scholarly journals Board Level Employee Representation and CEO Compensation: The Mediation and Interaction Effects of the Largest Shareholder

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 199
Author(s):  
Ali Dardour ◽  
Rana Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Interaction Effects ◽  
Employee Representation ◽  
Board Level

Board-level employee representation in the Visegrád countries

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Zybała
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
National Level ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Class ◽  
Employee Representation ◽  
Policy Paradigm ◽  
Labour Participation ◽  
Board Level ◽  
Practical Agenda ◽  
Visegrád Countries

This article addresses the complexity of trade-union approaches to board-level employee representation in the Visegrád countries, and the barriers it faces in particular national settings. Trade unionists in these countries accept the relevance of such employee representation in theory, but their practical agenda covers other issues which they perceive as more important as they struggle to survive at many levels of activity, and face growing existential uncertainty and risk. Unions also lack capacity to overcome obstacles such as reluctance on the part of the political class and managerial hostility to board-level representation; they cannot exert influence on major policy decisions at national level. They are operating in a more and more difficult environment, reflecting not merely a declining membership base, but also the recent economic crisis that failed to change the economic policy paradigm in the Visegrád countries: policies there still rely on a neoliberal approach and hence are not conducive to labour participation. What can still be seen as the predominant model is the traditional one of the market economy in which rights of ownership reign supreme.

Corporate Governance, Employee Voice and the Interests of Employees: The Broken Promise of a ‘World Leading Package of Corporate Reforms’

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Villiers
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Employee Motivation ◽  
Employee Voice ◽  
Corporate Value ◽  
Workplace Democracy ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Employee Representation ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
Union Representation ◽  
Board Level

Abstract Following a series of corporate governance scandals which involved exploitative treatment of workers, reforms were introduced to the UK’s corporate governance system in 2018, presented both as an attempt to rebuild trust and to afford a stronger voice for workers in that system. This paper explores the new landscape from a workers’ voice and protection perspective. It highlights that, while corporate governance has a role in ensuring workers’ needs are met, there is a tension between the goals of any reforms in this territory: board-level employee representation could be seen as a way of democratising the economy and valuing the part played by labour in that process, but it could also be seen as a way of increasing corporate value, economic performance or employee motivation, and disregarding the implications for labour. It is argued in this paper that worker protection requires a more genuine workplace democracy with full involvement of trade union representation. This would also help to broaden the corporate governance framework’s horizon towards a more genuine stakeholder vision beyond the existing tokenistic legal and regulatory nods in that direction.

Negotiated board-level employee representation in European Companies: Leverage for the institutional power of labour?

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Lafuente Hernández
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Primary Source ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
European Law ◽  
European Company ◽  
Employee Representation ◽  
Institutional Power ◽  
Board Level ◽  
First Time

The European Company Directive anchored board-level employee representation in European law for the first time. Rules negotiated between management and worker representatives became the primary source for formulating and designing such representation as an institution of European industrial relations. However, I show that negotiated rules on board-level representation provide limited institutional leverage for European workers. I examine the fragmented and incomplete legal framework applicable, the diverse forms and patterns of negotiated rules and their potential and limitations for supporting workers’ power on boards.

Board-level employee representation in Europe

1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-296
Author(s):  
Mark Carley
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
European Company ◽  
Employee Representation ◽  
Worker Participation ◽  
Board Level

This article examines briefly the nature of employee representation on company boards, its extent in western Europe and the revival of the European Company Statute which has once again brought this form of indirect worker participation to the fore. The article goes on to outline some of the main findings of recent research by the author into board-level representation in five countries (Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands), highlighting areas of diversity and of convergence.

scholarly journals Corportate Diversification and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Moderating Effect of Stock Ownership

e-Finanse ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-92
Author(s):  
Hwei Cheng Wang ◽  
Yung-I Lou ◽  
Chiulien C. Venezia ◽  
Nicole A. Buzzetto-Hollywood
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Large Fraction ◽  
International Diversification ◽  
Interaction Effects ◽  
Stock Ownership ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Total Compensation ◽  
Industry Diversification ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThe article is an attempt to assess whether Stock Ownership moderates the relationship between corporate diversification and CEO compensation. Based on agency theory, we develop the hypothesis of whether when CEOs hold a large fraction of their firms’ outstanding stock, the CEOs are acting more as owners or shareholders than employees. This reduces the principal and agency relationship of agency theory, since CEOs are acting as owners rather than employees; thus the demand for further stock-based compensation is likely to be reduced because the interests of CEOs and shareholders are relatively aligned. For the purposes of this study, a sample of 2,448 CEO compensations across 1,622 firms from 1997 to 2002 was used to test several hypotheses. Corporate diversification was divided into two categories; international diversification and industry diversification. To test the hypotheses, multiple regression analysis was employed to examine stock ownership as a moderator variable on the relationship between international diversification and industry diversification and CEO total compensation with tenure, age, duality, and gender as control variables. The results indicate that stock ownership negatively and significantly influences the relationship between International diversification and CEO compensation. Additionally, the findings also confirm that stock ownership negatively and significantly influences the relationship between industrial diversification and CEO compensation. Our results are consistent with our hypotheses and indicate that firms with lower Stock Ownership produce larger interaction effects to increase international diversification and total compensation pay to CEOs, and firms with lower Stock Ownership, produce larger interaction effects to increase industry diversification and total compensation pay to CEOs.

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