scholarly journals Wordsworthian Chance

2009 ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Andrew Burkett
Keyword(s):  
First Generation ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
The Novel ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Causal Relations ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason

Abstract First-generation Romantic poets generally hold a deeply rooted faith in the notion of the limitless nature of possibility, and in reaction to Enlightenment determinism, several of these poets strive for an understanding and representation of nature that is divorced from Enlightenment notions of causality. This essay specifically explores William Wordsworth’s poetic denunciation of such deterministic accounts of causality through an investigation of The Prelude’s (1799, 1805, 1850) complication of the assumption that the natural effect can be traced backward towards a single identifiable cause. I argue that in place of this principle of sufficient reason, Wordsworth embraces the notion of “chance” as possessing the inexhaustible powers of difference. In accordance with his fascination with the potentialities of the novel infinite, the idea of “chance” allows Wordsworth to challenge the notion of “necessity,” or the philosophic claim that steadfast and orderly laws determine all events in space and time. While Wordsworth certainly does not argue with the notion that cause-effect chains can be traced temporally back in time, such a genealogical record, he suggests, can only ever be deduced and constructed a posteriori. Only after the fact of its historical instantiation can the genealogical record of causal relations be deciphered and inscribed, he indicates. Such a genealogy, then, in no way undermines a faith in chance. Rather, according to Wordsworth, the record only makes the idea of chance all the more manifest. Such a posteriori inscriptions provide a distillation of the concept of chance. In this causal record Wordsworth locates the phantom outlines left in chance’s conceptual wake, or perhaps better stated, through the specters of the idea of chance.

The Correspondence with Clarke

2020 ◽  
pp. 228-249
Author(s):  
Gregory Brown
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Identity Of Indiscernibles ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
The World

The correspondence between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke—mediated by Leibniz’s erstwhile friend and disciple at the electoral court in Hanover, Caroline of Brandenburg-Ansbach, princess of Wales—is arguably the most famous and influential of philosophical correspondences. In this chapter, I begin by tracing the background of the correspondence and the role that Caroline played in its inception and development. I then turn to a discussion of the main themes of the correspondence, paying particular attention to the importance of Caroline’s presence in shaping the themes of the debate: the principle of sufficient reason, the identity of indiscernibles, God’s choice in creating this world, space and time, God’s presence and activity in the world, miracles, and gravity.

The Necessity of Sufficiency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce L. Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Quantum Physics ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Divine Action ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Quantum Phenomena

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of quantum physics and the philosophical deficiency of necessitarian conceptions of physical law, deserves to be given a clear formulation. The goal is to demonstrate, via a suitably articulated principle of sufficient reason, that divine action in an occasionalist mode is needed (and hence God’s existence is required) to bring causal closure to nature and render it ontologically functional. The best explanation for quantum phenomena and the most adequate understanding of general providence turns out to rest on an ontic structural realism in physics that is grounded in the immaterialist metaphysics of theistic idealism.

The Provenance of Consciousness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Vision
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Material Base ◽  
Distinctive Character ◽  
Intrinsic Nature ◽  
Fundamental Particles ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason

Unlike brute ‘entities’, if conscious states (c-states) are brute, it will be a consequence of their primitive—viz., not admitting further elaboration—connection to their material base, what is commonly known as emergence. One might suppose the chief challenge to emergence comes from various materialist counter-proposals. However, given the distinctive character of c-states, a class of critics describe even materialist reductions as objectionable forms of emergentism. Instead, their fallback position is a reinvigorated panpsychism: consciousness is the intrinsic nature of the most fundamental particles. In this chapter the author examines that form of panpsychism, tracing its roots to a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and to suggestions aired in Bertrand Russell’s struggles with the issue. He concludes that this panpsychism fails, leaving the field to materialism and emergentist dualism.

