scholarly journals La crisis financiera como oportunidad político-constitucional : el nuevo freno al endeudamiento en la Constitución Alemana

2011 ◽  
pp. 93
Author(s):  
Ekkehart Reimer
Keyword(s):  
High Price ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Federal Level ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Deficit Spending ◽  
The Stability

In course of the financial crisis, States have proven to be strong actors. However, they have paid a high price for the demonstration of their power-skyrocketing budgetary deficits as well as an alarming increase of overall public debts. With regard to EU Member States, it is true that EU law has mitigated tendencies towards deficit-spending to a considerable degree and that these merits are due to State Aid rules (Arts. 87 et seq. EC Treaty, now Arts. 107 et seq. TFEU) rather than to the Stability and Growth Pact. Many Member States, however, regard an autonomous reduction of deficits as indispensable and take constitutional measures to restrict their annual deficits and/or overall debts. The article analyses the amendments to the German Grundgesetz as well as accompagnying legislation which have been enacted by the Bundestag and Bundesrat in July 2009 as a „Föderalismusreform II“, a major reconfiguration of the legal rules on public deficits on both the federal level and the level of the 16 Länder (states), and provides an outlook on further steps to be taken in the future.En la crisis financiera los Estados se han mostrado como agentes poderosos. Ahora bien, han pagado un precio muy elevado por esta demostración de su capacidad de acción: un aumento vertiginoso de su nuevo endeudamiento neto y un incremento preocupante de la deuda acumulada. Dentro de la Unión Europea, si bien el Derecho de la Unión ha suavizado en considerable medida la tendencia de los Estados a financiarse mediante déficit, esto se ha debido más a una inteligente aplicación de las normas en materia de ayudas estatales [arts. 87 y 88 del Tratado de la Comunidad Europea (antigua versión), actualmente arts. 107 y 108 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea] y menos al Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento. No obstante, muchos Estados miembros consideran a la vez indispensable una reducción autónoma del déficit, y están adoptando medidas constitucionales para limitar su nuevo endeudamiento anual y/o su deuda acumulada. El presente trabajo analiza la reforma de la Ley Fundamental alemana y la legislación de acompañamiento que aprobaron el Bundestag y el Bundesrat en julio de 2009 en el marco de la segunda reforma del federalismo (Föderalismusreform II), una reordenación fundamental de la normativa en materia de déficit público, tanto en el ámbito federal como de los dieciséis Estados Federados (Länder), y aporta una visión prospectiva de qué reformas adicionales son necesarias.

Zur juristischen Begründung des ‚Rettungsschirms‘

2010 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Market Failure ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Market Reactions ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Financial Burdens ◽  
The Stability ◽  
System Errors ◽  
Bail Out

SummaryThe financial and guarantee aids within the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism suspend the Stability and Growth Pact as the basis of the European Economic and Monetary Union. The actual ‘suspension’ from the ‘no bail-out’ restriction (Art. 125 TFEU) and the prohibition of funding national debts (Art. 123 TFEU) transfers risks and financial burdens from deeply indebted states to solvent EU member states. This is the beginning of an unauthorized ‘transfer union’.This analysis does not display any evidence of market failure with respect to a potential domino effect for other EU member states. In addition, a destabilizing speculation cannot be identified. The case ‘Greece’ is rather a special case which has become a common model for other member states, caused by the Council of the European Union and the aid packages. Speculations build a part of the observable market reactions apart from pure hedging, but they simply indicate political system errors.The interventions by the European Central Bank do not lead to functioning markets. These interventions rather lead to yield structures that are inadequate in terms of risks and scarcity. Therefore they will cause a misallocation of financial resources with high economic costs.

Institutionelle Alternativen in der Europäischen Union: Das Beispiel des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes

2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Renate Ohr ◽  
André Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Monetary Union ◽  
Allocative Efficiency ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Fiscal Deficits ◽  
Member States ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
The Stability

AbstractThe Stability and Growth Pact is one of the constituent pillars of the European Monetary Union. Though, meanwhile it is obvious that it will not be able to limit fiscal deficits of the member states. For this reason in this paper Coase′s thinking in institutional alternatives is applied to find a better way to increase the incentives for more fiscal stability. We present and discuss tradable deficit permits comprising market-orientated incentives for fiscal stability. It is shown that tradable deficit permits are superior from a politico-economical view as well as with regard to allocative efficiency.

Eu Fiscal Governance on The Member States: The Stability and Growth Pact and Beyond

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Paul Keppenne
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Maastricht Treaty ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Core ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Fiscal Planning ◽  
The Stability

As explained in the previous chapter, the Maastricht Treaty put in place a mild system of coordination in the area of economic policy, in particular fiscal policy. The Member States keep conducting their fiscal policy, particularly the adoption of budgets and the exercise of taxation power which are at the core of the sovereignty of the states. The Member States thus remain largely sovereign with regard to the conduct of their budgetary policies given that their annual budget, as well as their longer-term fiscal planning are still decided by the national authorities. The Union has no competence to interfere directly in this area acting in place of the national authorities. Notably, no veto right is provided, and the Union could not somehow prevent the adoption of national budgets.

