scholarly journals The Supreme Court ofthe United States and the Law of Libel: A Review of Decided Cases

2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 833-854
Author(s):  
Edward G. Hudon
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Common Law ◽  
New York Times ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law

Pendant presque deux cents ans aux États-Unis, le droit du libelle a relevé exclusivement de la common law d'origine anglaise dont les États-Unis ont hérité au moment de la révolution américaine. Quiconque publiait, publiait à ses risques et périls. Selon le système constitutionnel américain à cette époque, toute expression diffamatoire, écrite ou verbale, même sans l'intention de diffamer autrui, était hors de la protection accordée par la constitution à la liberté de parole et de presse. Mais tout cela a changé avec le jugement de la Cour suprême des États-Unis dans New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, décidé en 1964. En effet, ce jugement a déclaré que le droit du libelle selon la common law était, en bonne partie, incompatible avec la protection accordée à la liberté de parole et de presse par le premier amendement à la constitution des États-Unis. Dans le présent article, l'auteur analyse les changements qui ont résulté de New York Times Co. v. Sullivan depuis que ce jugement a été rendu. Il montre comment la Cour suprême elle-même a, de temps à autre, changé son interprétation de ce jugement, explique que ce changement résulte du changement de personnel du tribunal lui-même et prédit qu'il y aura encore plus de changements dans le proche avenir.

Jesus' Legal Theory—A Rabbinic Reading

2007 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chaim Saiman
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
New York Times ◽  
Past Century ◽  
Politics And Religion ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
American Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
Political Philosopher ◽  
President Bush

These are heady times in America's law and religion conversation. On the campaign trail in 1999, then-candidate George W. Bush declared Jesus to be his favorite political philosopher. Since his election in 2001, legal commentators have criticized both President Bush and the Supreme Court for improperly basing their decisions on their sectarian Christian convictions. Though we pledge to be one nation under God, a recent characterization of the law and religion discourse sees America as two sub-nations divided by God. Moreover, debate concerning the intersection between law, politics and religion has moved from the law reviews to the New York Times Sunday Magazine, which has published over twenty feature-length articles on these issues since President Bush took office in 2001. Today, more than anytime in the past century, the ideas of an itinerant first-century preacher from Bethlehem are relevant to American law.

The Living River

Power Lines ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Needham
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Colorado River ◽  
New York Times ◽  
Grand Canyon ◽  
Public Lands ◽  
National Interest ◽  
Sierra Club ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
The Supreme Court

This chapter addresses how The New York Times challenged the long-held claims of Arizona officials that their state was entitled to a portion of the Colorado River by rights, a claim recently upheld by the Supreme Court. The paper also argued that Arizona's attempt to realize those claims endangered the Colorado River and the Grand Canyon itself. Transforming the flowing energy of water into flowing electricity, the Times suggested, was not in the national interest. Such critiques of Arizona's growth emerged in the wake of the Interior Department's development of the Pacific Southwest Water Plan, a plan designed in 1963 to realize Arizona's Colorado River claims. The critiques emerged from several different conservationist groups, but most powerfully from the Sierra Club, which was gradually changing the description of its politics from “conservation” to “environmentalism” and assuming a far more public voice in disputes over the proper use of public lands.

A Curious Decision by Zambia’s Highest Court: Six Years Imprisonment for Civil Contempt?

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-138
Author(s):  
Christopher Phiri
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

Abstract On 23 November 2018, the Supreme Court of Zambia delivered a judgement which suggests that Zambian judges have virtually unbridled power to move on their own motion to punish for contempt of court anyone who criticises their judicial decisions. This article considers that judgement. It argues that whilst justice might well have been done in the case in question, it was certainly not seen to be done. Two main reasons are given for this argument. First, the judges appeared to have acted both as prosecutors and adjudicators in their own cause when it was neither urgent nor imperative to act immediately on their own motion. Second, the classification by the Court of the contempt in question as civil contempt rather than criminal contempt is alien to the common law world. The article culminates in a clarion call for the Zambian legislature to intervene and clarify the law of contempt of court to avert capricious and unbridled invocation of the judicial power to punish for contempt.

The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule: Blurring the Line Between Rule and Exception

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Liz Heffernan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Exclusionary Rule ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

The admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal proceedings has generated controversy throughout the common law world. In the United States, there has been renewed debate in recent years over the propriety of the judicially-created exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. When defining the scope and purpose of the rule, the US Supreme Court has placed ever increasing emphasis on the likely deterrent effect which suppressing evidence will exert on law enforcement. This article explores the consequent restriction of the exclusionary rule evinced in the contemporary case law including United States v Herring in which the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the so-called "good faith" exception. In conclusion it offers reflection from the perspective of another common law country, Ireland, where the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence has been the subject of debate.

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