Snapshot: Robert Brandom

2019 ◽  
pp. 38-46
Author(s):  
Ronald Loeffler ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Robert Brandom

A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge

Dialogue ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 565-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byeong D. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Practice Model ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
The Gettier Problem

ABSTRACTRobert Brandom argues for a “pragmatic phenomenalist account” of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to develop and defend a pragmatic phenomenalist account of knowledge by resolving those problems. I argue, in particular, that this account can accommodate both the lesson of the Gettier problem and the lesson of reliabilism simultaneously.

Two Refutations of the Vorhanden Reading of Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science in Being and Time

2021 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 174-187
Author(s):  
Paul Goldberg ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Hubert Dreyfus

The dominant interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy of science in Being and Time is that he defines science, or natural science, in terms of presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). I argue that this interpretation is false. I call this dominant view about Heidegger’s definition of science the vorhanden claim; interpreters who argue in favor of this claim I call vorhanden readers. In the essay, I reconstruct and then refute two major arguments for the vorhanden claim: respectively, I call them equipmental breakdown (Section 1) and theoretical assertion (Section 2). The equipmental breakdown argument, stemming mainly from Hubert Dreyfus, advances a vorhanden reading on the basis of three other interpretive claims: I call them, respectively, the primacy of practice claim, the decontextualization claim, and the breakdown claim. While I remain agnostic on the first claim, the argument fails because of decisive textual counterevidence to the latter two claims. Meanwhile, the theoretical assertion argument, which I reconstruct mainly from Robert Brandom, premises its vorhanden claim on the basis of some remarks in Being and Time indicating that theoretical assertions, as such, refer to present-at-hand things. Since science is taken to be a paradigmatic case of an activity that makes theoretical assertions, the vorhanden claim is supposed to follow. I refute this argument on the grounds that it equivocates on Heidegger’s concept of “theoretical assertion” and cannot account for his insistence that science does not principally consist in the production of such assertions. I conclude that, with the failure of these two arguments, the case for the vorhanden claim is severely weakened.

scholarly journals On the Contrary: Inferential Analysis and Ontological Assumptions of the A Contrario Argument

2008 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damiano Canale ◽  
Giovanni Tuzet
Keyword(s):  
Strong Version ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Inferential Analysis ◽  
The Law ◽  
Normative Sentence

We remark that the A Contrario Argument is an ambiguous technique of justification of judicial decisions. We distinguish two uses and versions of it, strong and weak, taking as example the normative sentence “Underprivileged citizens are permitted to apply for State benefit”. According to the strong version, only underprivileged citizens are permitted to apply for State benefit, so stateless persons are not. According to the weak, the law does not regulate the position of underprivileged stateless persons in this respect. We propose an inferential analysis of the two uses along the lines of the scorekeeping practice as described by Robert Brandom, and try to point out what are the ontological assumptions of the two. We conclude that the strong version is justified if and only if there is a relevant incompatibility between the regulated subject and the present case.

Inquiry and Argument in the Secular Academy

2021 ◽  
pp. 193-217
Author(s):  
William Wood
Keyword(s):  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Academic Argument ◽  
Pragmatist Philosophy ◽  
Academic Study

Part IV turns to an extended engagement with the academic study of religion, which is often constitutively hostile to any form of theology. Chapter 11 identifies some of the norms of inquiry and argument that prevail in the secular academy in order to show that analytic theology conforms to those very same norms. I develop a framework for academic argument that depends on the notion of “discursive commitments,” taken from the pragmatist philosophy of Robert Brandom and Jeffrey Stout. Here is the central insight: when we engage in academic argument, we are obliged to support our claims with reasons and evidence, and to respond with reasons and evidence when our claims are appropriately challenged.

Dewey, Rorty, and Brandom

2018 ◽  
pp. 98-130
Author(s):  
David Hildebrand
Keyword(s):  
Richard Rorty ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Political Realities

Sixty-five years after John Dewey’s last publication, there is an enormous literature interpreting, criticizing, and developing his pragmatism. Some working this vein are called “pragmatists,” while others are variously named “neopragmatists,” “new pragmatists,” and “linguistic pragmatists.” In general, the latter groups (a) focus more upon language, truth, and logic; (b) minimize or eschew talk of “experience”; (c) incline more toward professional, intraphilosophy dialogue rather than practical, extra-philosophy dialogue. Whither Dewey? What are the newer pragmatisms’ impacts on his reception and interpretation? What opportunities or obstacles are presented? Which among Dewey’s original insights still shine with signal importance? This chapter first considers the two most important neopragmatists, Richard Rorty and Robert Brandom, giving the largest space to Brandom. It concludes with Dewey, arguing that his melioristic, experiential starting point remains central and, indeed, indispensable to any pragmatism wishing to connect with everyday ethical, social, and political realities.

Inferentialism and Singular Reference

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark McCullagh
Keyword(s):  
Singular Terms ◽  
Inferential Role ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Binary Partition ◽  
Singular Reference

In Making It Explicit (1994) Robert Brandom claims that we may distinguish those linguistic expressions with object-representational purport — the singular terms — from others merely by the structure of their inferential relations. A good part of his inferentialist program rests on this claim. At first blush it can seem implausible: linguistic expressions stand in inferential relations to each other, so how could we appeal to those relations to decide on the obtaining of what seems to be relation between linguistic expressions and objects in general (viz., x purports to represent y)? It is perhaps not surprising then that Brandom's proposal fails. But it definitely is surprising how it fails. The problem is that in order to specify the sort of generality there is to an expression's inferential role, one must appeal to some version of the traditional distinction between extensional and nonextensional occurrences of expressions, and there appears to be no way to draw anything like that distinction in inferentialist terms. For the inferential proprieties governing the different occurrences an expression can have are so varied that they do not determine a binary partition of those occurrences.

Sprachgrenzen

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katja Stepec
Keyword(s):  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Robert Brandom

Eine Übersetzung funktioniert, weil Ausdrücke in unterschiedlichen Sprachen dieselbe Bedeutung haben – so die alltagspraktische Intuition. Dahinter verbirgt sich ein atomistisches Verständnis von Bedeutung, das von den sprachphilosophischen Reflexionen des semantischen Holismus überzeugend in Frage gestellt wird. Ihnen zufolge kann Bedeutungsgleichheit nicht durch Referenz auf ein außersprachlich Gegebenes garantiert und damit einfach vorausgesetzt werden. Dann aber drohen sprachlicher Relativismus und semantische Inkommensurabilität, was gemeinhin Unübersetzbarkeit zur Folge hätte. Wie kann trotzdem erklärt werden, dass Übersetzen möglich ist? Die vorliegende Studie beantwortet diese Frage, indem sie anhand der Ansätze von W.V. Quine, Donald Davidson und Robert Brandom zunächst den Mangel des semantischen Holismus herausarbeitet, der Bedeutung grundsätzlich intrasprachlich fasst. In der Folge wird Übersetzung als Interpretation missverstanden. Stattdessen soll Übersetzen als normativer intersprachlicher Vergleich konzipiert werden, sodass sich Bedeutungsgleichheit nicht als Voraussetzung, sondern als Ergebnis des Übersetzens darstellt. Eine Erklärung des Übersetzens ist insofern nicht nur möglich, sondern erweist sich auch als notwendig, um die Erklärungsdefizite des semantischen Holismus zu überwinden.

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