scholarly journals A Stringent but Critical Actualist Subjectivism about Well-Being

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 133-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphane Lemaire
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
The Other ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
Good For ◽  
Normative Role ◽  
Subjectivist Theory

Subjectivists about well-being claim that an object is good for someone if and only if this individual holds a certain type of pro-attitude toward this object. In this paper, I focus on the dispute among subjectivists that opposes those who think that the relevant pro-attitudes are actual to those who think that they are counterfactual under some idealized conditions. My main claim is that subjectivism should be stringently actualist, though our actual pro-attitudes may be criticized from an intrinsic perspective. To defend this claim, I first present three desiderata that a subjectivist theory of well-being should fulfil. Two of these desiderata result from the fact that a subjectivist theory of well-being should not be implicitly paternalist, while the other is that it should be able to play a normative role. I then show that several actualist theories that introduce light forms of idealization or other conditions that have a similar aim, fail to satisfy at least one of the antipaternalist desiderata. This gives some legitimacy to a very stringent version of actualism. I then describe three features of the kind of stringent actualism that I want to defend, which will explain the ability of what is good for someone to play its normative role. Finally, I show how these features allow us to deal with the classic objection that the objects of actual “defective attitudes” cannot be good for the holder of these pro-attitudes.

Locke’s Property Problem

2020 ◽  
pp. 16-66
Author(s):  
Daniel Layman
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Natural World ◽  
The Other ◽  
The World ◽  
Good For ◽  
The One ◽  
Private Right

According to Locke, all people are free and equal. Consequently, the natural world belongs to all people in common. But each person, along with his labor, belongs only to himself. Thus, although all people share a common right to use the world, each person acquires a private right to resources he “mixes” with his labor. Before large-scale economic development, there was no problem with each person appropriating as much as he could use, because this left “enough, and as good” for others. But once money spurred development, people could efficiently use far more. Under these new conditions, there was no longer enough and as good lying in common. Consequently, although everyone got richer through economic development, the world divided into resource owners and employees working on others’ resources. All of this posed a dilemma for Locke. On the one hand, people could be required to leave the world lying in common, preserving equal standing but sacrificing well-being for all. On the other, people could be permitted to develop the world into a network of private plots, greatly increasing well-being for all but sacrificing equal standing. Locke notices the tension, but he lacks an adequate solution. He implausibly appeals to our purported consent to money and its consequences before ending the chapter, thus leaving his property problem for others to solve.

Decentred autonomy and authenticity in Honneth

2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 292-312
Author(s):  
Dagmar Wilhelm
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Approach ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Other ◽  
Traditional Theory ◽  
Ethical Life ◽  
True Self ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Intimate Relation ◽  
The One ◽  
Normative Role

AbstractAxel Honneth proposes a recognition theoretical approach to justice, where justice is a matter of the recognition of individuals in the three spheres of ethical life he identifies. The value of recognition is based on the value of ‘self-realization’. Given the intimate relation between self-realization on the one hand and autonomy and authenticity on the other, autonomy and authenticity also play an important normative role in Honneth’s recognition theoretical approach to justice. In this paper I will examine Honneth’s conceptions of autonomy and authenticity. I will argue that these conceptions manage to meet some of the descriptive challenges faced by recognition theories, but fail to provide recognition with the required normative underpinnings. In order to gain or retain normative force, Honneth needs to provide an account of ‘true self’ or objective human well-being, which in turn would fail to meet the descriptive challenge and move dangerously close to traditional theory.

Against ‘Good for’/‘Well-Being’, for ‘Simply Good’

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hurka
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
The Other ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
The Common ◽  
Good For

Abstract This paper challenges the widely held view that ‘good for’, ‘well-being’, and related terms express a distinctive evaluative concept of central importance for ethics and separate from ‘simply good’ as used by G. E. Moore and others. More specifically, it argues that there's no philosophically useful good-for or well-being concept that's neither merely descriptive in the sense of naturalistic nor reducible to ‘simply good’. The paper distinguishes two interpretations of the common claim that the value ‘good for’ expresses is distinctively ‘subject-relative’. One concerns the ground of this value, or the properties that make something good for you; it says these must involve some relation to you. The other concerns the resulting value itself, or what supervenes on this ground; it says that too involves a relation. Neither interpretation, the paper argues, yields a significantly distinct evaluative concept. The ethically fundamental evaluative concept is just ‘simply good’.

