Re-imagining Olympus: Keats and the Mythology of the Individual Consciousness1

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin Sheley

Abstract By the time John Keats began to write his great mythological works, the use of the classical world in poetry had become somewhat scorned in English literary circles, after the allegorical excesses of the eighteenth century. In Keats’ imagination, however, the Greco-Roman pantheon served not as a source of aesthetic embellishment but as part of a new, organic mythology of his own creation. For Keats, the self-exploration of a personal consciousness most closely approximates divinity, and such divinity depends upon interaction with the immediate, earthly space surrounding an individual. In this essay I explore Keats’ use of myth to access this personal identity, which he does frequently through three poetic techniques. The first I call “mythological sense,” meaning the apprehension of mythological allusions acting as a sixth sense for the narrator as he perceives his surroundings. The second is the physical boundedness that constricts mythological poems. The third is his use of embodied figures, initially anonymous mythological forms which appear first as objects in the narrator’s sensual experience, their mythological identifications secondary and often revealed only after their physical significance has been explored.

Author(s):  
Jakub Čapek ◽  
Sophie Loidolt

AbstractThis special issue addresses the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological viewpoint, especially contemporary phenomenological research on selfhood. In the introduction, we first offer a brief survey of the various classic questions related to personal identity according to Locke’s initial proposal and sketch out key concepts and distinctions of the debate that came after Locke. We then characterize the types of approach represented by post-Hegelian, German and French philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We argue that whereas the Anglophone debates on personal identity were initially formed by the persistence question and the characterization question, the “Continental” tradition included remarkably intense debates on the individual or the self as being unique or “concrete,” deeply temporal and—as claimed by some philosophers, like Sartre and Foucault—unable to have any identity, if not one externally imposed. We describe the Continental line of thinking about the “self” as a reply and an adjustment to the post-Lockean “personal identity” question (as suggested by thinkers such as MacIntyre, Ricœur and Taylor). These observations constitute the backdrop for our presentation of phenomenological approaches to personal identity. These approaches run along three lines: (a) debates on the layers of the self, starting from embodiment and the minimal self and running all the way to the full-fledged concept of person; (b) questions of temporal becoming, change and stability, as illustrated, for instance, by aging or transformative life-experiences; and (c) the constitution of identity in the social, institutional, and normative space. The introduction thus establishes a structure for locating and connecting the different contributions in our special issue, which, as an ensemble, represent a strong and differentiated contribution to the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological perspective.


Author(s):  
Ann Jefferson

This chapter traces the popular usage of “genius” in the nineteenth century. If genius no longer has the self-evidence that was attributed to it in the eighteenth century, this is due in part to the profligacy with which the word had come to be used. While the term is widely invoked—in fact, ever more widely so—it is rarely the subject of sustained theoretical scrutiny of the type established by aesthetics and philosophy in the previous century. The genius celebrated in this popular usage was, more often than not, a collective phenomenon linking success or supremacy with the individual character of institutional or abstract entities in a way that combined genius as ingenium with genius as the form of superlative excellence.


Problemos ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 98 ◽  
pp. 154-169
Author(s):  
Natalia Artemenko

The article dwells upon the issue of a subject intrinsic to the art of the 70s and 80s of the 20th century, it elicits the reasons determining the problematization of “the Self” category inherent in the aesthetic program of the Moscow Conceptualism, preeminently with regards to the works of Dmitry Prigov. “The crisis of the language describing ‘the Self’” has been considered as discrediting the dominant discursive models, disabling the possibility of individual expressing. Within the first part of the article we problematize “the Self” category inherent in the aesthetic program of the Moscow Conceptualism, examine the dominant discursive models and denote the crisis of the language describing “the Self.” The second part is devoted to the issue of “the personal consciousness” coming into being within the aesthetic program of Moscow Conceptualism. The Self is considered as a “category of categories” in dichotomy between “the collective” and “individual” ones. Finally, the third part represents the analysis of a subject of the aesthetic activity. “An imaginary personality” intrinsic to the works of Dmitry Prigov is considered as a subject of “a gnoseological game.”


KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gábor Tóth

The paper discusses Kant’s concept of the subject through Heideger’s critique. Heidegger deconstructs the structure of Kant’s idea of personal identity as the moral subject. In the 13th paragraph of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), Heidegger distinguishes three basic aspects of Kant’s idea of the self: the personalitas transcendentalis, the personalitas psychologica, and the personalitas moralis. The personalitas moralis is defined as the sphere of pure morality, the intelligible realm of freedom. This is an aspect of the individual beyond physical features and also beyond the determinism of laws of nature. The causality by freedom forms the basis of practical actions ordered by moral law. Therefore, it acts as the highest level determinism of Being in human existence. Heidegger’s conclusion shows Kant’s failure in delineating a functional model of the moral subject but accepts Kant’s contribution to laying the foundations of such a theory.


