scholarly journals RESEÑA de : García-Escudero Márquez, Piedad. Técnica Legislativa y seguridad jurídica :¿Hacia el control constitucional de la calidadde las Leyes?. Madrid : Cívitas, 2010

Author(s):  
Francisco Martínez Vázquez

Piedad García-Escudero Márquez’ work gives an insight on legislation technique, yet with a new approach that focuses strictly on constitutional aspects. She analyzes the Constitutional Court case law on legal security and how the imperfect technicalities of legislation have an influence on it. The author proposes typical legislation technique solutions which are directly linked to the quality of acts, with a constitutional bias that improves certitude and predictability of Law. She dwells on aspects such as the title and ranking of acts, the homogeneity of their subject matter as well as the problem of invasive norms, legislative jargon, and how acts can fit into the general legislation or the novel assessment of enactments. It is a profound juridical review far from the traditional perception based on practice that has always been enshrined in our doctrine regarding legislation technique.La obra de Piedad García-Escudero Márquez constituye un acercamiento al ámbito de la técnica legislativa que, de forma novedosa, plantea el debate en términos estrictamente constitucionales pues analiza la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional acerca del principio de seguridad jurídica y la influencia que sobre el mismo tienen los defectos de técnica normativa. Asimismo, la autora realiza una ambiciosa propuesta de contenidos típicos de técnica normativa, directamente relacionados con la calidad de las leyes y susceptibles de integrar un juicio de constitucionalidad que redunde en beneficio de la certeza y previsibilidad del Derecho. Aspectos como el título y rango de las leyes, la homogeneidad del contenido y el problema de las «normas intrusas», el lenguaje legislativo, la inserción de la ley en el ordenamiento jurídico o la novedosa evaluación legislativa son aspectos analizados en profundidad en esta obra, desde una rigurosa perspectiva jurídica que se aleja de la tradicional concepción instrumental que nuestra doctrina ha dado siempre a la técnica legislativa.

Author(s):  
Natalia CAICEDO CAMACHO

LABURPENA: Artikulu honetan Estatu zentralaren gastu-ahalmenaren norainokoa aztertzen da gizarte-laguntzaren eremuan. Horretarako, eskumen autonomikoaren garapena deskribatzen da Estatu sozialaren lurralde-deszentralizazioaren esparruan, eta gero azken urteotan diru-laguntzak emateko ahalmenaren erabilerari buruz Konstituzio Auzitegiak jaulkitako jurisprudentzia aztertzen da xeheki. Artikuluan ondorioztatzen da funtsezko aldaketa gertatu dela STC 13 /1992 epaiko diru-laguntzen lurralde-banaketari buruzko irizpideen inguruan. Aldaketa horrek ekarri du ondorio modura, diru-laguntzen deialdiak Espainiako Konstituzioaren 149.1 artikuluko eskumen-tituluetatik banandu eta bereizi egin direla eta laguntzen lurralde-banaketarako irizpideak berrinterpretatu direla ikuspegi zentralista batetik, eta eskumen esklusiboen eremura lekualdatu dela eskumen partekatuentzat finkatuta zegoen araua. Baina, horrez gainera, zentzu zabalago batean, Estatuaren gastuaren bideratzaile izatearen eskumen-funtzioari buruz lehen aplikatzen zen irizpidearen ordez, irizpide zabalagoa, generikoagoa ezarri da, zeinaren arabera araugintza-eginkizunak Estatuari dagozkion eta kudeaketa-eginkizunak, aldiz, autonomia-erkidegoei. Arau hori laguntzaren xede den arloa eskumen partekatukoa edo esklusibokoa den kontuan hartu gabe aplikatzen da. RESUMEN: El presente artículo analiza el alcance del poder de gasto del Estado central en el campo de la asistencia social. Para ello, describe el desarrollo de la competencia autonómica en el marco de la descentralización territorial del Estado social para posteriormente detallar la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional emitida en los últimos años sobre la utilización del poder del poder subvencional. El artículo concluye que se ha producido un cambio sustancial a los criterios sobre la territorialización de las subvenciones de la STC 13/1992. Este cambio supone la desvinculación de las convocatorias de subvenciones de los títulos competenciales del art. 149.1CE y una reinterpretación de los criterios de territorialización de las ayudas en clave centralista trasladando al campo de las competencias exclusivas la regla fijada para las competencias compartidas. Pero, además desde un sentido más amplio, el criterio de la función de la competencia como orientador de la disposición del gasto del Estado se ha sustituido por un criterio más amplio y genérico, conforme al cual las funciones normativas corresponden al Estado y las funciones de gestión corresponden a las Comunidades autónomas. Esta regla se aplica con independencia de que la materia objeto de la ayuda sea una competencia compartida o exclusiva. ABSTRACT : This article analyzes the scope of the spending power by the Central State within the field of social assistance. To that end, it is described the development of the autonomous competence within the State territorial descentralization in order subsequently to itemize the Constitutional Court case law delivered during the last years regarding the use of the power to subsidize. The article concludes that there has been a significant change in the criteria regarding the territorialization of subsidies as stated by the Constitutional Court judgement 13/1992. This change means the decoupling of the call for subsidies from the powers by art. 149.1 C and a reinterpretation of the territorialization criteria in the field of aids in terms of centralization allocating to the field of the exclusive competences the rule established for the shared competences. But from a broader sense the criteria of the competence as a guiding criteria for the disposal of spending by the State has been substituted for a wider and broader criteria according to whom legal functions belong to the State and management functions to the Autonomous Communities. This rule applies regardless of the field of the aid is a shared or exclusive competence.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1&2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba

