Chatbot breakthrough in the 2020s? An ethical reflection on the trend of automated consultations in health care

Many experts have emphasised that chatbots are not sufficiently mature to be able to technically diagnose patient conditions or replace the judgements of health professionals. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, has significantly increased the utilisation of health-oriented chatbots, for instance, as a conversational interface to answer questions, recommend care options, check symptoms and complete tasks such as booking appointments. In this paper, we take a proactive approach and consider how the emergence of task-oriented chatbots as partially automated consulting systems can influence clinical practices and expert–client relationships. We suggest the need for new approaches in professional ethics as the large-scale deployment of artificial intelligence may revolutionise professional decision-making and client–expert interaction in healthcare organisations. We argue that the implementation of chatbots amplifies the project of rationality and automation in clinical practice and alters traditional decision-making practices based on epistemic probability and prudence. This article contributes to the discussion on the ethical challenges posed by chatbots from the perspective of healthcare professional ethics.

Good reasons for losers: lottery justification and social risk

Many goods are distributed by processes that involve randomness. In lotteries, randomness is used to promote fairness. When taking social risks, randomness is a feature of the process. The losers of such decisions ought to be given a reason why they should accept the outcome. Surprisingly, good reasons demand more than merely equal ex ante chances. What is also required is a true statement of the form: ‘the result could easily have gone the other way and you could have been the winner’. This rules in standard lotteries but rules out many lotteries based on merely epistemic probability.

Sense Structure of Modal Units “Probabilmente” (“Probabile”, “Probabilità”) (in the Italian Language)

The article focuses on appropriateness’s of quantifying of information in microtext of functioning of modal units “probabilmente” (“probabile”, “probabilità”) in the Italian language. Modal units probabilmente” (“probabile”, “probabilità”) determine quantifying of information in microtext beeing nucleus and forming modal structures together with joined components. The modal structure is formed by joined components in according to the regularity rules in the pre-nuclear zone (components combined with modal units probabilmente” (“probabile”, “probabilità”) and the near-peripheral zone (components used in the modal sentence with these modal units or in adjacent sentences). The modal units “probabilmente” (“probabile”, “probabilità”) beeing prototypes of the modal meaning of epistemic probability serves as marker of modal evaluation of probability by epistemic vector based on precedent or background knowledge. The sense structure of “probabilmente” (“probabile”, “probabilità”) spread in microtext reflects measuring approach to reality made by subject of modal evaluation. In their pre-nuclear zone are used quantors, approximators, existential predicate, verbs of action semantics “avvenire”, “accadere”, “succedere”, causative connectors. The near periphery zone is characterized by sense relations of associativeness and causality between parts of modal annunciation. In their near periphery zone are used causative connectors of consequence “perché”, “poiché” and mental predicates of point of view “credere”, “supporre”. Verbs of action semantics “avvenire”, “accadere”, “succedere”, “provare”, “argumentare” are combined with verbs of processual mental activity “spiegare”, “capire”. Such parameters of microtext as spread of perceptive, emotive, volitive, evaluative vectors are not determined because there is no explicit contradiction between situational information and precedent or background knowledge of the subject of modal evaluation. The modal units “poco probabile” (“poco probabilmente”, “poca probabilità”) are markers of diminishing of grade of probability by epistemic, volitive and evaluative vector; microtext usually verbalizes partial contradiction between subjective idea and real situation. The using of quantor “poco” in their pre-nuclear zone that determines low grade of epistemic probability make these modal units to be modal structures and causes parameters of microtext to be more determined in comparison with prototypical modal units. In such case volitive and evaluative vectors of microtext are often verbalized and contain binary causal antonymic structures. In the near periphery zone are used lexical units meaning incapacity, fallacy of proofs, unsuccess, uncontrollability, negative evaluation. The modal units “molto probabile” (“molto probabilmente”, “moltа probabilità”) are markers of increasing of grade of probability by epistemic, volitive and evaluative vector; microtext usually verbalizes concordance between subjective idea and real situation. The using of quantor “molto” in their pre-nuclear zone that determines high grade of epistemic probability make these modal units to be modal structures. In such case volitive and evaluative vectors of microtext are often verbalized and contain binary causal complemental structures including information about proofs of modal evaluation of the point of view of probability. In their near periphery zone are used verbs of choose (“scegliere”, “optare”, “preferire”) often in Conditional Mood, lexical units meaning effectiveness and positive evaluation. The volitive vector of microtext beeing verbalized contains information about capability, effectiveness, advisability. The evaluative vector of microtext beeing verbalized contains lexical units of positive evaluation and Conditional Mood. The annunciations with modal units containing high degree of probability express epistemic state of the subject of modal evaluation that approaches to knowledge. The hypothesis introduced in such annunciation has tendency to be proved and is based not on a precedent or background knowledge but on a system of values.

