Evergreening patents: The Indian Supreme Court rejects patenting of incremental improvements

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Brougher

On April 1, 2013, the Supreme Court in India handed down its decision to dismiss Swiss drug maker Novartis AG's attempt to win patent protection for its cancer drug Glivec. In doing so, the Supreme Court held that incremental improvements or modifications to an existing drug are not patentable under India’s patent laws. While the ruling may have allowed India to maintain its ability to manufacture generic drugs, the ruling has increased the challenges that pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies face in obtaining patent protection in India. In the long term, these challenges may prove to have far greater implications for the biotechnology industry that go beyond merely the patentability of one drug product. In view of this recent decision, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies are undoubtedly re-evaluating their foreign patent strategies.

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer A. Camacho

On March 20, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Mayo Collaborative Services, et al v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc (“Mayo”) and ended an eight-year legal battle over patents covering processes for determining patient-specific dosing for a thiopurine drug to treat autoimmune diseases.  In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the claimed processes are not patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101 of the U.S. patent laws, and overturned the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The Supreme Court decision in Mayo established that the machine-or-transformation test is not the definitive test for determining the patent-eligibility of process claims, including process claims that embody laws of nature or natural phenomena.  In its analysis, the Court determined considered whether the claims were drawn to patent eligible subject matter as provided under 35 U.S.C. §101 of the U.S. patent laws, or patent ineligible subject matter excepted from §101.  The Court held that the process claims were essentially drawn to the laws of nature themselves and thus fell into the laws-of-nature exception to §101.  The process claims did not cover patent-eligible processes of applying certain laws of nature.  This decision has clear implications for the biotechnology industry that go beyond diagnostics and personalized medicine. As such, biotechnology companies should consider re-evaluating their patent position and adapting their patent strategies in view of Mayo.


Author(s):  
Gust A. Yep ◽  
Rebecca N. Gigi ◽  
Briana E. Avila

This chapter addresses the complex interplay between voice and silence in US LGBT communities. In terms of voice, the chapter focuses on Evan Wolfson, founder of Freedom to Marry and colloquially known as “Mr. Gay Marriage,” whose public comments on same-sex divorce before and after the Supreme Court ruling on marriage equality focused on two central themes: (1) fairness and (2) protection. In terms of silence, the chapter focuses on the largely absent discourse about same-sex divorce in mainstream LGBT online media to explore its multiple meanings. The analysis explores three major themes: (1) that same-sex divorce is a recent phenomenon, (2) that same-sex divorce may not be relevant to unconventional long-term relationships, and (3) that creation of a pseudo charmed circle suppresses the visibility of same-sex divorce. The chapter concludes by exploring the implications of the multiple meanings of voice and silence surrounding same-sex relational dissolution.


Author(s):  
Vakil Raeesa

This chapter explores how the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court has evolved as an appellate court, a constitutional court, and a ‘final’ court. It begins by reviewing the four kinds of appeal that may be heard by the Supreme Court as specified in the Indian Constitution: civil, criminal, questions of constitutional interpretation, and appeals by special leave of the Court. It then considers the uncertainty and expansion in the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, with particular emphasis on the imbalance in jurisdictional reforms, the absence of guidelines for the exercise of discretion, and inconsistency in implementing constitutional provisions. It also discusses the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, adjudication of federal disputes, and jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution, along with its power to enforce justice and its claim to inherent powers. The chapter concludes by outlining some of the challenges faced by the Court today.


Significance Rubio's move comes as several candidates for the Democratic Party's 2020 presidential nomination are discussing 'packing' the Supreme Court -- adding justices intended to nullify the perceived long-term conservative bias of the Court following Trump-era appointments. Impacts A constitutional change to limit the Supreme Court to nine justices is unlikely: amendments are purposely hard. Court-packing would not guarantee 'Democratic' or 'Republican' rulings: much depends on the case and how justices feel. Packing the courts would likely increase their politicisation, and potentially slow their deliberative capacity. If Trump wins a second term and Republicans keep the Senate, they will appoint further conservative justices. If the Democrats win the White House and Senate in 2020, they might 'pack' the lower courts.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinee Lokaneeta

