Separation of powers with ideological parties

Separation of powers with checks and balances (SP) is usually regarded as a key institution complementing elections in the control of elected officials. However, some analysts and many politicians also warn that excessive checks on the executive in the presence of polarization may lead to political inaction. We analyze the interaction between elections and SP, and study under what circumstances they complement each other. We first introduce a political agency model with ideological parties where citizens and politicians care about rents (a valence issue) and policy (a positional issue). Then, we analyze the impact of SP on the effectiveness of elections to discipline and select politicians. We demonstrate that SP unambiguously raises a majority of voters’ welfare in highly polarized non-competitive political environments, because it strengthens both discipline and selection without causing political gridlock. SP also raises voters’ welfare if elections are very effective at disciplining first period incumbents. Nevertheless, SP may reduce voters’ welfare if most rents go undetected and reform is not a first-order issue.

Instytucjonalne uwarunkowania rywalizacji o władzę w postradzieckich systemach autorytarnych

Institutional Conditions of the Political Rivalry in the Post-Soviet Authoritarian RegimesMore than 25 years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite that, political scientists until now have used the category of ‘post-Soviet countries’, meaning that the Soviet past still determines the direction of the evolution of the political systems of the republics that won their independence in 1991 and that they still share some common features of the political design and have failed to successfully complete the transformation to democracy. The main goal of the following paper is to present institutional conditions that make post-Soviet authoritarian regimes relatively stable and limit the alternation of power. Main conclusions of the paper are the following: firstly, the power in post-Soviet authoritarian countries is held by their presidents who create informal groups of relevant politicians and businessmen that can be treated as neo-patrimonial clients. Secondly, presidential or parliamentary elections are regularly held but are just a facade that is meant to hide and legitimize authoritarian practices of these regimes. Thirdly, in such countries significant role the political life is played by the so-called ‘parties of power’ – non-ideological parties whose only goal is to support the president.

Regional political parties in the context of the study of the process of nationalization (based on the results of the local elections in 2015)

The article is devoted to the study of the characteristics and typology of regional political parties in Ukraine, the assessment of the connection of the nationalization of the party system of Ukraine, the deviance (non-typology) of electoral behavior of the regions with the development of regional parties in the state by the results of local elections in 2015.In the course of the study, the main scientific approaches to the characterization and typology of regional parties in Ukraine were considered. It has been established that scholars identify the following categories of regional political parties, namely: ideological parties, political parties-projects of prominent personalities, ethnic parties, administrative parties (pro-government political parties). It is proposed to expand existing typology by introducing such categories of regional parties as projects of local elites, regional parties oriented on pro-Russian politics in Ukraine, technical political parties, which are beginning active activities before the elections, helping to ensure passing to local bodies of self-government to certain persons. It was found that regional political parties, based on the results of the local elections in Ukraine in 2015, were two pro-Russian political forces, four parties that focused on supporting the interests of local elites and one ethnic party. It is noted that the support of regional political parties is low. This is confirmed by the results of the electoral vote at the national level. It was noted that against the backdrop of a high level of nationalization of the party system for the period of 2014–2015, calculated on three approaches (the nationalization index was calculated according to the approach of M. Johns and S. Meinwering, G. Holosov and author’s modified approach), these parties did not have significant influence on the electoral picture of the country. It is also determined that since the third author’s modified approach allows to take into account the results of elections to local self-government bodies, it is relevant for the study of regional parties. Therefore, its use is most optimal for similar analytical purposes.Among the factors that had the greatest influence on party nationalization over the period of 2014–2015 were the electoral system, the transformational factors in the socio-political space, the change in the form of government, decentralization (de-volition) associated with the reform of local self-government and the territorial organization of power in Ukraine Accordingly, it has been proved that the latter of these factors has become an important prerequisite for the emergence of new regional political parties at the local elections of 2015.

When Things Get Personal: How Informal and Personalized Politics Produce Regime Stability in Small States

The personalization of politics, the decline of political parties and the weakening of political institutions in large democracies are considered to produce instability and to undermine democratic governance. Yet despite having extremely informal and personalized systems with non-ideological parties, small states around the world maintain significantly higher levels of democracy and regime stability than large ones. This article addresses this paradox by offering a systematic literature review of 167 case study publications on personalization and informal politics in 46 small states. The analysis reveals that personalized relations between political elites translate into either fragmentation or power concentration, while pervasive patron–client linkages structure the interaction between citizens and politicians. Despite the obvious downsides of these dynamics for democratic governance, the small state system is functional in the sense that it fulfils the needs of both citizens and politicians, which explains why small states have succeeded in maintaining their political stability.

Centre-left will struggle to win more votes in Balkans

Subject The state of social-democratic parties in the Western Balkans. Significance The centre-left space in the Western Balkans is a diverse combination of social-democratic parties -- either in government, serious contenders in upcoming snap elections or weak and fragmented in opposition. Notwithstanding the national specificities of post-communist transition and post-conflict politics, social democracy is as ideologically confused and politically vulnerable in the region as in the EU. Impacts Parliamentary politics faces crises almost everywhere in the Western Balkans, 25 years after the collapse of communism. Parties will compete to control state resources, in conditions of polarised, often corrupt, parliamentary politics and hybrid ideologies. Ethnically dominated politics will not allow much space for ideological parties.

Economic liberalization and political moderation

Although economic liberalization has been argued to promote political liberalization, this relationship is poorly understood and we do not consistently observe greater economic openness leading to more open and moderate political systems. We examine the connection between liberalization and moderation in the context of Islamist and Communist parties, both of which are characterized by ideologies opposed to democracy and the market. When will these ideological parties moderate by adopting more pragmatic agendas? We argue that competitive liberalization spurs the emergence of more moderate parties, but crony liberalization does not. In support of this, we use two sets of most different case comparisons in which we compare two instances of competitive liberalization (Turkey and Hungary) and two instances of crony liberalization (Egypt and Bulgaria). Our research offers an important clarification to existing explanations and a more generalizable theory of how and why liberalization is linked to political moderation.