Effects of Personal Attributes and Performance on the Level of CEO Compensation: Direct and Interaction Effects

1993 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janice Monti‐Belkaoui ◽  
Ahmed Riahi‐ Belkaoui
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Interaction Effects ◽  
Personal Attributes ◽  
And Performance

scholarly journals CEO compensation and performance of state owned enterprises in South Africa

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Ngwenya ◽  
Mahlomolo Khumalo
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Total Revenue ◽  
Return On Assets ◽  
Base Salary ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Relationship

The study investigates the relationship between CEO compensation and performance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in South Africa, using data for the period 2009 to 2011. The results indicated that there exist no positive relationship between CEO compensation and SOEs performance as measured by return on assets. The results also indicated a positive relationship between CEO compensation (base salary) and the size of SOEs as measured by total revenue and number of employees. The results suggest that board members of SOEs in South Africa should hold CEOs accountable for the performance of SOEs, and should not pay huge salaries and bonuses to non performing CEOs.

Social Embeddedness, Overt and Covert Power, and Their Effects on CEO Pay: An Empirical Examination Among Family Businesses in India

2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 293-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajaram Veliyath ◽  
Kannan Ramaswamy
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Developing Economies ◽  
Social Embeddedness ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Firm Diversification ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
And Performance

The literature on CEO compensation reflects two common biases: (a) the dominant use of the agency theory perspective and (b) the almost exclusive use of U.S. and U.K samples. Agency theory views compensation as a consequence of the incentive contracts and the processes of corporate governance. However, little is known about the determinants of CEO compensation in developing countries. Considering that foreign direct investment of U.S. multinational enterprises increased 10-fold over the past decade, mostly in developing economies, there is a great need to understand the dynamics of pay setting in these foreign contexts. Overall, there is an imperative need to explore alternative theoretical perspectives as well as investigate nontraditional contexts to broaden existing theoretical premises. In an attempt to address this need, this study investigates the CEO's social embeddedness and overt and covert power as determinants of CEO pay in a sample of Indian family-controlled firms. Using a time-series, cross-sectional regression analysis, we find family shareholding and the percentage of inside directors on the board (identified as bases of overt power for the CEO) to be the predominant influences on CEO pay. By contrast, some of the identified bases of covert power, such as the CEO's tenure, age, education, and firm diversification, are not significant. Surprisingly, controls for firm size and performance also exhibit no influence on CEO pay. These findings offer a useful point of reference against which results from western studies can be compared to formulate more holistic theories of CEO pay.

Intellectual capital and performance: testing interaction effects

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 554-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nixon Kamukama ◽  
Augustine Ahiauzu ◽  
Joseph M. Ntayi
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Capital ◽  
Performance Testing ◽  
Interaction Effects ◽  
And Performance

CEO Compensation and Performance of Commercial Banks

1997 ◽  
Vol 23 (11) ◽  
pp. 40-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aigbe Akhigbe ◽  
Jeff Madura ◽  
Huldah Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
And Performance

Geographic and Industrial Corporate Diversification: The Level and Structure of Executive Compensation

2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Augustine Duru ◽  
David M. Reeb
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Performance Criteria ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Geographic Diversification ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Industrial Diversification ◽  
Diversification Strategies ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
And Performance

We explore the relation between corporate diversification and CEO compensation. We document that geographic diversification provides a compensation premium, while industrial diversification is associated with lower levels of CEO pay. We also examine the effect of corporate diversification on the structure and performance criteria of CEO compensation contracts. We find that both diversification strategies are associated with a greater use of incentive-based compensation and with a greater reliance on market-based, rather than accounting-based measures of firm performance. Finally, we address the question of whether shareholders reward CEOs for corporate diversification. We document that while value-enhancing geographic diversification is rewarded, non-value-enhancing industrial diversification is penalized.

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