Knowledge Norms for Constative Speech Acts

This chapter is up to an ambitious task: it develops the first integrated account of the epistemic normativity of constatives. In order to do that, it argues for a generalized knowledge-based account of the epistemic normativity of constative speech, and it develops the corresponding accounts for, respectively, assertives, predictives, retrodictives, descriptives, ascriptives, informatives, confirmatives, concessives, retractives, assentives, dissentives, disputatives, responsives, suggestives, and suppositives. The chapter argues for a knowledge account from three different angles: (1) the nature of communicative speech acts, (2) the relation between assertion and other constatives, and (3) the normativity of belief together with constatives’ epistemic function.

Norms and Novelty: Reflections on Legal Knowledge, Norms and Evolutionary Systems

The paper has three sub-topics: legal knowledge, legal norms, and evolutionary systems. The three are interconnected. A reflection on the nature of legal knowledge throws light on the nature of legal norms. Legal knowledge is largely a posteriori and it is so because norms are largely contingent. Being a realm of continual change, law has novelty as a fundamental feature. The process of legal change is not driven by chance but by the attempt to face ever new problems and changing circumstances. This supports a view of legal systems as adaptive and evolutionary, as classical pragmatism suggested. However, inference can give some a priori legal knowledge.

KEARIFAN LOKAL MASYARAKAT DUSUN TEKALONG DESA SETIA JAYA DALAM MENJAGA KEBERADAAN TEMBAWANG DI KECAMATAN TERIAK KABUPATEN BENGKAYANG

Tembawang is a form of land management carried out by the Dayak people in West Kalimantan. The exixtence of Tembawang in Tekalong Hamlet is still well preserved, it is suspected that the community is carrying out local wisdom in its management. This study aims to describe the forms of local wisdom that consist of knowledge, norms, regulations, and skills in Tekalong Village, Setia Jaya Village in tembawang management. The study was conducted using a survey method that is descriptive with interview techniques and questionnaire aids in the form of a list of questions submitted to a number of people (respondents). Respondents in this study were 30 people. There are 4 tembawang in Tekalong Hamlet, namely Tembawang Tekalong, Tembawang Sunge Tangket, Tembawang Bangkaris, and Tembawang Madas. The results of this study indicate that there are (5) forms of local wisdom that support the management of tembawang in Tekalong Hamlet, namely : (1). Knowledge, apply customary law to every violatoin both intentionally or unintentionally, the community also believes in several myths to be used as role models in managing Tembawang. (2). Norm, there are certain days the people cut Tembawang location. (3). Regulations, no trees can be cut down in Tembawang, and may not carry out activities that can damage the ecosystem that is in Tembawang. (4). Skills, the community utilizes the Tembawang land by planting fruit-producing trees, and (5). Trust, the presence of a ghost (Kuntilanak) who was killed, the myth of the worm king who became a watchman on Tembawang, may not build a house/sacred landKeywords : Local Wisdom, Indigenous people, Tembawang

Transformative Experience and the Knowledge Norms for Action

In this chapter, Richard Pettigrew continues his defense of the Fine-Graining Response to L. A. Paul’s critique of decision theory, arguing that it meets a new challenge from Sarah Moss’s probabilistic knowledge framework. The strategy of the Fine-Graining Response is to treat uncertainty about one’s post-transformation preferences just like decision theory standardly treats uncertainty about the world. After reviewing the dialectic between himself and Paul, Pettigrew examines Moss’s argument that the potential for transformation blocks the kind of probabilistic knowledge she claims is necessary for rational decision. He distinguishes ways in which Moss’s argument both comports with and diverges from Paul’s. Finally, he defends the possibility of forming the kinds of justified credences needed for the Fine-Graining Response, and that this is sufficient for rational choices regarding transformation.

Do We Know Enough to Make Decisions This Way?

This chapter considers two related arguments that, if successful, tell against the Aggregate Utility Solution to the problem of choosing for changing selves. The first is due to L. A. Paul (2014), ‘Voluntary Benefits from Wrongdoing’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31(4); the second is due to Sarah Moss (2018), Probabilistic Knowledge. Both claim that we cannot know enough to make decisions in the way proposed by the Aggregate Utility Solution. Paul appeals to considerations of authenticity; Moss appeals to knowledge norms for decision-making. The chapter responds to those arguments.