scholarly journals Flexible emission fees

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magnus Enell
Keyword(s):  
Emission Fees

Why do firms oppose entry-deterring policies? Environmental regulation and entry deterrence

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Espínola-Arredondo ◽  
Félix Muñoz-García
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Entry Deterrence ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Policy Regimes ◽  
Incumbent Firm ◽  
The Social ◽  
Emission Fees

AbstractThis paper investigates the design of environmental regulation under different regimes: flexible and inflexible policies. We analyze under which settings strict emission fees can be used as an entry-deterring tool, and become socially optimal. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the incentives of the social planner and the incumbent firm are aligned regarding policy regimes ifentry can be easily deterred by setting a stringent regulation. Their incentives, however, can bemisaligned when entry becomes more costly to deter, leading the incumbent to actually preferenvironmental policies that attract entry.

Strategic Emission Fees: Using Green Technology to Deter Entry

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Espínola-Arredondo ◽  
Felix Munoz-Garcia ◽  
Boying Liu
Keyword(s):  
Green Technology ◽  
Emission Fees

Economic Instruments for Sustainable Environmental Management

2020 ◽  
pp. 438-457
Author(s):  
Günay Kocasoy
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
User Fees ◽  
Road User ◽  
Solid Waste Disposal ◽  
Air Emission ◽  
The World ◽  
Polluter Pays Principle ◽  
Water Fee ◽  
The Many ◽  
Emission Fees

Environmental pollution has been continuously threatening the world. In the combat with environmental pollution problems, waste management authorities, in compliance with the “User Pays Principle-USP”, apply the “Polluter Pays Principle-3Ps” to the waste generators. Thus the resource users and the waste generators will be paying a fee for the resources and services they are using. They can be summarized as water fee, wastewater discharge fee, effluent permit fee, air emission fees, solid waste disposal fee, landfill tax, and hazardous waste tax and product charge, Advance Disposal Fee (ADF), Ozone-Depleting Chemicals (ODC), government product charge and road user fees. The main purpose of charging a fee is to encourage the users and the polluters to reduce the amount of pollutants they are generating and disposing into the environment. These fees can also be named as “a pollution charge fee”, “user charge fee” or “product charge fee”. This chapter outlines the many existing waste fee models.

scholarly journals Refunding Emission Payments: Output-Based Versus Expenditure-Based Refunding

2020 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-667
Author(s):  
Cathrine Hagem ◽  
Michael Hoel ◽  
Thomas Sterner
Keyword(s):  
Abatement Technology ◽  
Crucial Difference ◽  
Political Advantage ◽  
Emission Fees ◽  
Polluting Firms

Abstract We analyse two mechanism designs for refunding emission payments to polluting firms: output-based refunding (OBR) and expenditure-based refunding (EBR). In both instruments, emission fees are returned to the polluting industry, typically making the policy more politically acceptable than a standard tax. The crucial difference between OBR and EBR is that the fees are refunded in proportion to output in the former but in proportion to the firms’ expenditure on abatement technology equipment in the latter. To achieve the same abatement target as a standard tax, the fee level in the OBR design is higher, whereas the fee level in the EBR design is lower. The use of OBR and EBR may lead to large differences in the distribution of output and costs across firms. Both designs imply a cost-ineffective provision of abatement, as firms put relatively too much effort into reducing emissions through abatement technology compared with reducing output. However, a standard tax may be politically infeasible and maintaining output may be seen as a political advantage by policymakers if they seek to avoid activity reduction in the regulated sector.

scholarly journals Emission Fees and Tera: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives in The Twin Cities

1981 ◽  
Vol 31 (8) ◽  
pp. 839-845 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger K. Raufer ◽  
Lawrence G. Hill ◽  
Michael E. Samsa
Keyword(s):  
Twin Cities ◽  
Policy Alternatives ◽  
Emission Fees

scholarly journals Promotion of Green Technology under Different Environmental Policies

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
John C. Strandholm
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Environmental Policies ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Tradeable Permits ◽  
Policy Regime ◽  
Abatement Technology ◽  
Welfare Implications ◽  
Emission Fees

In this paper, I develop a two-stage game of pollution abatement technology adoption in a Cournot oligopoly to investigate a firm’s decision to adopt pollution abatement technology. In particular, I study the adoption incentives and welfare implications of popular environmental policies, namely emission fees and quotas. Tradeable permits result in identical outcomes to emission fees. Within each policy regime, the conditions for Nash equilibria are identified where both firms invest in the green technology, neither firm invests in the technology, or only one firm invests. The following extensions are also analyzed: asymmetric adoption costs, increase in the marginal cost of production from adoption, and a type-dependent fee where adoption reduces the emission fee. Social welfare under an emission fee is identical to that under a quota. However, when policy is (not) stringent, firms are more willing to adopt expensive technology under a fee (quota) than under a quota (fee, respectively).

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