Shared agency: a planning theory of acting together

2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (02) ◽  
pp. 52-0764-52-0764
Keyword(s):  
Planning Theory ◽  
Shared Agency

scholarly journals Shared Agency: Replies to Ludwig, Pacherie, Petersson, Roth, and Smith

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman
Keyword(s):  
Planning Theory ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Oxford University Press

AbstractThese are replies to the discussions by Kirk Ludwig, Elizabeth Pacherie, Björn Petersson, Abraham Roth, and Thomas Smith of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).

scholarly journals Shared Agency in Modest Sociality

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Ludwig
Keyword(s):  
Planning Theory ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
Shared Agency

AbstractA contribution to a symposium on Michael Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.

scholarly journals Précis of Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman
Keyword(s):  
Planning Theory ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Oxford University Press

AbstractA précis of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).

scholarly journals Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Michael E. Bratman)

Gogoa ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zvonko Díaz
Keyword(s):  
Planning Theory ◽  
Shared Agency

Shared agency eskala txikiko ekintza kolektiboari buruzko lana da, jar- duera sozialak ekite indibidualarekin daukan harremanaren ingurukoa.

Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together

2014 ◽  
Vol 65 (260) ◽  
pp. 582-585
Author(s):  
Adam Morton
Keyword(s):  
Planning Theory ◽  
Shared Agency

Précis of Shared agency: a planning theory of acting together

2015 ◽  
Vol 172 (12) ◽  
pp. 3375-3378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman
Keyword(s):  
Planning Theory ◽  
Shared Agency

scholarly journals Bratman, Searle, and Simplicity. A comment on Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Petersson
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
Planning Theory ◽  
Group Agency ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Central Claim

AbstractMichael Bratman’s work is established as one of the most important philosophical approaches to group agency so far, and Shared Agency, A Planning Theory of Acting Together confirms that impression. In this paper I attempt to challenge the book’s central claim that considerations of theoretical simplicity will favor Bratman’s theory of collective action over its main rivals. I do that, firstly, by questioning whether there must be a fundamental difference in kind between Searle style we-intentions and I-intentions within that type of framework. If not, Searle’s type of theory need not be less qualitatively parsimonious than Bratman’s. This hangs on how we understand the notions of modes and contents of intentional states, and the relations between modes, contents, and categorizations of such states. Secondly, by questioning whether Bratman’s theory steers clear of debunking or dismissing collectivity. Elsewhere I have claimed that the manoeuvres Bratman suggested to avoid circularity in his conceptual analysis (in 1992 and 1997) undermine the strength of his resulting notion of collective action. Bratman responds in detail to this objection in his new book and I return to the issue towards the end of the paper.

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