Author(s):  
Makoto Ozaki

Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), another pole of the so-called Kyoto-School of Philosophy of modern Japan, attempts to construct a dialectical, triadic logic of genus, species and individual as a creative synthesis between Eastern and Western philosophy. Although the formal pattern of his method is influenced by the Hegelian dialectic, the way of his thinking is rather prevailed by Kantian dualism. This makes a sharp contrast to his mentor Nishida Kitaro, whose logic of Topos or Place qua Absolute Nothingness is criticized as all-embracing and static in character by him. The difference between them might be parallel to that of Greek and Latin theology concerning the Trinity. Tanabe never presupposes any preexistent entity as the primordial One in the eternal dimension, but rather maintains the individuality as the free subjective agent in the field of history. The dichotomy between the universal and the individual is overcome in and through the mediation of the third term— the species — as the negatively self-realized, specific form of the genus. The species, however, turns out to be the self-estrangement, when it loses the perpetually negative mediation of the free subjective activity of the individual.


1974 ◽  
Vol 124 (580) ◽  
pp. 221-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis Hill

It is a paradox that during the years of psychosocial development each man has to achieve an identity, a role in which he can feel secure, and yet poets and philosophers tell us that man is forever seeking to diminish the isolation which a personal identity imposes. Without the development of a personal identity and a role in life the individual remains a social isolate, a dependent parasite or a social deviant. Yet, once achieved, identity brings a new awareness of separateness from others and a need to merge the self with others, to identify with someone or something else. This would seem to be a main objective of love. It has been said that human love is the supreme act of communication with another, a merging of identity, and poets speak of communicating with nature or with God in like terms. Romantic and sacred literature abound in metaphors and images describing the bliss which such activity offers. If it is true that while we have a need to develop a sense of personal selfhood, an identity and a role, we have a further need to diminish the separateness such awareness imposes, how do we go about it? The contemporary answer is, of course, by communication, by relating to others. The better the communication we have with others, the greater our sense of belongingness, the less the pain of individual isolation. It is not necessary to emphasize that a cardinal feature of all severe mental illness is either a loss or a distortion of the individual's communicative capacity. But I would like to emphasize that the debate as to whether failure of communication is either a cause, or an association, or a consequence of mental illness is not my theme.


This chapter discusses the transition from Kant's view of the self to that deeper but more problematic conception of the self which characterized the later idealism. The transition from Kant's philosophy to the later idealism was a reflection of the spirit which determined the course of contemporary social events. Three features marked the mental life in Germany during the decades with which the eighteenth century closed and the nineteenth century opened, say from 1770 to 1805. The first feature was the great development of actual productive power in scholarship, literature, imaginative work, and the accompanying increase in the popular respect for great individuals. The second was that deepening of sentiment, that enrichment of emotional life, which characterized first the storm and stress period, and later both the classical and the romantic literatures of Germany in those decades. The third feature was that relative indifference to mere political fortunes.


Author(s):  
Anik Febrianti

Openness Self(Self-Disclosure) is the attitude of the individual able and willing to provide information about himself personally, and open and willing to accept the opinions of others to trust someone to be a friend to share. This study aims to: 1) Knowing how the level of the Self Disclosure students at SMAN 2 Bengkulu city F Class X Mathematics and Natural Sciences before being awarded with Technical Guidance Services Group Plots Johari. 2) Knowing how the level of the Self Disclosure students at SMAN 2 Bengkulu city F Class X Mathematics and Natural Sciences after being awarded with Technical Guidance Services Group Plots Johari. 3) Knowing the success of the group with technical guidance services Johari plots in increasing Disclosure Self-student at SMAN 2 Bengkulu city F Class X Mathematics and Natural Sciences. The method used in the research was a class act. The subjects were students of class XI SMA N 2 F MIPA Bengkulu City. The procedure of classroom action research conducted through four (4) stages: 1) planning, 2) implementation, 3) observation, 4) Reflection. Once the data is collected and analyzed obtained the following results: (1) At each cycle of increased openness Yourself students, On Pre Test of 30 students there are eight students who have low levels of self openness as much as 5 students with a percentage of 62.5% and the level of openness Being self as much as 3 students with a percentage of 37.5%. (2) In the first cycle, the level of openness of students improve their self becomes Self Disclosure levels were as much as 6 students with a percentage of 75% and a high level of self Disclosure much as 2 people with a percentage of 25%. In the third cycle, the degree of openness of the Self increases to moderate as much as 1 students with a percentage of 12.5% and higher by 7 students with a percentage of 87.5%. (3) Implementation Guidance Services group with Johari plot technique can increase the level of self Disclosure students at SMAN 2 Bengkulu city F Class X Mathematics and Natural Sciences .


