scholarly journals Updating the Surgical Preference List

Cureus ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James S Huntley ◽  
Jason J Howard ◽  
Jason Simpson ◽  
David L Sigalet
Keyword(s):  
Preference List

The allocation of positions with double preference list model

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Ramos Mendez ◽  
Jose Antonio Carrillo Ruiz
Keyword(s):  
Preference List ◽  
List Model

A visual nutrition preference list for preschool (NPL_4–6)

Appetite ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 89 ◽  
pp. 308 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Sommer ◽  
M. Meindl ◽  
J. Blechert ◽  
T. Freudenthaler ◽  
J. Hattinger ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Preference List

The Michigan vocational preference list.

1938 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 558-575 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward B. Greene ◽  
Virginia Dahlem
Keyword(s):  
Preference List ◽  
Vocational Preference

scholarly journals Manipulating Gale-Shapley Algorithm: Preserving Stability and Remaining Inconspicuous

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rohit Vaish ◽  
Dinesh Garg
Keyword(s):  
Stability Result ◽  
Single Woman ◽  
Preference List ◽  
True Preference ◽  
The Stability ◽  
True Preferences

We study the problem of manipulation of the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm by a single woman via permutation of her true preference list. Our contribution is threefold: First, we show that the matching induced by an optimal manipulation is stable with respect to the true preferences. Second, we identify a class of optimal manipulations called inconspicuous manipulations which, in addition to preserving stability, are also nearly identical to the true preference list of the manipulator (making the manipulation hard to be detected). Third, for optimal inconspicuous manipulations, we strengthen the stability result by showing that the entire stable lattice of the manipulated instance is contained inside the original lattice.​

scholarly journals Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 1860-1874 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Calsamiglia ◽  
Guillaume Haeringer ◽  
Flip Klijn
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
School Choice ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Preference List ◽  
The Stability

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy (JEL D82, I21)

scholarly journals Strongly Stable and Maximum Weakly Stable Noncrossing Matchings

Algorithmica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koki Hamada ◽  
Shuichi Miyazaki ◽  
Kazuya Okamoto
Keyword(s):  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Time Algorithm ◽  
The Other ◽  
Np Completeness ◽  
Preference List ◽  
Parallel Lines ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Np Complete ◽  
Weakly Stable ◽  
Stability Notions

AbstractIn IWOCA 2019, Ruangwises and Itoh introduced stable noncrossing matchings, where participants of each side are aligned on each of two parallel lines, and no two matching edges are allowed to cross each other. They defined two stability notions, strongly stable noncrossing matching (SSNM) and weakly stable noncrossing matching (WSNM), depending on the strength of blocking pairs. They proved that a WSNM always exists and presented an $$O(n^{2})$$ O ( n 2 ) -time algorithm to find one for an instance with n men and n women. They also posed open questions of the complexities of determining existence of an SSNM and finding a largest WSNM. In this paper, we show that both problems are solvable in polynomial time. Our algorithms are applicable to extensions where preference lists may include ties, except for one case which we show to be NP-complete. This NP-completeness holds even if each person's preference list is of length at most two and ties appear in only men's preference lists. To complement this intractability, we show that the problem is solvable in polynomial time if the length of preference lists of one side is bounded by one (but that of the other side is unbounded).

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