Salary Arbitration and Pre-Arbitration Negotiation in Major League Baseball

Two assumptions in this analysis of baseball salary arbitration are that (1) players and clubs, to serve their interests in pre-arbitration negotiation, submit final offers to maximize and minimize, respectively, the expected value of the arbitrator's decision, and (2) arbitrators whose decisions are predictably biased are not appointed to settle player disputes, because such arbitrators are vetoed by one or the other side. These assumptions allow the authors to estimate the effects of several variables on arbitrators' decisions in 1984–91 cases. They find statistically significant effects for four variables that the industry's collective bargaining agreement identifies as matters arbitrators should consider—the player's performance during the previous season, the length and consistency of the player's career performance, previous compensation, and the club's recent performance—and for one variable not mentioned in that agreement—player position.

Major League Baseball Salaries: The impacts of Arbitration and Free Agency

Earnings equations are estimated for major league baseball hitters and pitchers using salary data for the 1989 season. The results indicate that final-offer salary arbitration and long-term contracts have a large positive impact on salaries. The impact of free-agency eligibility is also positive, but smaller man arbitration eligibility. This implies that some players have used the arbitration process to extract above-market salaries. Therefore it is concluded that it would be in the interest of the owners to replace arbitration with earlier eligibility for free agency.