scholarly journals L'affaire des « champignons magiques »

2005 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 427-438
Author(s):  
Antoine Manganas

Following a number of acquittals based on a strict interpretation of the terms of the Food and Drugs Act, the Supreme Court of Canada recently had to determine, in Dunn, if a mushroom containing « psilocybin » was a restricted drug despite the fact that the legislation was referring only to the chemical substance and not to the plant itself The Supreme Court found that the text was clear and that the fact that « psilocybin » may be contained within a mushroom does not destroy its character as a restricted drug. Drug traffic must naturally be condemned, but that is not the problem for the moment. The problem is that the Supreme Court of Canada adopted, in Dunn, the rule of the liberal interpretation of a penal statute despite the fact that, not so long ago, it chose a different approach when dealing with a different statute. We are critical of both the way the inferior courts treated the cases before them and the way the legislator treated the problem. We think that it was possible for the lower courts to find the accused guilty of attempting to commit the offense. We think also that it was possible for the legislator to anticipate those situations and take some precautions by deliberately adopting a text capable of embracing these cases.

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 227
Author(s):  
Matthew Barber

In the Supreme Court decision of Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd, Tipping J put forward an approach to contact interpretation that, while indebted to that of Lord Hoffmann, was expressed differently and promoted the use of evidence of prior negotiations. Despite not gaining the support of any of the other sitting judges, this approach was swiftly taken up in the lower courts and, until recently at least, seems to have been accepted as representing New Zealand law. This article attempts a comprehensive examination of Tipping J’s approach. It concludes that, while coherent in principle, the detail of the approach is flawed in a number of ways, especially the way in which evidence of subsequent conduct is assumed to work. The future of Tipping J’s approach is considered.


2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 741 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Jochelson

In R. v. Labaye, the Supreme Court of Canada finally retired the community standards of tolerance test of obscenity. The test had been the subject of much academic critique, a matter that reached its zenith in the period following Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), in which a gay and lesbian bookshop contested the procedures and legislative regime of customs officials in detaining its imports. The engagement in the literature on the efficacy of the community standards test that followed was often heated, always interesting, and ultimately unresolved. To date, we have not seen any clarifying applications of the newly proposed harm test by the Supreme Court, nor have we seen a profound articulation in any lower courts. Subsequently, the academic discussion has slowed to a crawl. In this article, the author reviews four accounts of the community standards test that were prominent following Little Sisters, and asks if the newly proposed Labaye standard meets their concerns. The Labaye case provides much fodder for the previous critics and supporters of a community standards of tolerance approach to analyze. After a critical analysis of the new Labaye test, the author concludes that the concerns have not been muted by the retirement of the community standards test, even if the voices have been. The engaged voices heard in the aftermath of Little Sisters should not hold back and they should not abandon the work to be done in obscenity law and freedom of expression discourse generally.


1969 ◽  
pp. 848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Berger

The author explores various theoretical approaches to the defence of necessity, rejecting both excusatory conceptions of the defence and those based on the notion of moral involuntariness. Rather, the author argues that necessity is properly understood as a justificatory defence based on a lack of moral blameworthiness. After extensively surveying the history of the defence in Canadian law, the author critiques the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada has restricted the defence. He contrasts the current Canadian approach with the treatment of the defence in other jurisdictions and concludes that Canadian law would be served best by a robust defence of necessity, which would acknowledge that, in some circumstances, pursuit of a value of greater worth than the value of adherence to the law can be justified.


Federalism-E ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Allison O‘Beirne

The Supreme Court of Canada has an absolutely undeniable role in intergovernmental relations. As the country‘s only constitutionally entrenched body charged with the resolution of division-of-powers disputes, its decisions and rulings are always certain to influence the way in which governments interact with each other. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has come to be less highly regarded as a method of resolving the disputes that arise between governments [...]


