. Thereby, the Philosophy of Illumination suggests a new horizon of entry into transcendental phenomenological philosophy. The paper also contains a justification of a phenomenological reading of Suhrawardī’s work, including explanation of the historical reduction.

Nietzsche on the Soul as a Political Structure

A critic of metaphysically robust accounts of the human self, Nietzsche means not to do away with the self entirely, but to reimagine it. He pursues an account according to which the unity of the self is born out of a coherent organization of drives and yet is not something other than that organization. Readers of Nietzsche have pointed to a so-called “lack of fit” between this theoretical account of the self, according to which the self is nothing apart from the organization of drives, and Nietzsche’s practical account of human agency, which often seems to require that the self be something more than mere drives. I suggest Nietzsche’s interest in Greek agonistic norms of contest sheds light on this apparent incongruity. Agonistic relationships, insofar as they cultivate contest among diverse forces, are for Nietzsche one appropriate model for the subjectivity of beings whose psychology is similarly characterized by contest among diverse forces—that is, beings like us.Nietzsche est un critique des théories métaphysiques de l’ego. Cependant, il a l'intention de ne pas entièrement éliminer l’ego, mais de le réinventer. Selon Nietzsche, l’ego est le produit d'une organisation cohérente des pulsions et pourtant il n'est pas autre chose que cette organisation. Certains ont souligné une contradiction entre ce récit de soi et le récit de l'action humaine de Nietzsche, qui semble souvent exiger que le soi soit autre chose que de simples pulsions. Je suggère que l'intérêt de Nietzsche pour le concours grec soit important pour cette discussion. Selon Nietzsche, la contestation, parce qu'elle organise diverses forces, est un modèle approprié pour la subjectivité des personnes, dont la psychologie est caractérisée de la même manière par la lutte entre diverses forces.

Bradley’s Account of the Self as Appearance: Between Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Hegel’s Speculative Idealism

The constitutive activity of the self and the ground of the unity of the self are two important aspects of understanding the self. This paper attempts to delineatethese considerations, tracing their use, function and implications in Bradley’s thesis on the self. The article argues that for Bradley, the focalization is on the understanding of the self and the relation of thought to reality. Furthermore, the article attempts to locate Bradley’s account of the self as appearance as a middle course between Kant’s transcendental idealism to Hegel’s speculative idealism to demonstrate the overlaps, ruptures, and evolution of the philosophical journey of the concept of the self, its nature, and its expressions.

Unities of the Self: From Kant to Locke

This paper re-evaluates the relation between Kant and some of the most important philosophers traditionally labelled ‘empiricists’ on the topic of the unity of the self. Although Kant was familiar with at least some of the writings of the philosophers dealt with here, this paper’s concern is not with the question of influence or development, but with systematic aspects of Kant’s relation to the empiricist tradition. It is argued that Kant’s relationship to empiricist thought on this issue is more complex than one might be tempted to think. There are several different notions of unity within the empiricist tradition. Moreover, the philosophers considered here, thinkers as diverse as Locke, Condillac, Hume, Feder, Priestley, Reid and Tetens, work with more than one notion of the unity of the self, as does Kant. Locke’s contribution at the beginning of early modern thought about unity turns out to be closer to Kant’s account than that of other empiricists in that Kant develops further the Lockean idea of consciousness as a unifying activity. In general terms Kant’s account can be seen as continuous with the debate about unity among empiricist thinkers, it does not constitute a simple break with that tradition.