scholarly journals ¿También los extranjeros son iguales ante la ley?

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosario Mora Alemañy
Keyword(s):  
Personal Data ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Data Section ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
The Law

«Los españoles son iguales ante la ley» (art. 14 CE). La recentísima STC 17/2013 señala que «los extranjeros gozan en España del derecho fundamental derivado del artículo 18.4 CE en las mismas condiciones que los españoles»; pero, como señala el voto particular del Magistrado Pérez Tremps, al que se unen otros tres magistrados, la regulación avalada por el Tribunal Constitucional en esta sentencia «pone de manifiesto una notable limitación del contenido esencial del derecho fundamental a la protección de los datos personales (art. 18.4) que, por afectar sólo a personas de origen extranjero, lleva a la conclusión de que los extranjeros ya no gozan en España del derecho fundamental derivado del artículo 18.4 CE en las mismas condiciones que los españoles». Esta sentencia, pues, invita a precisar el alcance con el que la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional reconoce la igualdad también para los extranjeros.«Spaniards are equal before the law» (section 14 of the Spanish Constitution). The latest Constitutional Court ruling states that «aliens in Spain have the fundamental right set by section 18.4 of the Spanish Constitution under the same conditions that Spanish citizens». But the dissenting vote of the senior judge Pérez Tremps, joined by other three judges, appoints that the guidelines backed up by the Constitutional Court in this ruling «show a great restriction of the essential subject of the fundamental right about the protection of personal data (section 18.4). Because only alien citizens are affected by this ruling, it is concluded that alien citizens in Spain enjoy no more the fundamental right set by section 18.4 under the same conditions that Spanish citizens». This ruling invites to specify the extent with which Constitutional Court case law acknowledges equality for aliens, too.

scholarly journals De la ‘libertad informática’ a la constitucionalización de nuevos derechos digitales (1978-2018) // From «computing freedom» towards the constitutionalization of new digital rights (1978-2018).

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artemi Rallo Lombarte
Keyword(s):  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Digital Age ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Contemporary Society ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Digital Rights ◽  
European Directive ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
New Framework

Resumen:La referencia a la informática en la Constitución de 1978 reconoció trascendencia constitucional a la necesidad de protección del individuo frente a los riegos derivados de los avances tecnológicos. Cuatro décadas después, la sociedad contemporánea afronta el reto de constitucionalizar nuevos derechos digitales. En España, sendas leyes (LORTAD y LOPD) desarrollaron el precepto constitucional que consagra la garantía de los derechos frente al uso de la informática. Para preservar a los individuos frente a los riesgos y amenazas de latecnología, el Tribunal Constitución dedujo del artículo 18.4 CE un derecho fundamental autónomo a la protección de datos personales. Las leyes españolas de protección de datos son el resultado de la obligación de cumplir compromisos internacionales (Convenio 108 del Consejo de Europa de 1981) y europeos (Directiva 95/46, artículo 8 de la CDFUE 41 y Reglamento UE 2016/679). Sin embargo, el reconocimiento constitucional o europeo, legal o constitucional, del derecho fundamental a la protección de datos no agota la necesidad de establecer un nuevo marco de protección de los ciudadanos en la era digitalen el que se reconozcan nuevos derechos digitales.SummaryI. Introduction. II. The misleading constitutionalization of «computing ». III. Convention 108 of the council of europe (1981). IV. Data protection right as an autonomous fundamental right. V. LORTAD (1992), LOPD (1999) and its reform. VI. The europeanization of data protection right: Directive 95/46, art. 8 CDFUE and regulation EU 2016/679. VII. Towards the constitutionalization of new digital rights.Abstract:The reference to computing in the Spanish Constitution (1978) recognized constitutional significance to the need for protection against the technological risks. Four decades later, the contemporary society faces the challenge of constitutionalising new digital rights. In Spain, two laws (LOPD and LORTAD) developed the constitutional article that enshrined the guarantee of rights against the use of computers. The Constitutional Court inferred from article 18.4 CE an autonomous fundamental right to the protection of personal data. Spanish data protection laws are the result of the obligation to comply withinternational (Convention 108 of the Council of Europe from 1981) and European (Directive 95/46, article 8 of the CDFUE and Regulation EU 2016/679) commitments. However, the European, legal or constitutional, recognition of the fundamental right to data protection does not exclude the need to establish a new framework for the protection of citizens in the digital age in which new digital rights should be recognized.