M/C Journal ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Felicity Meakins

Identity is two-faced. In fact, identity is many-faced. Since the work of Goffman on the theory of face, we have come to recognise the flucuating and diverse nature of our identities. Context has become highly relevant. In my own experience, my identity adjusts to various social situations and people. One moment, I am a linguistics student paying more attention to how people speak than to what they are saying -- a tactic guaranteed to irritate the imperturbable. In this face, I frequent the library at lunchtime only to emerge lugging a pile of books and periodicals. The next moment I find myself wearing dresses (well, occasionally) and lipstick, frolicking about the Arts scene feigning an air of infinite wisdom about some obscurity or other. Finally, I don the baggies, yellow glasses and an air of cool unconcern as I sit on my bike at the top of a steep drop-off, contemplating the promise of blood, mud, scars and facial reconstructions. In all these guises, I expend great energy ensuring that various friends only see one of these faces, adjusting my appearance and language accordingly. Mixed parties, of course, present an ultimate dilemma -- which face will I reveal this time!? Of course, this fluidity of face shift is not merely a personality quirk. We all constantly adopt different faces, depending on particular social contexts. We dress differently, adjust the modulation of our voices, and skillfully change the topics of our conversations as we interact in our changing environments. We are not merely two-faced, but many-faced. In this issue of M/C, the writers pull on their 'social commentator' faces to deal with various aspects of identity. M/C guest writer Jonathan Lillie takes a constructionist approach to identity, considering Manuel Castells's idea of a collective identity. He highlights problems with models which fail to identify the individual within the mass, proposing that even within an identity constructed by the dominant instutions, a person may adopt some aspects of a resistance identity. Lillie recognises the Internet as an ideal outlet for resistance identities. Continuing with the Internet theme, Axel Bruns discusses the display of personal identity within the Internet community. He describes how the disembodied nature of online identity means that some form of outside feedback to the presentation of individual personality is needed to realise a user's identity. The effect of this phenomenon is, Bruns suggests, that in computer-mediated communication the Cartesian 'cogito ergo sum' must be rephrased. Adam Dodd looks at computer fighting games and the transfer of player identity onto the characters onscreen. He suggests that in this projection, we demonstrate a willingness to forget ourselves and become an arrangement of coloured lights, happily turning our friends into quivering bloody masses. Linguistically, we can't separate the "I" at the controller from the "I" onscreen. Yet Dodd believes that we still never fail to distinguish between the violence of the computer microworld and that of everyday 'reality'. P. David Marshall considers the confession and its relationship to the self, suggesting that while confession demands an audience, the protestant reformations of self internalised this audience. However, Marshall believes that this audience has recently re-emerged in television programmes such as Ricki Lake, which he dubs the 'public confessional' of television talkshows. This type of confession is exemplified with his own confession concerning a Pat Rafter obsession. Also writing on identity and confession, Heather Wolffram examines the motives behind the current "scholarly striptease", proposing that academics are revealing their identities to vindicate their politics. Adrienne Rich is one academic rejecting the shroud of objectivity, identifying herself as a lesbian in order to speak with more authority on the subject. Wolffram also describes the self-promotion factor of these public confessions. Nick Caldwell turns the focus to a very different kind of assumption of identity. He observes that with the advent of sufficient processor power, many computer users are now using their machines to take on the look and feel of older home computers from a time before Microsoft established its stranglehold on the market. The reason behind this phenomenon, Caldwell offers, is not so much a nostalgia for the good old days, but the desire for computers with an identity beyond the slick and soulless design of Windows. Finally, Kirsty Leishman also looks at an area of rebellion against the mainstream. Taking her cue from a recent newsgroup debate, she reviews the adolescent nature of zines -- publications on the low- and no-budget end of the market. By nature, she finds, zines are both revolutionary in their questioning of institutional publishing industry wisdom, and evolutionary in their aim to develop the zine medium as well as the individual identities of their creators -- qualities which are also at the very heart of the adolescent quest for personal identity. As you can see, cultural criticism has approached problems of identity from many angles. So please slip on your critical reader face, and send us your comments on any of these articles! Citation reference for this article MLA style: Felicity Meakins. "Editorial: 'Identity'." M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 1.3 (1998). [your date of access] <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9810/edit.php>. Chicago style: Felicity Meakins, "Editorial: 'Identity'," M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 1, no. 3 (1998), <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9810/edit.php> ([your date of access]). APA style: Felicity Meakins. (199x) Editorial: 'identity'. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 1(3). <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9810/edit.php> ([your date of access]).


Author(s):  
Bardo Fassbender

The chapter is a comment on Lynn Hunt’s reconsideration, in the same volume, of a crucial moment in the history of human rights when in North America and in France for the first time a ‘self-evidence’ of certain rights of ‘all men’ was claimed in constitutional discourse and documents, and a fundamental shift occurred in the explanation of human rights from a religious framework towards a secular one. The first part of the comment is devoted to the drafting history of the 1776 Declaration of Independence of the United States and to the meaning of the claim to ‘self-evidence’ in the Declaration. In a second part, the author returns to Lynn Hunt’s analysis of the limitations of the actual enjoyment of rights in eighteenth-century North America and France. The third part of the comment deals with the importance, or rather unimportance, of the notion of the self-evidence of human rights in the present age. It is argued that the idea of self-evidence proclaimed in 1776 failed to find general recognition, so that we must search for a new credible foundation of universal human rights.


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