Being and Reason

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence And Nonexistence ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Necessary Existence

In Being and Reason, Martin Lin offers a new interpretation of Spinoza’s core metaphysical doctrines with attention to how and why, in Spinoza, metaphysical notions are entangled with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. For example, according to Spinoza, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself, and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, appear to be defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Or between being and reason? Lin argues against idealist readings according to which the metaphysical is reducible to or grounded in something epistemic, logical, or psychological. He maintains that Spinoza sees the order of being and the order of reason as two independent structures that mirror one another. In the course of making this argument, he develops new interpretations of Spinoza’s notions of attribute and mode, and of Spinoza’s claim that all things strive for self-preservation. Lin also argues against prominent idealist readings of Spinoza according to which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is absolutely unrestricted for Spinoza and is the key to his system. He contends, rather, that Spinoza’s metaphysical rationalism is a diverse phenomenon and that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is limited to claims about existence and nonexistence which are applied only once by Spinoza to the case of the necessary existence of God.

scholarly journals Human Induction in Machine Learning

2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Petr Spelda ◽  
Vit Stritecky
Keyword(s):  
Machine Learning ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Experimental Paradigm ◽  
Risk Minimisation ◽  
Inductive Risk ◽  
Acceptable Accuracy ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
The Common ◽  
Testing Set

As our epistemic ambitions grow, the common and scientific endeavours are becoming increasingly dependent on Machine Learning (ML). The field rests on a single experimental paradigm, which consists of splitting the available data into a training and testing set and using the latter to measure how well the trained ML model generalises to unseen samples. If the model reaches acceptable accuracy, then an a posteriori contract comes into effect between humans and the model, supposedly allowing its deployment to target environments. Yet the latter part of the contract depends on human inductive predictions or generalisations, which infer a uniformity between the trained ML model and the targets. The article asks how we justify the contract between human and machine learning. It is argued that the justification becomes a pressing issue when we use ML to reach “elsewhere” in space and time or deploy ML models in non-benign environments. The article argues that the only viable version of the contract can be based on optimality (instead of on reliability, which cannot be justified without circularity) and aligns this position with Schurz's optimality justification. It is shown that when dealing with inaccessible/unstable ground-truths (“elsewhere” and non-benign targets), the optimality justification undergoes a slight change, which should reflect critically on our epistemic ambitions. Therefore, the study of ML robustness should involve not only heuristics that lead to acceptable accuracies on testing sets. The justification of human inductive predictions or generalisations about the uniformity between ML models and targets should be included as well. Without it, the assumptions about inductive risk minimisation in ML are not addressed in full.

A restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason and the cosmological argument

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Quantum Mechanical ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Restricted Version ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen ◽  
Mechanical Phenomena

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that, necessarily, every contingently true proposition has an explanation. The PSR is the most controversial premise in the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is likely that one reason why a number of philosophers reject the PSR is that they think there are conceptual counter-examples to it. For instance, they may think, with Peter van Inwagen, that the conjunction of all contingent propositions cannot have an explanation, or they may believe that quantum mechanical phenomena cannot be explained. It may, however, be that these philosophers would be open to accepting a restricted version of the PSR as long as it was not ad hoc. I present a natural restricted version of the PSR that avoids all conceptual counter-examples, and yet that is strong enough to ground a cosmological argument. The restricted PSR says that all explainable true propositions have explanations.

scholarly journals A SÍNTESE DA TEORIA GERAL DO EMPREGO, DOS JUROS E DA MOEDA SEGUNDO ROY HARROD EM “MR. KEYNES AND TRADITIONAL THEORY”

1999 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Heller
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Traditional Theory ◽  
Ongoing Research ◽  
Causal Relations ◽  
Complete Development ◽  
Space And Time

A hipótese discutida na pesquisa (ainda inconclusa) que dá origem a este texto é a de que as formalizações matemáticas da Teoria Geral do Emprego, dos Juros e da Moeda, elaboradas por Roy HARROD, John HICKS e James MEADE, além das de David CHAMPERNOWNE e de Brian REDDAWAY, ainda que semelhantes na forma final, foram alcançadas mediante diferentes raciocínios, justificativas e argumentos teóricos, e que a aceitação e o sucesso da versão matematizada se deu pelo fato dela permitir a incorporação – de modo implícito – das variadas relações de causalidade definidas por cada um destes autores. Por razões de tempo e de espaço, o texto explora esta hipótese de forma ainda preliminar e cinge-se apenas à contribuição de HARROD. Abstract The hypothesis behind the ongoing research that motivates this paper suggests that the mathematical formalizations of the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money advanced by Roy HARROD, John HICKS and James MEADE, as well as the ones by David CHAMPERNOWNE and Brian REDDAWAY, although similar in their form, were constructed using different kinds of reasonings, justifications and theoretical arguments. Consequently, the acceptance and success of the mathematized version occurred because it allowed the – implicit – incorporation of the diverse causal relations proposed by each of these authors. Lack of space and time prevent a complete development of this hypothesis here, so this text focuses only on HARROD’s contribution.

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