scholarly journals El derecho de acceso a la información pública como derecho fundamental:una valoración del debate doctrinal a propósito de la ley de transparencia = The right of access to public information as fundamental right:an assessment of the doctrinal debate c

2014 ◽  
pp. 349
Author(s):  
Göran Rollnert Liern
Keyword(s):  
Public Information ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
Information Set ◽  
The Law ◽  
Parliamentary Procedure ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access

La tramitación parlamentaria de la Ley de Transparencia ha reabierto el debate doctrinal sobre el acceso a la información pública como derecho fundamental. El trabajo hace una valoración de los argumentos utilizados en la discusión, en particular de la jurisprudencia nacional sobre este derecho y de su posible integración en la libertad de información del art. 20.1 d) CE interpretándolo conforme a los tratados internacionales y atendiendo a las recientes sentencias del TEDH dictadas en 2009 y 2013.The parliamentary procedure of the Law of Transparency has reopened the doctrinal debate on access to public information as a fundamental right. The paper gives a valuation of the arguments used in the discussion, in particular the national case-law on this right and the possible integration thereof in the freedom of information set in article 20.1 d) of the Spanish Constitution interpreting it according to international treaties and taking into account the recent judgments of the ECHR established in 2009 and 2013.

scholarly journals Globalization and the Law: Deciphering the Message of Transnational Human Rights Litigation

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1499-1520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Law ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

On 14 October 2004, theBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) voided a decision by theOberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Naumburg, finding a violation of the complainant's rights guaranteed by theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The Decision directly addresses both the observation and application of case law from the European Court of Human Rights under the Basic Law's “rule of law provision” in Art. 20.III. While there is a myriad of important aspects with regard to this decision, we may limit ourselves at this point to the introductoryaperçucontained in the holdings of the case. One of them reads as follows:Zur Bindung an Gesetz und Recht (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) gehört die Berücksichtigung der Gewährleistungen der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten und der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Rahmen methodisch vertretbarer Gesetzesauslegung. Sowohl die fehlende Auseinandersetzung mit einer Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs als auch deren gegen vorrangiges Recht verstoßende schematische “Vollstreckung” können gegen Grundrechte in Verbindung mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip verstoßen

scholarly journals Interpretation of law by the court as an element of legislation

2021 ◽  
pp. 153-164
Author(s):  
O. G. Koban
Keyword(s):  
Court Case ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Judicial Interpretation ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
Characteristic Features ◽  
Correct Understanding