In this essay, I explore some of the contemporary debates on the role of the Indian Supreme Court in the context of equality and liberty at a moment when it appears that the very reasons for the celebration of judicial review and interventions are under attack by progressive scholars and activists. In reviewing the debates on the role of the Court, I focus on one particular contention that since the realm of social/equality was paramount for the Indian state as a whole, and the Supreme Court post-emergency, the realm of political/liberty was consequently ignored. By revisiting the debate on equality trumping liberty, I acknowledge the critiques of the Court but also point to ways in which certain facets of political liberty do get addressed even in the absence of a focus on liberty. Even if by themselves these judicial interventions may be inadequate to create a due process revolution as far as criminal defendant rights are concerned, they create an “arsenal of tools” available for those concerned with liberty and justice. At the very least, such a conception portrays the Court as less unidimensional than characterized by recent scholarship and retains the Court as a productive site of contestation.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aparna Chandra ◽  
William Hubbard ◽  
Sital Kalantry

There has been a national debate raging in India about the system of appointments for Supreme Court and High Court judges. At the founding of the Indian Supreme Court, the executive had primary authority over judicial appointments. In 1993, the Supreme Court created a new system of appointments known as the collegium system, whereby the Chief Justice of India and senior judges of the Supreme Court make new appointments to the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts. In 2014, Parliament amended the Constitution and passed a bill to create a commission to appoint judges, but the Indian Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional.In this article, we ascertain whether the nature of the appointments procedure impacts the biographical and other characteristics of the judges that are eventually selected. We do this by comparing the biographical characteristics of judges appointed by the executive-appointments system (prior to 1993), on the one hand, and the judges appointed by the collegium (on or after 1993) to the Supreme Court of India.We find that both the pre-collegium and the collegium system maintain the geographical and religious diversity of India in the candidates that are appointed. However, both have failed to account for gender diversity. In addition, the path to the Supreme Court appears to have narrowed – typically those who are appointed as judges by the collegium spend longer periods in private practice and on the bench than pre-collegium judges.


Author(s):  
Baxi Upendra

This chapter examines constitutional hegemony in relation to three forms of prudence: legisprudence, jurisprudence, and demosprudence. It considers how constitutional pluralism has influenced the making and working of the Indian Constitution, especially through the dynamics of the Supreme Court of India. In particular, it explores the notion of adjudicatory leadership and the concept of demosprudence in the context of the Indian Supreme Court, along with the changing relation between demosprudence and jurisprudence. The article first looks at the demosprudence of the Supreme Court of India, before discussing the concepts of organisational adjudicatory leadership, hermeneutic adjudicatory leadership, Social Action Litigation, and socially responsible criticism. It also analyses the politics and law of constitutional amendments.


1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Mishler ◽  
Reginald S. Sheehan

Although normative questions about the role of the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian institution have long excited controversy in democratic theory, empirical questions about how far the Court acts contrary to majoritarian opinion have received less attention. Time series analyses for the period 1956–89 indicate the existence of a reciprocal and positive relationship between long-term trends in aggregate public opinion and the Court's collective decisions. The Court's ideological composition changes in response to previous shifts in the partisan and ideological orientation of the president and Congress. The Court also responds to public opinion at the margins even in the absence of membership change. Since 1981, the relationship has vanished or turned negative in direction. The Court's ideological balance has been upset by an unbroken string of conservative-to-moderate appointments, thereby undermining the dynamics that promote judicial responsiveness and raising questions about the majoritarianism of the contemporary and future Court.


Author(s):  
Neha Jain

This chapter argues that international law has served as a useful tool for the Indian Supreme Court in fulfilling aims that have little to do with the court’s purported status as an organ of the international community. Rather, the Supreme Court has appropriated international legal norms to pursue primarily domestic goals. This chapter proceeds as follows. Section II gives an overview of the status of international law in the Indian constitutional scheme. Section III analyzes the creative uses of international law by the Indian Supreme Court to fill in and add to the content of constitutional rights and guarantees, enabling its encroachment into domains that are normally the prerogative of the legislature and the executive. Section IV puts forward a possible explanation for this appropriation of international legal norms and suggests that international law has performed a legitimizing function in the Supreme Court’s articulation of its vision of the state.


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