The New Agnosticism

What is agnosticism? Is it compatible with a genuinely religious life? Here is a conventional answer to these questions: ‘Agnosticism is the view that we do not, and perhaps cannot, know whether God exists. Provided we think the epistemic probability of God’s existence is not negligible, engagement in religious discourse and practice is entirely rational’. Agnosticism so defined is quite different from fictionalism, which takes religious discourse to be fictional discourse, and religious practice a game of make-believe. Fictionalism, it seems, would have to offer a completely different justification for a religious life. This paper explores a hybrid between these positions, a hybrid that might be called ‘religious semantic agnosticism’, but which is perhaps more memorably called ‘New Agnosticism’. It is suggested that this hybrid position combines the advantages of both traditional agnosticism and fictionalism, but does not inherit their disadvantages.

Luck, Knowledge, and Epistemic Probability

Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject’s evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account (KA). He has recently argued that his view is preferable to my Epistemic Analysis of Luck (EAL), which defines luck in terms of evidential probability. In this paper, I defend EAL against Steglich-Petersen’s arguments, clarify the view, and argue for the explanatory significance of EAL with respect to some core epistemological issues. My overall goal is to show that an epistemic probability account of luck rooted in the concepts of evidence and evidential support remains a viable and fruitful overall account of luck.

Justificação, Probabilidade e Independência

Epistemic justification has been widely accepted as both a gradational and relational notion. Given those properties, a natural thought is to take degrees of epistemic justification to be probabilities. In this paper, we present a simple Bayesian framework for justification. In the first part, after putting the model in an evidentialist form, we distinguish different senses of “being evidence for” and “confirming”. Next, we argue that this conception should accommodate the two relevant kinds of qualitative confirmation or evidential support. In the second part of the paper, we discuss the claim that this view is unable to satisfy the modified version of the conjunction closure for beliefs in probabilistically independent propositions. We defend that the underlying assumption on which this objection depends leads to an improper reading of the concept of epistemic probability. After providing a better interpretation of it, we put forward a rationale, which is based on the notion of conditional uncertainty, in support of a more plausible and restricted version of the closure of justification under conjunction.

The Probabilistic Logic of Eusebius Amort (1692-1775)

While classical sources including Aristotle, Cicero and Boëthius addressed different notions of probability, medieval contributions to probability (other than epistemic probability) seem rather scarce. The situation changes during the Second Scholasticism with the post-Tridentine debates on “probable opinion” in moral theology and the introduction of “moral necessity” and “moral implication” (tied to the ideas of frequency, stochastic processes, and propensity) in the debates on compatibilism and theological optimism. The eighteenth-century transformation of scholastic philosophy was marked, among other characteristics, by a gravitation towards the early modern scientific revolution. In his Philosophia Pollingana ad normam Burgundicae, the renowned moral theologian Eusebius Amort (1692-1775) addressed the basic issues of probabilistic logic from the philosophical, logical, and mathematical points of view in an attempt to synthesise earlier scholastic conceptual analyses of probability and probabilistic epistemic logic with the cutting-edge mathematical calculus introduced by Jacob Bernoulli.