scholarly journals J. David Velleman, "On Being Me: A Personal Invitation to Philosophy."

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 168-169
Author(s):  
Calvin Harrison Warner
Keyword(s):  
David Velleman ◽  
Personal Invitation

scholarly journals Personal Ideals as Metaphors

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICK RIGGLE
Keyword(s):  
Complex Phenomenon ◽  
Philosophical Question ◽  
Personal Ideal ◽  
Personal Ideals ◽  
David Velleman ◽  
Literary Coherence

ABSTRACT:What is it to have and act on a personal ideal? Someone who aspires to be a philosopher might imaginatively think ‘I am a philosopher’ by way of motivating herself to think hard about a philosophical question. But doing so seems to require her to act on an inaccurate self-description, given that she is not yet what she regards herself as being. J. David Velleman develops the thought that action-by-ideal involves a kind of fictional self-conception. My aim is to expand our thinking about personal ideals by developing another way of understanding them. On this view action-by-ideal involves a kind of metaphorical self-conception. I investigate some salient differences between these views with the aim of understanding the different perspectives they take on the rationality of action-by-ideal. Where the fiction view runs into problems of literary coherence, the metaphor view exploits the richness of poetic invention. But action-by-ideal is a complex phenomenon about which there may be no tidy story to be told. This paper is an attempt to clarify and understand more of this messy terrain.

Foundations for Moral Relativism, by J. David Velleman.

Mind ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 125 (497) ◽  
pp. 284-290
Author(s):  
David B. Wong
Keyword(s):  
Moral Relativism ◽  
David Velleman

A Kantian Defense of Prudential Suicide

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 489-515 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Cholbi
Keyword(s):  
Absolute Value ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
David Velleman

AbstractKant's claim that the rational will has absolute value or dignity appears to render any prudential suicide morally impermissible. Although the previous appeals of Kantians (e. g., David Velleman) to the notion that pain or mental anguish can compromise dignity and justify prudential suicide are unsuccessful, these appeals suggest three constraints that an adequate Kantian defense of prudential suicide must meet. Here I off er an account that meets these constraints. Central to this account is the contention that some suicidal agents, because they are unable to fashion a rational conception of their own happiness, are diminished with respect to their dignity of humanity, and as a result, lack the pricelessness that makes prudential suicide wrong on a Kantian view.

Belief

2020 ◽  
pp. 152-176
Author(s):  
John Brunero
Keyword(s):  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Strong Belief ◽  
David Velleman ◽  
Made In ◽  
The Way

Cognitivists about practical rationality argue that some requirements of practical rationality can be explained by the requirements of theoretical rationality, given the way in which intentions involve beliefs. This chapter considers several possible ways a cognitivist could explain means–ends coherence. It first considers accounts that use the Strong Belief Thesis, according to which intending to X involves believing one will X. It considers and reject several important arguments David Velleman has proposed in defense of the thesis. Additionally, the chapter argues that the thesis is vulnerable to counterexamples, and the standard moves made in response to such counterexamples are unhelpful to the cognitivist. It then considers accounts that use a weaker thesis about the intention–belief connection, but even the best available cognitivist account along these lines has trouble showing that the theoretical requirements explain the practical ones.

Moral Aspirations

2019 ◽  
pp. 78-100
Author(s):  
Karen Stohr
Keyword(s):  
Critical Reflection ◽  
Moral Identity ◽  
Moral Improvement ◽  
David Velleman

This chapter takes up the question of what it means for a person’s moral identity to be aspirational and how we can go about cultivating aspirational moral identities that are conducive to moral improvement. It considers the role of conflict and crisis in precipitating critical reflection on existing moral identities. It also considers the ways in which a person can enhance her capacities for the requisite kind of reflection, with a particular focus on perspective shifts, imagination, and the use of exemplars. The chapter draws on work by Agnes Callard and David Velleman to argue that aspirational moral identities are cultivated proleptically through developing and enacting imaginative self-conceptions that reflect moral aspirations. These imaginative self-conceptions take the form of what the chapter describes as fictive moral selves.

scholarly journals Organised Versus Opportunistic Cervical Cancer Screening in Urban and Rural Regions of Lithuania

Medicina ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (9) ◽  
pp. 570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justina Paulauskiene ◽  
Rugile Ivanauskiene ◽  
Erika Skrodeniene ◽  
Janina Petkeviciene
Keyword(s):  
Cervical Cancer ◽  
Cancer Screening ◽  
Cervical Cancer Screening ◽  
Rural Areas ◽  
Pap Smear ◽  
Screening Program ◽  
Rural Regions ◽  
Reminder Letter ◽  
Invitation Letter ◽  
Personal Invitation

Background and Objectives: In 2004, Lithuania started the Nationwide Cervical Cancer Screening Programme. However, screening is more opportunistic than population-wide and the programme’s coverage is insufficient. The aim of this study was to assess the effect of systematic personal invitation on coverage of cervical cancer (CC) screening in urban and rural regions of Lithuania. Materials and Methods: The study was conducted in an urban primary healthcare centre (PHCC) and in a rural PHCC, where prevailing CC screening practice was highly opportunistic. Over the first year, all women aged 25–60 who had not received a Pap smear test within the last three years in urban (n = 1591) and rural (n = 1843) PHCCs received a personal invitation letter to participate in the screening. Over the second year, the reminder letter was sent to the non-attendees (n = 1042 in urban and n = 929 in rural PHCCs). A random sample of women (n = 93), who did not attend for screening after two letters, was contacted by phone in order to identify the barriers of non-attendance. Results: Before the study, only 9.6% of the target population in urban and 14.7% in rural PHCCs participated in CC screening. After the first invitation letter, the participation in CC screening increased up to 24.6% in urban and 30.8% in rural areas (p < 0.001). After the reminder letter, the attendance was 16.4% in urban and 22.2% in rural PHCCs (p < 0.001). The most common barriers for the non-attendance were lack of time, long waiting time for family doctor’s appointment, worries that a Pap test might be unpleasant and preventive gynaecological examination outside of the screening program. Conclusions: A systematic personal invitation with one reminder letter significantly increased the coverage of CC screening and was more effective in rural regions than in urban regions. The assessed barriers for non-attendance can be used to improve the coverage of screening.

scholarly journals The Priority of the Good Over Right in Love: Challenging Velleman’s Kantian View

Etyka ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 47-57
Author(s):  
Gary Foster
Keyword(s):  
General Problem ◽  
Moral Emotion ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
David Velleman

In Love as a Moral Emotion David Velleman rejects the conative analysis of love arguing instead for a conception which is modelled after Kantian respect. The general problem associated with conative views of love according to Velleman is that they cut love loose from morality, sometimes characterizing its aims as in conflict with morality.

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