1969 ◽  
pp. 149
Author(s):  
G. H. L. Fridman

In this article, Professor Fridman criticizes the Supreme Court of Canada for what he feels to be its lack of independence of thought and reasoning in its tendency to apply English precedents rather than to develop its own opinions in the area of contracts, quasi-contracts and torts. He recommends that the Court should analyse problems in depth at every opportunity afforded to it so as to provide greater guid ance for the lower Courts of Canada.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori G. Beaman ◽  
Cory Steele

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the ways in which the Supreme Court of Canada has shifted away from transcendent/religious to nonreligious conceptualizations of assisted dying. Design/methodology/approach A discourse analysis of a Supreme Court of Canada case on assisted dying and the facta of the 26 associated interveners. Findings The research points to a shift away from religious to nonreligious understandings in the way the Court conceptualizes suffering, pain, illness and assisted dying. Originality/value This paper contributes to the understanding of nonreligion as a social phenomenon.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vaughan Black

Starting about a generation ago, Canadian courts altered the rules governing causation to make them more plaintiff-friendly. However, these changes came to be regarded as misguided. In the 2012 decision Clements v. Clements, the Supreme Court of Canada modified the doctrine, reversing the plaintiff-friendly trend that had defined the law of causation for decades. This article will explore how Clements effectively curtailed the test of causation. It will do so in part by examining the impact it has had on the lower courts in subsequent years.


1996 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 870 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. McCormick

The author undertakes an examination of the citation practices of the Supreme Court of Canada from 1984 to 1994, with a look at which courts and which judges the Supreme Court tends to favour. Particular attention is given to the frequency of references to the decisions of Alberta courts. Additionally, the article canvasses the basic functions served by the practice of judicial citation.


2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradley W. Miller

Constitutional interpretation in Canada is dominated by the metaphor of the “living tree”. Living tree constitutional interpretation is usually defined in terms of its incompatibility with what is understood in Canada to be the central commitment of originalist interpretation: that the constitution is, in some sense, “frozen at the moment of adoption. But the tenets of originalism that are used as a definitional contrast are not widely held by originalist constitutional scholars today, and are in fact expressly rejected in the new originalist theories that have been developed principally (but not exclusively) in the United States over the past 20 years. There has not been a meaningful engagement in Canada with contemporary schools of originalist interpretation. The originalism rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1985 (and periodically reaffirmed thereafter), is not the new originalism, and a rejection of this new family of interpretive theories does not necessarily follow from the fact of the Supreme Court of Canada’s rejection of original intent originalism. Unfortunately, the Canadian courts have continued to affirm living tree constitutional doctrine and denounce originalism without providing much of an account of what they are accepting or rejecting. This paper is a prefatory study to an engagement with new originalist scholarship. I attempt a statement of the current commitments in Canadian living constitutional doctrine (pausing to engage with theoretical arguments that have been made in its defence) and, in passing, note the Supreme Court’s attitudes towards originalism. My purpose is to determine what the central commitments of living tree constitutional doctrine are, as a preliminary step towards a later study to determine the extent to which Canadian doctrine is truly incompatible with orginalist interpretation. I explore what I observe to be the four central commitments to living tree constitutionalism in Canada: (1) the doctrine of progressive interpretation; (2) the use of a purposive methodology in progressive interpretation; (3) the absence of any necessary role for the original intent or meaning of framers in interpreting the constitution; and (4) the presence of other constraints on judicial interpretation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-368
Author(s):  
ALISTER BROWNE ◽  
J.S. RUSSELL

AbstractIn 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the criminal law prohibiting physician assisted death in Canada. In 2016, Parliament passed legislation to allow what it called ‘medical assistance in dying (MAID).’ The authors first describe the arguments the Court used to strike down the law, and then argue that MAID as legalized in Bill C-14 is based on principles that are incompatible with a free and democratic society, prohibits assistance in dying that should be permitted, and makes access to medically-assisted death unnecessarily difficult. They then propose a version of MAID legislation (‘Ideal MAID’) that gives proponents and opponents of MAID everything they can legitimately want, contend that it is the only way to legalize MAID that is compatible with a free and democratic society, and conclude that it is the way to legalize MAID in Canada and other similarly free and democratic societies.


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