scholarly journals Sobre la filosofia de l’humanista valencià Joan Serra al "De contemplatione amicicie". Notes a una traducció catalana

Author(s):  
Salvador Cuenca Almenar

Resum: Presentem la traducció catalana del De contemplatione amicicie, escrit per l’humanista valenciàJoan Serra l’any 1454. La traducció parteix de l’edició curada per Evencio Beltran de l’únic manuscritconegut: BNF ms Nat. lat. 8756. La translació s’acompanya d’una introducció historicofilosòficaarticulada al voltant de l’analogia fonamental de l’obra, a saber, la concòrdia absoluta de dos amicsés com la unió perfecta del cos i de l’ànima humana. S’hi analitzen les fonts fonamentals: Cicerói Pseudo-Agustí, i s’hi constata l’organització dual dels continguts del text, en tant que dedica elscapítols senars a la consideració de la unió del cos i l’ànima segons la filosofia natural, mentre queels parells a la concòrdia absoluta dels amics virtuosos d’acord amb la filosofia moral.Paraules clau: Joan Serra, Ciceró, Pseudo-Agustí, Filosofia moral de l’amistat, Humanismevalencià.Abstract: We present the Catalan translation of De contemplatione amicicie, written by the Valencianhumanist Joan Serra in 1454. The translation is based on the only known manuscript (BNFms Nat. lat. 8756), edited by Evencio Beltran. The likelihood of the perfect union between bodyand soul and the complete accord between two friends is the basic analogy of the text and guidesthe composition of a historical and philosophical introduction that precedes the translation. Weanalyze its main sources, namely, Cicero and Pseudo-Augustine. Moreover, we reveal the dual organizationof the text, which devotes odd chapters to natural philosophy and to the union betweenbody and soul, while even chapters to ethics and to the absolute accord between virtuous friends.Keywords: JoanSerra, Cicero, Pseudo-Augustine, moral philosophy of friendship, Valencian humanism

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 160-170
Author(s):  
Max Marcuzzi ◽  

Fichte’s philosophy is known as a science of freedom since his first Wissenschaftslehre. But since the ego is interpreted as a mere picture in his late moral philosophy, we wonder how the passive image of a truly existing original (the Absolute) can be free. The answer suggested here is that the ego can be understood as a free being, if it is understood as being pure of every Non-I, as pure dynamic being, which cannot be bound to any substantial version of itself, and not even the form of the present.Seit seiner ersten Wissenschaftslehre ist Fichtes Philosophie bekanntlich eine Freiheitslehre. Sofern das Ich in seiner späten Moralphilosophie als einfaches Bild gedeutet wird, stellt sich jedoch die Frage, wie das passive Bild eines wirklich existierenden Originals (das Absolute) frei sein kann. Die Antwort, die hier vorgeschlagen wird, ist, dass das Ich als frei verstanden werden kann, wenn es als rein von jedem Nicht-Ich gedacht wird, als dynamisches Wesen, das an keine Bestimmung seiner selbst gebunden sein darf, auch nicht an die Form der Gegenwart.


Author(s):  
Sven Arntzen

Dignity, according to one conception, is the absolute, inherent and inalienable value of every person. There is general agreement that this idea of dignity has a source in Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy. I argue that Kant formulates what I characterize as an agency or agent based conception of dignity. Persons are bearers of dignity in their capacity as moral subjects and subjects of action. Central here is the idea that a rational agent is the subject of “any end whatsoever” and so must be considered the free cause of actions. Accordingly, to be treated merely as a thing, or “as a means”, is to be treated in a manner incompatible with having and acting for the sake of any end of one’s choosing. Also relevant in this connection is Alan Gewirth’s agency based theories of dignity and of human rights. I then consider this conception of dignity in addressing three ethical issues: to let die or keep alive, assisted suicide, and so-called dwarf-tossing. Finally, I consider challenges to the idea of dignity in general and the agency based conception of dignity in particular.