In order to accomplish its objectives of extensively regulating rights and obligations, the 1996 Constitution of South Africa similarly provides for the enforcement of those rights by the courts. In turn, it has, in the said enforcement provisions, invested in the courts enormous discretionary powers to enable them to effectively deal with breaches of the entrenched fundamental rights as well as all constitutional rights violations. That the Constitutional Court has purposefully interpreted and made optimum use of the expressions: ‘appropriate relief’ and ‘just and equitable’ order in developing the constitutional remedies jurisprudence is crystal clear from a wealth of available case law. It is also not in doubt that the contributions of Justice Ngcobo (later Chief Justice) in this regard are intellectually gratifying. This presentation singles out for discussion and analysis the judgment of Ngcobo J in Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) which not only typifies judicial activism at its acme; it has also introduced into the South African public and labour laws, the novel remedy of ‘instatement.’ Apparently drawn from the analogy of the labour law remedy of reinstatement, ‘instatement’ is akin to the remedy of mandamus in public law, and specific performance in the law of contract. This article moves from the premise that this innovation is one of its kind in contemporary common law jurisprudence and one which courts in the common law jurisdictions world would no doubt emulate one fine day.


Author(s):  
Pavelas Ravluševičius

The primacy and supremacy clauses of European Union law (“EU law”) are to one of the most prevalent issues concerning the relationship between EU law and domestic law of the Republic of Lithuania. It seems that such issues were not definitely settled even when the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union, which established the European Community. During that period, significant changes were made in EU Member States, regarding the domestic application of the principle of primacy and supremacy of EU law. Lithuanian law has undergone the development in this sphere too.The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has developed the meaning of the principle of primacy, which means that European Union law should take precedence over the national law (even over constitutional provisions) and, in case of conflicts between EU law and national law, every national court is obliged to apply the European Union law. The comparative analysis of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court case law shows counter development to the ECJ case law, which may cause the jurisdictional collision of setting aside EU law based on constitutional grounds.The paper includes some relevant examples of application of EU law arising from preliminary ruling procedure under Art. 267 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the praxis of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and Lithuanian courts of general and special competences.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cássia Juliana de Souza Monteiro