The article examines the problem of the essence and content of judicial interpretation, its characteristic features. The goal of a casual court interpretation is the correct understanding of the content of the norms of law, and the task is to individualize legal regulations. Acts of casual court interpretation are «samples» for lower courts, given that they are always guided by the practice of interpretation. The article also deals with the theoretical aspects of the institute of interpretation of law by court, its gist, and legal nature; explores the views of the Ukrainian and foreign scientists on the subject. The article also deals with relevant to modern legal practice issues of judicial interpretation. The peculiarity of the casual interpretation is that it has a person-oriented character and is relevant to specific circumstances. A casual interpretation can not go beyond the boundaries of a particular legal case and apply to similar cases. The difference between the normative interpretation and the casual is that the former may extend to an unspecified range of cases, and the second one to the incident that was the subject of a dispute. Subjects of casual interpretation are the judicial and administrative bodies. Clarification of the content of the law by the judiciary is a judicial interpretation. The official constitutional interpretation of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is carried out in providing opinions on cases of constitutionality of laws and other legal acts, compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine of international treaties, adherence to the procedure of investigation and consideration of the case of removal of the President of Ukraine from office in the order of impeachment. The supreme court’s interpretation of the case largely influences judicial practice. Courts, in court cases, carry out a casual interpretation of the rules of law and develop case-law on the application of the rules of law. The casual judicial interpretation is the interpretive activity of the court in the process of reviewing and resolving court cases (or in the order of their review by the appellate or cassation instances), the purpose of which is a correct understanding of the content of the legal norm. His task is the individualization of legal requirements, and the result is binding only for a specific court case and parties involved in it. The acts of the casual interpretation of the higher judicial bodies are «samples» for lower courts, given that they are always guided by the practice of interpretation and application of the law by the highest judicial authorities and, as a rule, follow it. Characteristic features of the casual judicial interpretation is that its subjects are judges of all courts, it is directed at the consideration and resolution of a particular court case, the results of such an interpretation are binding only for the parties to a specific court case and are fixed in the motive part of the decision. Keywords: court, casual interpretation, the rule of law, judicial interpretation, rule.

scholarly journals HOW MUCH MIGHT IS RIGHT? Application of Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Traggy Maepa
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Criminal Procedure ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
The South ◽  
Standards Of Practice ◽  
The Law

In 1998 the South African parliament voted on the issue of the use of force when effecting an arrest, in order to bring standards of practice in line with the rest of the democratic world. Four years later the law still has not been signed by the state president, largely due to protests by the ministers of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and Safety and Security. The issue has been before the Constitutional Court and in May 2002, this court did what the executive was afraid to do, striking down parts of the Section and clarifying “reasonable force”. But the court ruling still did not go as far as the legislation in protecting citizens.

scholarly journals La utilización del poder subvencional del Estado en el marco de la asistencia social

2016 ◽  
pp. 355-398
Author(s):  
Natalia CAICEDO CAMACHO
Keyword(s):  
Social Assistance ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Central State ◽  
Autonomous Communities ◽  
Significant Change ◽  
Management Functions

LABURPENA: Artikulu honetan Estatu zentralaren gastu-ahalmenaren norainokoa aztertzen da gizarte-laguntzaren eremuan. Horretarako, eskumen autonomikoaren garapena deskribatzen da Estatu sozialaren lurralde-deszentralizazioaren esparruan, eta gero azken urteotan diru-laguntzak emateko ahalmenaren erabilerari buruz Konstituzio Auzitegiak jaulkitako jurisprudentzia aztertzen da xeheki. Artikuluan ondorioztatzen da funtsezko aldaketa gertatu dela STC 13 /1992 epaiko diru-laguntzen lurralde-banaketari buruzko irizpideen inguruan. Aldaketa horrek ekarri du ondorio modura, diru-laguntzen deialdiak Espainiako Konstituzioaren 149.1 artikuluko eskumen-tituluetatik banandu eta bereizi egin direla eta laguntzen lurralde-banaketarako irizpideak berrinterpretatu direla ikuspegi zentralista batetik, eta eskumen esklusiboen eremura lekualdatu dela eskumen partekatuentzat finkatuta zegoen araua. Baina, horrez gainera, zentzu zabalago batean, Estatuaren gastuaren bideratzaile izatearen eskumen-funtzioari buruz lehen aplikatzen zen irizpidearen ordez, irizpide zabalagoa, generikoagoa ezarri da, zeinaren arabera araugintza-eginkizunak Estatuari dagozkion eta kudeaketa-eginkizunak, aldiz, autonomia-erkidegoei. Arau hori laguntzaren xede den arloa eskumen partekatukoa edo esklusibokoa den kontuan hartu gabe aplikatzen da. RESUMEN: El presente artículo analiza el alcance del poder de gasto del Estado central en el campo de la asistencia social. Para ello, describe el desarrollo de la competencia autonómica en el marco de la descentralización territorial del Estado social para posteriormente detallar la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional emitida en los últimos años sobre la utilización del poder del poder subvencional. El artículo concluye que se ha producido un cambio sustancial a los criterios sobre la territorialización de las subvenciones de la STC 13/1992. Este cambio supone la desvinculación de las convocatorias de subvenciones de los títulos competenciales del art. 149.1CE y una reinterpretación de los criterios de territorialización de las ayudas en clave centralista trasladando al campo de las competencias exclusivas la regla fijada para las competencias compartidas. Pero, además desde un sentido más amplio, el criterio de la función de la competencia como orientador de la disposición del gasto del Estado se ha sustituido por un criterio más amplio y genérico, conforme al cual las funciones normativas corresponden al Estado y las funciones de gestión corresponden a las Comunidades autónomas. Esta regla se aplica con independencia de que la materia objeto de la ayuda sea una competencia compartida o exclusiva. ABSTRACT : This article analyzes the scope of the spending power by the Central State within the field of social assistance. To that end, it is described the development of the autonomous competence within the State territorial descentralization in order subsequently to itemize the Constitutional Court case law delivered during the last years regarding the use of the power to subsidize. The article concludes that there has been a significant change in the criteria regarding the territorialization of subsidies as stated by the Constitutional Court judgement 13/1992. This change means the decoupling of the call for subsidies from the powers by art. 149.1 C and a reinterpretation of the territorialization criteria in the field of aids in terms of centralization allocating to the field of the exclusive competences the rule established for the shared competences. But from a broader sense the criteria of the competence as a guiding criteria for the disposal of spending by the State has been substituted for a wider and broader criteria according to whom legal functions belong to the State and management functions to the Autonomous Communities. This rule applies regardless of the field of the aid is a shared or exclusive competence.