2009 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-66
Author(s):  
Reinier Leushuis

In 1526, Antonio Brucioli (1487-1566) published a series of thirty dialogues that form a typical humanist compendium of moral and political wisdom in the vernacular. Scholars have considered these dialogues mainly from the perspective of Brucioli’s humanist and political allegiances, in particular with exiled Florentine humanists whose discussions in the Orti Oricellari the dialogues echo. However, textual reworkings in subsequent editions (1538 and 1544, in which this group constitutes the first volume, entitled Della morale filosofia, of a series that includes other volumes of dialogues on natural philosophy) warrant a reconsideration that complements intellectual history with literary and rhetorical analysis. This article revalorizes Brucioli’s Dialogi della morale filosofia by arguing that their literary and rhetorical strategies, such as the use of ancient dialogue models, the shifting choice and staging of interlocutors, the creation of Ciceronian ethos and decorum, and the mimetic aspects of the interaction of male and female voices not only evince a conscious application of early Cinquecento dialogue poetics, but also establish the author’s volgarizzamento of a compendium of classical and humanist wisdom as a uniquely Italian project aimed at an emulation and appropriation of moral philosophy by dialogical speaking at the level of a national cultural elite.


2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 789-796
Author(s):  
William Jefferies

Clear Bright Future is Paul Mason’s radical defence of humanity from Trumpist populism and de-globalisation, neo-liberalism, the threat of machine learning and, notwithstanding the book’s title (lifted from Trotsky’s Testament), Marxism, which, he considers, needs a ‘kicking’. Mason redefines Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach so that the point of change is to understand the world, or more precisely, for him to understand the world. According to Mason, the declassed, amorphous but nonetheless conscious, yet unconscious, networked individual, who is far more complex, and so essential, than traditional classes, although not a traditional class, and so subjective and not objective, and so not essential, will adopt communism, even though it has not, and implement a new world order, somehow. Mainly it would appear by arguing that machines do not have feelings, but also by rehabilitating the absolute moral philosophy of Thomas Malthus, amongst other things.


Author(s):  
John Henry

This paper draws attention to the remarkable closing words of Isaac Newton's Optice (1706) and subsequent editions of the Opticks (1718, 1721), and tries to suggest why Newton chose to conclude his book with a puzzling allusion to his own unpublished conclusions about the history of religion. Newton suggests in this concluding passage that the bounds of moral philosophy will be enlarged as natural philosophy is ‘perfected’. Asking what Newton might have had in mind, the paper first considers the idea that he was foreshadowing the ‘moral Newtonianism’ developed later in the eighteenth century; then it considers the idea that he was perhaps pointing to developments in natural theology. Finally, the paper suggests that Newton wanted to at least signal the importance of attempting to recover the true original religion, and perhaps was hinting at his intention to publish his own extensive research on the history of the Church.


2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-66
Author(s):  
Ejvind Larsen

