A Kantian Defense of Prudential Suicide

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 489-515 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Cholbi

AbstractKant's claim that the rational will has absolute value or dignity appears to render any prudential suicide morally impermissible. Although the previous appeals of Kantians (e. g., David Velleman) to the notion that pain or mental anguish can compromise dignity and justify prudential suicide are unsuccessful, these appeals suggest three constraints that an adequate Kantian defense of prudential suicide must meet. Here I off er an account that meets these constraints. Central to this account is the contention that some suicidal agents, because they are unable to fashion a rational conception of their own happiness, are diminished with respect to their dignity of humanity, and as a result, lack the pricelessness that makes prudential suicide wrong on a Kantian view.

Etyka ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 47-57
Author(s):  
Gary Foster

In Love as a Moral Emotion David Velleman rejects the conative analysis of love arguing instead for a conception which is modelled after Kantian respect. The general problem associated with conative views of love according to Velleman is that they cut love loose from morality, sometimes characterizing its aims as in conflict with morality.


2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 165-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Smith ◽  
John J.B. Allen ◽  
Julian F. Thayer ◽  
Richard D. Lane

Abstract. We hypothesized that in healthy subjects differences in resting heart rate variability (rHRV) would be associated with differences in emotional reactivity within the medial visceromotor network (MVN). We also probed whether this MVN-rHRV relationship was diminished in depression. Eleven healthy adults and nine depressed subjects performed the emotional counting stroop task in alternating blocks of emotion and neutral words during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The correlation between rHRV outside the scanner and BOLD signal reactivity (absolute value of change between adjacent blocks in the BOLD signal) was examined in specific MVN regions. Significant negative correlations were observed between rHRV and average BOLD shift magnitude (BSM) in several MVN regions in healthy subjects but not depressed subjects. This preliminary report provides novel evidence relating emotional reactivity in MVN regions to rHRV. It also provides preliminary suggestive evidence that depression may involve reduced interaction between the MVN and cardiac vagal control.


2000 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis M. Hsu ◽  
Judy Hayman ◽  
Judith Koch ◽  
Debbie Mandell

Summary: In the United States' normative population for the WAIS-R, differences (Ds) between persons' verbal and performance IQs (VIQs and PIQs) tend to increase with an increase in full scale IQs (FSIQs). This suggests that norm-referenced interpretations of Ds should take FSIQs into account. Two new graphs are presented to facilitate this type of interpretation. One of these graphs estimates the mean of absolute values of D (called typical D) at each FSIQ level of the US normative population. The other graph estimates the absolute value of D that is exceeded only 5% of the time (called abnormal D) at each FSIQ level of this population. A graph for the identification of conventional “statistically significant Ds” (also called “reliable Ds”) is also presented. A reliable D is defined in the context of classical true score theory as an absolute D that is unlikely (p < .05) to be exceeded by a person whose true VIQ and PIQ are equal. As conventionally defined reliable Ds do not depend on the FSIQ. The graphs of typical and abnormal Ds are based on quadratic models of the relation of sizes of Ds to FSIQs. These models are generalizations of models described in Hsu (1996) . The new graphical method of identifying Abnormal Ds is compared to the conventional Payne-Jones method of identifying these Ds. Implications of the three juxtaposed graphs for the interpretation of VIQ-PIQ differences are discussed.


Filomat ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (19) ◽  
pp. 5945-5953 ◽  
Author(s):  
İmdat İsçan ◽  
Sercan Turhan ◽  
Selahattin Maden

In this paper, we give a new concept which is a generalization of the concepts quasi-convexity and harmonically quasi-convexity and establish a new identity. A consequence of the identity is that we obtain some new general inequalities containing all of the Hermite-Hadamard and Simpson-like type for functions whose derivatives in absolute value at certain power are p-quasi-convex. Some applications to special means of real numbers are also given.


2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (5) ◽  
pp. 1939-1967 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Callaway Dee ◽  
Ayalew Lulseged ◽  
Tianming Zhang

ABSTRACT We empirically test whether audit quality is affected when part of an SEC issuer's audit is outsourced to auditors other than the principal auditor (“participating auditors”). We find a significantly negative market reaction and a significant decline in earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for experimental issuers disclosed for the first time as having participating auditors involved in their audits. However, we find no market reaction and no decline in ERCs for a matching sample of issuers that are not disclosed as using participating auditors, nor for issuers disclosed for the second or third time as using participating auditors. We also find actual audit quality as measured by absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals is lower for the experimental issuers, although we find no difference in audit fees paid by the experimental and matching issuers in a multivariate model. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB's proposed rule requiring disclosure of the use of other auditors in addition to the principal auditor would provide information useful to investors in assessing audit quality for SEC issuers.


Author(s):  
John Kekes

The hard questions are: Is there an absolute value? Must we conform? Do we owe what our country asks of us? Is justice necessary? How should we respond to evil? Is it right to forgive wrong actions? Is shame good? Should we be true to who we are? Do good intentions justify bad actions? Should moral evaluations be overriding? These questions are hard because each has several reasonable but conflicting answers. Their conflicts show that we are ambivalent about what answer we should give when we have to make important decisions whose consequences affect us, our relationships, and our attitude to the society we live in. The aim of this book is to show how hard questions can be reasonably answered. Comparisons are central to the approach of this book. Each chapter is concerned with two conflicting answers that have been given to one of the hard questions by those who had to face the question in different anthropological, historical, and literary contexts. These comparisons are central to the evaluations of the answers. They enable us to learn from the successes and failures of others how we can form a deeper understanding of the reasons for and against the answers we might give. The comparisons enlarge how we see the possibilities and limits of life. By learning from others, we can decide more reasonably how we should respond to the hard questions we face.


Author(s):  
Richard Reilly

The focus of this chapter is Schopenhauer’s On The Basis of Morality (1841). His distinctive views are that compassion marks one’s being as spontaneously motivated to relieve another’s suffering as one’s own and that this requires a metaphysical explanation for how one identifies with another. The author defends these views and shows in some detail how they mirror the Mahayana account of compassion in Shantideva’s The Way of the Bodhisattva. Next, the author outlines Schopenhauer’s case for compassion being the sole basis of moral value and defends this claim against the Kantian view that acting beneficently cannot (rationally) override so-called perfect duties to others. Finally, the author explores how Buddha Shakyamuni’s teachings cohere with Schopenhauer’s account of suffering and how mystical consciousness, as represented in Mahayana Buddhism’s “Middle Way,” coheres with Schopenhauer’s asceticism—the “denial of the will”—as the path to overcoming suffering.


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