BREACH OF THE OATH AS A BASIS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF A JUDGE

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Legal Responsibility ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Professional Activities ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Law ◽  
Main Basis ◽  
The Right

The article reveals the basic principles of bringing a judge to constitutional responsibility due to violation of the oath as the main basis for this type of responsibility. It has been established that legislative and regulatory support of the procedure and peculiarities of bringing judges to legal responsibility is regulated by the following documents, as the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges», the Law of Ukraine «On the High Council of Justice», the Constitution of Ukraine, the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of 53 People's Deputies of Ukraine on the compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) with certain provisions of the Law of Ukraine «On the High Council of Justice», the European Charter on the Law “On the Status of Judges”, Conclusion No. 3 of the Consultative Council of European Judges into account of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on and the rules governing the professional conduct of judges, in particular, issues of ethics, incompatible behavior and impartiality, the Law of Ukraine «On the Prevention of Corruption», the Code of Judicial Ethics. It was found that only the High Council of Justice has the right to dismiss a judge from office in accordance with the procedure and the decision to dismiss the judge from office. It has been proved that systematic neglect of duties, which is by no means compatible with the status of a judge, revealing a judge's inadequacy to his position, serves as a good reason for dismissing a judge from office. It has been determined that the constitutional responsibility of a judge should be understood as constitutional proceedings for conducting investigations and bringing a judge to justice due to his violation of the provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine and other laws. It has been establishedthat the dismissal of a judge from office as a result of his violation of the oath is one of the grounds for bringing the judge to constitutional and legal responsibility. It has been established that the main types of misconduct committed by judges in the context of breaking the oath are: 1) committing such acts (actions) that tarnish their titles and create doubts about the impartiality, objectivity and independence of their professional activities, in the long term affects the vision of honesty and the integrity of the judiciary; 2) their failure to comply with the restrictions and requirements specified in the Law of Ukraine «On the Prevention of Corruption»; 3) deliberately delaying the time limits for the consideration of a court case, determined by legislation; 4) violation of moral and ethical principles of behavior.

scholarly journals The primacy and supremacy clauses of European Union Law and their application in the legal order of the Republic of Lithuania