Sacrifice Regained

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Psychological Egoism ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common ◽  
Good For

Does being virtuous make you happy? This book examines the answers to this ancient question provided by the so-called ‘British Moralists’, from about 1650 for the next two hundred years. This involves elucidating their views on happiness (self-interest, or well-being) and on virtue (or morality), in order to bring out the relation of each to the other. Themes ran through many of these writers: psychological egoism, evaluative hedonism, and—after Thomas Hobbes—the acceptance of self-standing moral reasons. But there are exceptions, and even those taking the standard views adopt them for very different reasons and express them in various ways. As the ancients tended to believe that virtue and happiness largely, perhaps entirely, coincide, so these modern authors are inclined to accept posthumous reward and punishment. Both positions sit uneasily with the common-sense idea that a person can truly sacrifice their own good for the sake of morality or for others, and the book shows that David Hume—a hedonist whose ethics made no appeal to the afterlife—was the first major British moralist to allow for, indeed to recommend, such self-sacrifice. Morality and well-being of course remain central to modern ethics, and this book demonstrates how much there is to learn from this remarkable group of philosophers.

Emotional Impact Feedback Changes How We Remember Negative Autobiographical Experiences

2010 ◽  
Vol 57 (5) ◽  
pp. 354-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie K. T. Takarangi ◽  
Deryn Strange
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
The Other ◽  
Personal Perspective ◽  
Emotional Impact ◽  
Potential Mechanism ◽  
Negative Experiences ◽  
Negative Memory ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Negative Memories ◽  
Over Time

When people are told that their negative memories are worse than other people’s, do they later remember those events differently? We asked participants to recall a recent negative memory then, 24 h later, we gave some participants feedback about the emotional impact of their event – stating it was more or less negative compared to other people’s experiences. One week later, participants recalled the event again. We predicted that if feedback affected how participants remembered their negative experiences, their ratings of the memory’s characteristics should change over time. That is, when participants are told that their negative event is extremely negative, their memories should be more vivid, recollected strongly, and remembered from a personal perspective, compared to participants in the other conditions. Our results provide support for this hypothesis. We suggest that external feedback might be a potential mechanism in the relationship between negative memories and psychological well-being.

The Price of Truth: Reciprocity, Giving, and Generosity in the Philosophy of René Descartes

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 147-170
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Rene Descartes ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Other ◽  
Economic Science ◽  
Homo Oeconomicus ◽  
Intellectual Activity ◽  
René Descartes ◽  
Economic Thinking ◽  
Selfish Interest

The article provides a comparison of the concept of homo œconomicus with the core theses of René Descartes’ moral philosophy. The first section draws on the work of the contemporary Western philosopher Anselm Jappe in which Descartes’ philosophy is held to be the cornerstone of the established view and current scientific definitions of homo œconomicus as the fundamental and indispensable agent of capitalistic relations. As opposed to this “common sense” position in the modern social sciences, the second section of the article builds upon Pierre Bourdieu’s Anthropologie économique (2017) to demystify the notion of homo œconomicus. The article then examines some aspects of modern philosophical anthropology that show odd traces of Descartes’ thinking and that are regularly applied in economic science as well as in the critique of economic thinking as such. These are the concepts of mutuality, giving, exchange and generosity, and they are regarded as central to the philosopher’s moral doctrine.The author concludes that the philosophical doctrine of generosity has very little in common with the bourgeois ideology of utility which implies an instrumental relationship between subjects: in Caretesian moral philosophy the Other is neither an object of influence nor a means to achieve someone’s personal goals nor a windowless monad. Generosity certainly has its economic aspects, but these do not include accumulating wealth in the bourgeois sense. It is more in the realm of the aristocratic practice of making dispensations. All throughout his life Decartes may be viewed as exhibiting a peculiar kind of nobility in which the desire to give, endow and sacrifice outweighs any selfish interest. The vigorous pursuit of well-being gives way to a quest for the leisure required to pursue intellectual activity, and care for oneself does not preclude attending to and loving the Other, whatever form it may take.

Are People More Important than the Other Animals?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
The World ◽  
Human Good ◽  
Good For ◽  
Ultimate Purpose

This chapter criticizes the familiar idea that humans are more important than animals. After examining some reasons why we treat humans and animals differently, and showing that they do not imply the superior importance of humans, it argues that the claim of superior human importance is not so much false as (nearly) incoherent. Importance and goodness are “tethered” values: things are only important or good when they are important-to or good-for some creature. To be important or good absolutely is to be important-to or good-for all creatures. One kind of creature could be absolutely more important than others only if the fate of that kind of creature were more important to others than their own fates. Only a teleological picture of the world that made human good the ultimate purpose of the world could support the conclusion that humans are more important than the other animals.