A Natural philosopher after Grundtvigs heartBy Ejvind LarsenThis essay is a chapter from the book on Grundtvig and Marx which Ejvind Larsen wrote after the paper that he read at the International Grundtvig Seminar in August 1972. The fundamental idea in this essay is that Shakespeare was of greater importance to Grundtvig - and incidentally also to Marx – than has hitherto been recognized. In the introduction to Nordic Mythology (1832), Grundtvig refers in a footnote to the, as he calls it, “ classic passage (As You Like It, Act III, Scene III) beginning: Hast thou any philosophy in thee, shepherd?”. If one looks this up, it becomes apparent that the shepherd’s simple answer to Touchstone’s question, being based as it is on experience and common sense, corresponds absolutely to Grundtvig’s views on the philosophy of nature of his own time - and especially of Schelling.Ejvind Larsen thus rejects Kaj Thaning’s interpretation of Grundtvig’s statement from the same book, that he will be able to collaborate with “naturalists with spirit”. What Grundtvig is here rejecting is, according to Thaning, something “ animal, merely biological” . This interpretation is at variance partly with a draft from 1834 (in which what Grundtvig rejects is on the contrary, “ fervent sollicitude for one’s neighbour’s immortal soul”), partly with Grundtvig’s works up to 1832, the year which, according to Thaning, marks a decisive break with the past in virtually every sphere in Grundtvig’s world. Ejvind Larsen asserts furthermore that the correct interpretation of the following sentence is to be found in the very work that marks the turning-point: “The naturalist must be far more concerned about a spiritual science that explains human life, than we are, for to us it is only, properly understood, an earthly matter, but to him it is a question of salvation” . (Selected Works, 1948, IV p. 59).Through quotations from Grundtvig’s works from 1810 to his death and Henning Høirup’s thesis, “Grundtvig’s View of Faith and Cognition” (1949), Ejvind Larsen establishes1) that throughout those years Grundtvig asserted that “ the secret of salvation is concealed from the learned and the wise” , namely, in Grundtvig’s own age the idealistic philosophy and theology which established a hierarchy separating the wise from the innocent, and2) that consequently, in Kirkens Gienmæle (1825) he claimed that the testimony he was seeking as to what true Christianity is, was quite simply to be found in the Apostles’ Creed at baptism, and finally3) that the mistake lay in Kant’s moral philosophy having been accepted at its face value (Høirup, p. 181 ff).“The fundamental error of Kantianism is, according to Grundtvig, the assertion about human independence and the invalidity of experience” (draft from 1824). It annoyed Grundtvig that this moral philosophy should, “with blind faith” , be accepted by everyone, thereby binding the faith of the uneducated to the testimony of the learned.Shakespeare’s shepherd, Corin, however, does not kneel to himself and does not worship his own reason as God. Despite the fact that he is not a Christian. Grundtvig, then, realized in 1832 that there is no need of any Christian faith to defend the people against the papacy of the learned philosophers and theologians.All that is needed is the experience and common sense that a simple shepherd possesses. It is the natural philosophy of the people that Grundtvig extols, the most essential proposition of which is “ that a great cause of the night is lack of the sun” .In 1814 Grundtvig protested against Schelling because he explicitly said, “ that darkness is that from which light originated“ . And in August 1872, for the same reason, he asked Ernst Trier to alter a line in one of his songs: “Let light shine out of darkness!” to “Let light shine through darkness” , remarking, “ for I assure you that light never comes out of darkness.” Darkness is caused by the sun being absent, just as falsehood may be explained as the contrary of truth. Truth explains itself. In the course of history.


Author(s):  
Susanna Berger

This essay discusses a novel category of broadside in which entire systems of logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, and moral philosophy are represented in a comprehensive manner and coherent format, by showing, on a single page, how individual elements of the system relate to the whole. These broadsides inspired viewers to explore philosophical topics through visually appealing artworks. They functioned to make the activity of learning philosophy and investigating philosophical notions pleasurable and entertaining. In this Reflection, details in two broadsides that present pictorial interpretations of the notion of pleasure and its dangers are examined, in order to show the equivocal attitudes toward sensual pleasures in the convent schools associated with the University of Paris in the early seventeenth century.


2002 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ku-Ming Chang

AbstractThis paper examines Georg Ernst Stahl's first book, the Zymotechnia Fundamentalis, in the context of contemporary natural philosophy and the author's career. I argue that the Zymotechnia was a mechanical theory of fermentation written consciously against the influential "fermentational program" of Joan Baptista van Helmont and especially Thomas Willis. Stahl's theory of fermentation introduced his first conception of phlogiston, which was in part a corpuscular transformation of the Paracelsian sulphur principle. Meanwhile some assumptions underlying this theory, such as the composition of matter, the absolute passivity of matter and the "passions" of sulphur, reveal the combined scholastic and mechanistic character of Stahl's natural philosophy. In the conclusion I show that Stahl's theory of fermentation undermined the old fermentational program and paved the way for his dualist vitalism.


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