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 303-322
Author(s):  
Pavelas Ravluševičius
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
National Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Republic

The primacy and supremacy clauses of European Union law (“EU law”) are to one of the most prevalent issues concerning the relationship between EU law and domestic law of the Republic of Lithuania. It seems that such issues were not definitely settled even when the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union, which established the European Community. During that period, significant changes were made in EU Member States, regarding the domestic application of the principle of primacy and supremacy of EU law. Lithuanian law has undergone the development in this sphere too.The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has developed the meaning of the principle of primacy, which means that European Union law should take precedence over the national law (even over constitutional provisions) and, in case of conflicts between EU law and national law, every national court is obliged to apply the European Union law. The comparative analysis of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court case law shows counter development to the ECJ case law, which may cause the jurisdictional collision of setting aside EU law based on constitutional grounds.The paper includes some relevant examples of application of EU law arising from preliminary ruling procedure under Art. 267 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the praxis of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and Lithuanian courts of general and special competences.

scholarly journals RESEÑA de : García-Escudero Márquez, Piedad. Técnica Legislativa y seguridad jurídica :¿Hacia el control constitucional de la calidadde las Leyes?. Madrid : Cívitas, 2010

2011 ◽  
pp. 681
Author(s):  
Francisco Martínez Vázquez
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Novel ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Legal Security

Piedad García-Escudero Márquez’ work gives an insight on legislation technique, yet with a new approach that focuses strictly on constitutional aspects. She analyzes the Constitutional Court case law on legal security and how the imperfect technicalities of legislation have an influence on it. The author proposes typical legislation technique solutions which are directly linked to the quality of acts, with a constitutional bias that improves certitude and predictability of Law. She dwells on aspects such as the title and ranking of acts, the homogeneity of their subject matter as well as the problem of invasive norms, legislative jargon, and how acts can fit into the general legislation or the novel assessment of enactments. It is a profound juridical review far from the traditional perception based on practice that has always been enshrined in our doctrine regarding legislation technique.La obra de Piedad García-Escudero Márquez constituye un acercamiento al ámbito de la técnica legislativa que, de forma novedosa, plantea el debate en términos estrictamente constitucionales pues analiza la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional acerca del principio de seguridad jurídica y la influencia que sobre el mismo tienen los defectos de técnica normativa. Asimismo, la autora realiza una ambiciosa propuesta de contenidos típicos de técnica normativa, directamente relacionados con la calidad de las leyes y susceptibles de integrar un juicio de constitucionalidad que redunde en beneficio de la certeza y previsibilidad del Derecho. Aspectos como el título y rango de las leyes, la homogeneidad del contenido y el problema de las «normas intrusas», el lenguaje legislativo, la inserción de la ley en el ordenamiento jurídico o la novedosa evaluación legislativa son aspectos analizados en profundidad en esta obra, desde una rigurosa perspectiva jurídica que se aleja de la tradicional concepción instrumental que nuestra doctrina ha dado siempre a la técnica legislativa.

scholarly journals Enforcing the Judgments of the ECtHR in Russia in Light of the Amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerttu Mäger
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
European Court ◽  
Domestic Legislation ◽  
Russian Constitution ◽  
Cherry Picking ◽  
The Law

The paper was written to analyse the enforceability of the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights in Russia, particularly in light of recent amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court and relevant case law of the Constitutional Court of Russia. Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights, obliging member states to execute the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, does not leave room for ‘cherry-picking’ in enforcing the judgements. However, the Constitutional Court has suggested that Russian authorities should indeed engage in cherry-picking and may refuse to enforce judgements that are not in accordance with the Russian Constitution as interpreted by the Constitutional Court. In December 2015, the Russian parliament amended the Law on the Constitutional Court so as to empower said court to declare judgements of the European Court of Human Rights unenforceable when implementation would be in conflict with the Constitution of Russia. The paper discusses the background of these developments and alternatives for overcoming the conflict between domestic legislation and the instruments of the Council of Europe.

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