El control democrático y la rendición de cuentas en el Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento

2018 ◽  
pp. 77-112
Author(s):  
Andreu OLESTI RAYO
Keyword(s):  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Budgetary Power ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Economic And Financial Crisis

LABURPENA: Europar Batasuneko herrialdeetako aurrekontu-diziplina zorrotz ziurtatzeko sortu zen bere garaian Egonkortasunerako eta Hazkunderako Ituna (EHI); batez ere, Ekonomia eta Diru Batasuneko partaideen aurrekontu-diziplina ziurtatzeko. Krisi ekonomiko eta finantzarioaren krisiak EHIa errebisatu beharra ekarri zuen, eta era askotako arau-egintzen multzo bat ezarri zen horren ondorioz. Gaur egun, estatuetako politika ekonomikoak zorrotzago koordinatzen eta ikuskatzen dituzte EBko erakundeek. Aplikatzeko arauak eta prozedurak direla-eta gardentasuna galdu egiten da, eta horrek kalte egiten dio kontu emateari. Gainera, herrialdeetako parlamentuei aurrekontuak maneiatzeko gaitasuna murriztu egin zaie, eta murrizketa hori ez da konpentsatu Europako Parlamentuaren egoera hobetuz, izan ere, EHIa eraldatu ondoren, erakundeen arteko harremanetan daukan posizio erlatiboa okerragoa da orain. RESUMEN: El Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento (PEC) fue creado para garantizar, de forma efectiva, la disciplina presupuestaria de los países de la Unión Europea (UE) en general y de los participantes en la Unión Económica y Monetaria en particular (UEM). La crisis económica y financiera motivó una revisión de la PEC mediante un conjunto de actos normativos de diversa naturaleza cuyo resultado ha llevado a una coordinación y supervisión más estrecha de las políticas económicas estatales por las instituciones de la UE. La complejidad de las normas y sus procedimientos de aplicación ocasiona una falta de transparencia que afecta a su rendición de cuentas. Además los parlamentos nacionales han visto limitado el ejercicio de su poder presupuestario y está contracción no se ha compensado con la mejora de la situación del Parlamento Europeo, pues tras la modificación de la PEC su posición relativa en las relaciones interinstitucionales ha empeorado. ABSTRACT: The Stability and Growth pact (SGP) was created to effectively guarantee the budgetary discipline within the EU Member states in general and within the European Monetary Union (EMU) participants in particular. The economic and financial crisis motivated an amendment upon the SGP by means of a set of normative acts of different kinds whose result has led to a closer coordination and supervision of state economic policies by the EU institutions. The complexity of rules and its application procedures result in a lack of transparency that affect its accountability. Besides national parliaments have had the exercise of their budgetary power limited and that constrainement has not been offset with the improvement of the European Parliament situation since after the SGP amendment, its relative position within the interinstitutional relationships had been worsened.

scholarly journals Medium-term budgetary framework in the EU Member States: study case

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatiana – Camelia Dogaru ◽  
Adelina Dumitrescu- Peculea
Keyword(s):  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Research Strategy ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Current Economic Crisis ◽  
Macroeconomic Indicators ◽  
Restructuring Process ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Fiscal Frameworks

The current economic crisis has called for huge fiscal efforts to avoid a deflationary spiral. In the context of the crisis, the national fiscal frameworks may play an important role in sustaining budgetary retrenchment. Therefore, the need for a fiscal consolidation, meaning a well-designed fiscal and budgetary policy is a challenge for all EU Member States. Moreover, the importance of strong and resilient fiscal frameworks has been emphasised by the October 2009 Council conclusions on the fiscal exit strategy.  On this premise, the paper discusses what elements and considerations should be taken into account more carefully in designing resilient fiscal frameworks so as to support optimal policy-making and to promote the respect of the Stability and Growth Pact provisions. The unit analysis consists on several EU Member States, affected by economic crisis. Taking into consideration the aim of the paper, the research methodology is based on a case study as research strategy, and uses the triangulation method to obtain confirmation of findings through convergence of different perspective. Regarding the qualitative research, the authors use theoretical framework, legal analyses, systematic and analytical collecting data from official written sources, and macroeconomic indicators for quantitative aspects.Keywords: budgetary framework, restructuring process, governmental measures and policies. 

Political aspects of security of the European Union Member States

2020 ◽  
pp. 97-105
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kusztykiewicz-Fedurek
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Political Security ◽  
New Institutions ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
The Eu

Political security is very often considered through the prism of individual states. In the scholar literature in-depth analyses of this kind of security are rarely encountered in the context of international entities that these countries integrate. The purpose of this article is to draw attention to key aspects of political security in the European Union (EU) Member States. The EU as a supranational organisation, gathering Member States first, ensures the stability of the EU as a whole, and secondly, it ensures that Member States respect common values and principles. Additionally, the EU institutions focus on ensuring the proper functioning of the Eurozone (also called officially “euro area” in EU regulations). Actions that may have a negative impact on the level of the EU’s political security include the boycott of establishing new institutions conducive to the peaceful coexistence and development of states. These threats seem to have a significant impact on the situation in the EU in the face of the proposed (and not accepted by Member States not belonging to the Eurogroup) Eurozone reforms concerning, inter alia, appointment of the Minister of Economy and Finance and the creation of a new institution - the European Monetary Fund.

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