In this study, we used as a basis the examination of the German Constitutional Court case law of January 27th, 2015, in which the right of two Muslim employees at public schools to use hijab in the workplace was discussed. We cover the protection of religious freedom in Germany, as defined in art. 4th of the German Basic Law; the relevance of abstract risk and concrete risk in the rationale for an eventual restriction on the fundamental right to religious freedom; the difference and the application of “weighting” and “proportionality”, within the scope of the constitutional interpretation principle of “practical agreement”, where the legal assets to be protected must be coordinated with each other, so that each of them, individually, gain reality, being applied in the relationship “positive religious freedom v. negative religious freedom”; and we highlight the importance of the concept of “neutrality” adopted by States, where some of them are based on secularity and others on secularism.


Author(s):  
Rosario Mora Alemañy

«Los españoles son iguales ante la ley» (art. 14 CE). La recentísima STC 17/2013 señala que «los extranjeros gozan en España del derecho fundamental derivado del artículo 18.4 CE en las mismas condiciones que los españoles»; pero, como señala el voto particular del Magistrado Pérez Tremps, al que se unen otros tres magistrados, la regulación avalada por el Tribunal Constitucional en esta sentencia «pone de manifiesto una notable limitación del contenido esencial del derecho fundamental a la protección de los datos personales (art. 18.4) que, por afectar sólo a personas de origen extranjero, lleva a la conclusión de que los extranjeros ya no gozan en España del derecho fundamental derivado del artículo 18.4 CE en las mismas condiciones que los españoles». Esta sentencia, pues, invita a precisar el alcance con el que la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional reconoce la igualdad también para los extranjeros.«Spaniards are equal before the law» (section 14 of the Spanish Constitution). The latest Constitutional Court ruling states that «aliens in Spain have the fundamental right set by section 18.4 of the Spanish Constitution under the same conditions that Spanish citizens». But the dissenting vote of the senior judge Pérez Tremps, joined by other three judges, appoints that the guidelines backed up by the Constitutional Court in this ruling «show a great restriction of the essential subject of the fundamental right about the protection of personal data (section 18.4). Because only alien citizens are affected by this ruling, it is concluded that alien citizens in Spain enjoy no more the fundamental right set by section 18.4 under the same conditions that Spanish citizens». This ruling invites to specify the extent with which Constitutional Court case law acknowledges equality for aliens, too.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey J. Golden

During the three years in which Gordimer drafted The House Gun (1998), she relied heavily on South African case law, international jurisprudence, and the discerning editorial eye of Nelson Mandela’s lawyer, George Bizos. As such, my reading of The House Gun brings new attention to the novel’s engagement with the reconciliatory efforts of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the juridical work of the South African Constitutional Court to redefine the terms of reconciliation in the country. Through language in a fictional courtroom, Gordimer’s novel turns the process of repair into one that is always immediate and ongoing. It shifts the primarily retributive focus of the law into a reparative and open-ended endeavor. Justice no longer is something that “is done,” Gordimer explains, but rather is a process equally conceived by law and literature. The novel depicts harm in terms of the interpersonal, spatial, and legal fractures it creates. In this way, it expresses reconciliation in the Commission’s language of bridging an injurious past with a present always open to healing.


