Lethal Infection of Wild Raptors with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N8 and H5N2 Viruses in the USA, 2014–15

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie I. Shearn-Bochsler ◽  
Susan Knowles ◽  
Hon Ip
Keyword(s):  
Avian Influenza ◽  
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza ◽  
Highly Pathogenic ◽  
Pathogenic Avian Influenza ◽  
Lethal Infection ◽  
The Usa

scholarly journals Estimating Risk to Humans Exposed to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreaks in the United States, 2014–2017

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (suppl_1) ◽  
pp. S24-S24
Author(s):  
Sonja Olsen ◽  
Fiona Havers ◽  
Melissa Rolfes ◽  
Lenee Blanton ◽  
Jane Rooney ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Avian Influenza ◽  
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza ◽  
The United States ◽  
Influenza Viruses ◽  
State Health ◽  
Active Monitoring ◽  
Highly Pathogenic ◽  
Post Exposure ◽  
Pathogenic Avian Influenza ◽  
The Usa

Abstract Background In the USA, poultry outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (AI) caused by H5 and H7 viruses have raised concern about the risk of infections in humans. Based on data from Asian lineage H5 and H7 AI, which sporadically transmit from poultry to humans, CDC currently recommends active daily monitoring of persons exposed to H5 and H7 AI viruses, including those who wear personal protective equipment (PPE). Methods Persons exposed to HPAI-infected birds or contaminated environments in the USA were actively monitored during exposure and for 10 days post-exposure for illness, during 2014–2017. Some exposed persons were monitored on-site by USDA or contract safety officers, company staff, or state health officials. State health department staff monitored people during the 10-day post-exposure period. Persons reporting any respiratory illness or conjunctivitis were swabbed for molecular influenza testing. Preliminary results are presented. Results From 2014 to 2017, 270 detections in poultry/wild birds were reported and at least 606 persons were potentially exposed to AI virus by exposure to birds, carcasses, or environment. Most exposed persons wore PPE. No human infections with AI viruses were detected. Conclusion The risk of transmission of these H5 and H7 AI viruses to humans was low. These preliminary data offer evidence to change the recommendations for monitoring in persons exposed to these viruses. If final data support these findings, self-monitoring by workers with reporting to health departments if symptoms develop, rather than active monitoring by public health personnel, could be considered. However, it will be important to reconsider and update recommendations as the viruses evolve. Furthermore, risk of infection likely varies by exposure and those without PPE should be actively monitored. Disclosures All authors: No reported disclosures.

scholarly journals Surveillance for highly pathogenic avian influenza in wild birds in the USA

2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 426-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. DELIBERTO ◽  
Seth R. SWAFFORD ◽  
Dale L. NOLTE ◽  
Kerri PEDERSEN ◽  
Mark W. LUTMAN ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Avian Influenza ◽  
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza ◽  
Wild Birds ◽  
Highly Pathogenic ◽  
Pathogenic Avian Influenza ◽  
The Usa

scholarly journals Co-circulation of both low and highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 viruses in current poultry epidemics in Taiwan

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yao-Tsun Li ◽  
Chen-Chih Chen ◽  
Ai-Mei Chang ◽  
Day-Yu Chao ◽  
Gavin J D Smith
Keyword(s):  
Avian Influenza ◽  
Direct Evidence ◽  
Migratory Birds ◽  
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza ◽  
Virus Transmission ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Dispersal Patterns ◽  
Highly Pathogenic ◽  
Pathogenic Avian Influenza ◽  
The Usa

Abstract Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses belonging to clade 2.3.4.4c of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96-like (Gs/GD) lineage caused severe global outbreaks in domestic birds from 2014 to 2015, that also represented the first incursions of Gs/GD viruses into Taiwan and the USA. However, few studies have investigated the circulation of clade 2.3.4.4c viruses after 2015. Here, we describe Gs/GD clade 2.3.4.4c and Mexican-like H5N2 viruses that were isolated in Taiwan during active surveillance conducted in chicken farms from February to March 2019. Phylogenetic analysis demonstrated two distinct genome constellations of the clade 2.3.4.4c H5 viruses, with the internal genes of one of the new genotypes closely related to a virus isolated from a pintail (Anas acuta) in Taiwan, providing the first direct evidence that migratory birds play a role in importing viruses into Taiwan. Our study also confirmed the co-circulation of Gs/GD clade 2.3.4.4c and Mexican-like H5 lineage viruses in Taiwan, presenting a rare case where Gs/GD viruses developed sustained transmission alongside another enzootic H5 lineage, raising the possibility that homosubtypic immunity may mask virus transmission, potentially frustrating detection, and the implementation of appropriate control measures. To eradicate H5 viruses from poultry in Taiwan, further studies on the effect of co-circulation in poultry of low pathogenic avian influenza and HPAI viruses are needed. Furthermore, only with continued surveillance efforts globally can we fully discern dispersal patterns and risk factors of virus transmission both to and within Taiwan.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document