Fellow Creatures

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Good For ◽  
Treat All ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship

This book argues that we are obligated to treat all sentient animals as “ends in themselves.” Drawing on a theory of the good derived from Aristotle, it offers an explanation of why animals are the sorts of beings who have a good. Drawing on a revised version of Kant’s argument for the value of humanity, it argues that rationality commits us to claiming the standing of ends in ourselves in two senses. As autonomous beings, we claim to be ends in ourselves when we claim the standing to make laws for ourselves and each other. As beings who have a good, we also claim to be ends in ourselves when we take the things that are good for us to be good absolutely and so worthy of pursuit. The first claim commits us to joining with other autonomous beings in relations of reciprocal moral lawmaking. The second claim commits us to treating the good of every sentient animal as something of absolute importance. The book also argues that human beings are not more important than, superior to, or better off than the other animals. It criticizes the “marginal cases” argument and advances a view of moral standing as attaching to the atemporal subjects of lives. It offers a non-utilitarian account of the relationship between the good and pleasure, and addresses questions about the badness of extinction and about whether we have the right to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us, and keep them as pets.

scholarly journals Private retirement resorts in South Africa: Guidelines for wellness and sustainability in the long term.

2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andries C. Hauptfleisch
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Knowledge Base ◽  
Quantitative Data ◽  
Qualitative Data ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Other ◽  
Literature Study ◽  
Optimal Profile

Unsubsidised private retirement resorts in South Africa developed during the last three decades present residents with many challenges. There is no existing generally accepted knowledge base or guidelines to serve this sensitive market. The research objective was to establish which elements are experienced by residents of retirement resorts as satisfactory and which as problematic. A literature study was also undertaken. Quantitative as well as qualitative data were obtained by means of structured questionnaires, interviews and a seminar. The results reported pertain to eight resorts in the east of Pretoria, four in Bloemfontein and two in Knysna. The study is currently being extended to other centres. The quantitative data is arranged in order of the priorities set by the biggest group (Pretoria), with the other groups in comparison. So the research was based on the sourcing of quantitative and qualitative data, as well as on descriptive evaluations. The results offer insightful knowledge and guidelines towards establishing an optimal profile for the development of long-term sustainable private retirement resorts. The implications and value of this study are that both developers of retirement resorts and prospective residents are provided with guidelines to better equip them to evaluate a specific retirement resort with regard to the sustainable well- being of residents long-term.

scholarly journals Quality of Life of Brazilian Vegetarians Measured by the WHOQOL-BREF: Influence of Type of Diet, Motivation and Sociodemographic Data

Nutrients ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 2648
Author(s):  
Shila Minari Hargreaves ◽  
Eduardo Yoshio Nakano ◽  
Heesup Han ◽  
António Raposo ◽  
Antonio Ariza-Montes ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Life ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Vegetarian Diet ◽  
The Other ◽  
Average Score ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Domain 3 ◽  
Domain 4

This study aimed to evaluate the general quality of life (QoL) of Brazilian vegetarians. A cross-sectional study was conducted with Brazilian vegetarian adults (18 years old and above). Individuals were recruited to participate in a nationwide online survey that comprised the WHOQOL-BREF as well as sociodemographic and characterization questions related to vegetarianism. The WHOQOL-BREF is composed of 24 items which are divided into four domains (domain 1: physical health; domain 2: psychological well-being; domain 3: social relationships; and domain 4: environment), plus two general items which were analyzed separately, totaling 26 items. The answers from the questionnaire were converted into scores with a 0–100 scale range, with separate analyses for each domain. Results were compared among groups based on the different characteristics of the vegetarian population. A total of 4375 individuals completed the survey. General average score results were 74.67 (domain 1), 66.71 (domain 2), 63.66 (domain 3) and 65.76 (domain 4). Vegans showed better scores when compared to the other vegetarians, except in domain four, where the statistical difference was observed only for semi-vegetarians (lower score). Individuals adopting a vegetarian diet for longer (>1 year) showed better results for domains one and two, with no difference for the other domains. Having close people also adopting a vegetarian diet positively influenced the results for all domains. On the other hand, it was not possible to distinguish any clear influence of the motivation for adopting a vegetarian diet on the scores’ results. Adopting a vegetarian diet does not have detrimental effects on one’s QoL. In fact, the more plant-based the diet, and the longer it was adopted, the better the results were.

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