Author(s):  
María Díaz Crego

En febrero del año 2006, el TS modificaba la forma de cómputo de la redención de penas por el trabajo, regulada en el ya derogado Código Penal de 1973. Esa modificación tenía consecuencias muy importantes para algunos de los condenados bajo el imperio de ese Código, que vieron cómo se alargaba su tiempo de permanencia en prisión hasta en 15 años. Las relevantes consecuencias derivadas de la aplicación de la llamada «doctrina Parot» llevaron a muchos de los reclusos afectados ante el TC y el TEDH. Sin embargo, los pronunciamientos de estos dos tribunales han sido divergentes: si bien el TC ha estimado muy pocos de los recursos de amparo interpuestos, el TEDH parece haber rechazado de forma frontal la doctrina introducida por el TS. En este marco, el presente trabajo analiza las decisiones de estos dos tribunales y trata de determinar cómo deben actuar las autoridades españolas tras la condena a España en el caso Del Río Prada, a fin de resolver el problema de fondo planteado por la aplicación de la doctrina Parot a una gran cantidad de reclusos.In February 2006, the Spanish Supreme Court modified its case-law regarding some provisions of the abrogated Criminal Code of 1973 that allowed the early release of prisoners if they worked while serving their sentence and they demonstrated good conduct. This change in the Spanish Supreme Court case-law had relevant consequences for some convicted prisoners as it meant an important extension of imprisonment years. Many of the prisoners affected by this new case-law appealed against the decisions extending their time in prison before the Spanish Constitutional Court and, after that, before the European Court of Human Rights. In this context, the main aim of this paper is to analyse the decisions adopted by these Courts while reviewing the Spanish Supreme Court case law, and to determine what the Spanish authorities must do after the European Court decision in «Del Río Prada», the sole case in which the European Court has examined the Spanish Supreme Court case-law.


ICL Journal ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabetta M. Lanza

AbstractThis paper analyzes the path paved by the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) in order to reconcile the series of its inconsistent judgments dealing with free trade, right to economic initiative, and freedom of competition. For this purpose, this article aims at investigating the role of the Italian Constitutional Court in the ‘constitutionalization’ of free trade and freedom of competition and at assessing the relationship between European Union policies and the Constitutional Court interpretation thereof.The last decade demonstrates, on the one hand, that the European Union law has influenced the domestic case law and, on the other hand, that, in turn, the European Union legal system has been ‘constitutionalized’ through the introduction of social and constitutional principles deriving from the Member States’ Constitutions.


Author(s):  
Leonardo Álvarez Álvarez

Este trabajo se ha propuesto analizar la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional Federal alemán sobre al proceso de integración europeo. Las categorías de soberanía y democracia, los dos pilares en los que se ha apoyado tradicionalmente su argumentación, se han concebido como cualidades de un ordenamiento nacional. Por ello, la naturaleza, las funciones y límites de la UE se han definido por el Tribunal Constitucional Federal a partir de categorías de derecho interno. Este trabajo ha tratado de demostrar cómo desde la Sentencia sobre el Tratado de Lisboa (2009), se han parecido sentar las bases para definir los conceptos soberanía y democracia, a partir de la tradición constitucional común de los Estados miembros. En definitiva, de lo que modernas escuelas de pensamiento científico denominan un iuspublicum europaeum. Esta transformación metodológica se lleva cabo por el Tribunal Constitucional Federal alemán retornando a la concepción material de democracia presente en su jurisprudencia de los años 50 y 60. Si esta sirvió entonces para construir una democracia militante ad intra frente a los enemigos de la democracia, es posible que pueda servir también ahora para la defensa militante ad extra de la democracia. El respeto de la identidad política alemana impuesta a la UE en la Sentencia Lisboa puede hablar a favor de ello.This paper analyzes the German Federal Constitutional Court case-law about the European integration process. Both concepts of sovereignty and democracy, base of its reasoning, have been constructed as related to a national legal system. Therefore, the nature, functions and limits of the EU has been determined by the BVerfG in relation to state categories. This paper tries to show how since Lisbon’s ruling (2009), the bases for a definition of sovereignty and democracy from the point of view of the common constitutional tradition of Member States may have been established. That’s to say, what modern Schools for Scientific Thought call iuspublicum europaeum. The German Federal Constitutional Court makes this methodological transformation returning to the material concept of democracy established during the 50’s and 60’s. If it was then used in order to construct a militant democracy ad intra against the enemies of democracy, it may be now used to the militant defense ad extra of democracy. The respect for German political identity imposed by Lisbon’s ruling supports this idea.


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