Equity-efficiency implications of a European tax and transfer system

This study simulates three income tax scenarios in a Mirrleesian setting for 24 EU countries using data from the 2014 Structure of Earnings Survey. In scenario 1, each country individually maximizes its own welfare (benchmark). In scenarios 2 and 3, total welfare in the EU is maximized over a common budget constraint. Unlike scenario 2, the social planner of scenario 3 differentiates taxes by country of residence. If a common tax and transfer system were implemented in the EU, countries with a relatively higher mean wage rate—particularly those in Western and some of the Northern European countries—would transfer resources to the others. Scenario 2 implies increased labor distortions for almost all countries and, hence, leads to a contraction in total output. Scenario 3 produces higher (lower) marginal taxes for high- (low-) mean countries compared to the benchmark. The change in total output depends on the income effects on labor supply. Overall, total welfare is higher for the scenarios involving a European tax and transfer system despite more than two thirds of all the agents becoming worse off relative to the benchmark. A politically more feasible integrated tax system improves the well-being of almost half of all the EU but considerably reduces the aggregate welfare benefits.

How Should Tax Progressivity Respond to Rising Income Inequality?

We address the question in the title in a heterogeneous-agent incomplete-market model featuring exogenous idiosyncratic risk, endogenous skill investment, and flexible labor supply. The tax and transfer schedule is restricted to being log-linear in income, a good description of the US system. Rising inequality is modeled as a combination of skill-biased technical change and growth in residual wage dispersion. When facing shifts in the income distribution like those observed in the United States, a utilitarian planner chooses higher progressivity in response to larger residual inequality but lower progressivity in response to widening skill price dispersion reflecting technical change. Overall, optimal progressivity is approximately unchanged between 1980 and 2016. We document that the progressivity of the actual US tax and transfer system has similarly changed little since 1980, in line with the model prescription.

Mobility and the lifetime distributional impact of tax and transfer reforms

This paper examines the lifetime distributional impact of changes to the tax and transfer system. We find that—in contrast to standard snapshot analyses—increases to work-contingent benefits are just as effective at redistributing resources to the lifetime poor as increases to out-of-work benefits. This has important implications for the equity-efficiency trade-off typically thought to apply to work-contingent transfers. We also show that increases to higher rates of income tax are an effective way of targeting the lifetime rich because higher earners tend to exhibit greater persistence in their incomes. Our results illustrate the importance that moving beyond an exclusively snapshot perspective can have when analysing tax and transfer reforms.

Why Did Income Inequality in Germany Not Increase Further After 2005?

While income inequality in Germany considerably increased in the years before 2005, this trend stopped after 2005. We address the question of what factors were responsible for the break in the inequality trend after 2005. Our analysis suggests that income inequality in Germany did not continue to rise after 2005 for the following reasons. First, we observe that the general rise in wage inequality that explained a lot of the inequality increase before 2005, became less steep (but did not stop) after 2005. Second, despite further increases in wage inequality after 2005, inequality in annual labour incomes did not increase further after 2005 because increased within-year employment opportunities compensated otherwise rising inequality in annual labour incomes. Third, income inequality did not fall in a more marked way after 2005 because also the middle and the upper part of the distribution benefited from the employment boom after 2006. Finally, we provide evidence that the effect of a wide range of other factors that are often suspected to have influenced the distribution such as capital incomes, household structures, population ageing, changes in the tax and transfer system and the financial crisis of 2008 did not significantly alter the distribution after 2005.