Sprachgrenzen

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katja Stepec

Eine Übersetzung funktioniert, weil Ausdrücke in unterschiedlichen Sprachen dieselbe Bedeutung haben – so die alltagspraktische Intuition. Dahinter verbirgt sich ein atomistisches Verständnis von Bedeutung, das von den sprachphilosophischen Reflexionen des semantischen Holismus überzeugend in Frage gestellt wird. Ihnen zufolge kann Bedeutungsgleichheit nicht durch Referenz auf ein außersprachlich Gegebenes garantiert und damit einfach vorausgesetzt werden. Dann aber drohen sprachlicher Relativismus und semantische Inkommensurabilität, was gemeinhin Unübersetzbarkeit zur Folge hätte. Wie kann trotzdem erklärt werden, dass Übersetzen möglich ist? Die vorliegende Studie beantwortet diese Frage, indem sie anhand der Ansätze von W.V. Quine, Donald Davidson und Robert Brandom zunächst den Mangel des semantischen Holismus herausarbeitet, der Bedeutung grundsätzlich intrasprachlich fasst. In der Folge wird Übersetzung als Interpretation missverstanden. Stattdessen soll Übersetzen als normativer intersprachlicher Vergleich konzipiert werden, sodass sich Bedeutungsgleichheit nicht als Voraussetzung, sondern als Ergebnis des Übersetzens darstellt. Eine Erklärung des Übersetzens ist insofern nicht nur möglich, sondern erweist sich auch als notwendig, um die Erklärungsdefizite des semantischen Holismus zu überwinden.

Author(s):  
Joseph Rouse

This paper recapitulates my four primary lines of argument that what is wrong with scientific realism is not realist answers to questions to which various anti-realists give different answers, but instead assumptions shared by realists and anti-realists in framing the question. Each strategy incorporates its predecessors as a consequence. A first, minimalist challenge, taken over from Arthur Fine and Michael Williams, rejects the assumption that the sciences have a general aim or goal. A second consideration is that realists and antirealists undertake a mistaken, substantive commitment to a separation between mind and world, which allows them to frame the issue in terms of how epistemic “access” to the world is mediated. A third strategy for dissolving the realism question challenges its underlying commitment to the independence of meaning and truth, a strategy pursued in different ways by Donald Davidson, Robert Brandom, John McDowell, John Haugeland, and myself. The fourth and most encompassing strategy shows that realists and antirealists are thereby committed to an objectionably antinaturalist conception of scientific understanding, in conflict with what the sciences themselves have to say about our own conceptual capacities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Lisa Landoe Hedrick

This article addresses the problem of intentionality in Analytic philosophy. It begins with an assessment of post-Sellarsian scholarship, with primary attention to the work of Richard Rorty, Donald Davidson, Robert Brandom, and John McDowell. I argue that contemporary Analytic discourse on intentionality not only needs, but internally warrants, a pragmatist metaphysics in order to adequately and accurately communicate its public relevance—particularly in ethics. I suggest the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead as consonant with the sort of metaphysics needed in order to correct tacit presuppositions currently limiting Analytic treatments of intentionality and, in turn, the possibility of ethical critique without ethnocentrism. The resultant proposal is for a “modest” metaphysics, not unlike that for which Jeffrey Stout has called.


Polisemia ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 79-95
Author(s):  
Edisson Rincón Higuera

El presente artículo es una aproximación a las problemáticos suscitadas por el surgimiento de teorías como lo inconmensurabilidad y la indeterminación de lo traducción, propuestos por Paul Feyerabend y Quine respectivamente, y las cuestiones de fondo que ello suscita en la problemático del multiculturalismo. Luego de plantear las propuestas fundamentales de los teorías mencionadas, revisaremos la crítica que Donald Davidson realiza con la postulación del principio de caridad, como condición de lo posibilidad de la comunicación y, proponemos una línea interpretativa sobre la base de una teoría de construcción de mundo apoyados en el concepto de empatía e imaginación, como presupuesto fundamentales a la hora de entablar un diálogo.


Dialogue ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 565-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byeong D. Lee

ABSTRACTRobert Brandom argues for a “pragmatic phenomenalist account” of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to develop and defend a pragmatic phenomenalist account of knowledge by resolving those problems. I argue, in particular, that this account can accommodate both the lesson of the Gettier problem and the lesson of reliabilism simultaneously.


1979 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Black
Keyword(s):  

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 601-629
Author(s):  
Maura Tumulty

Some theories of language, thought, and experience require their adherents to say unpalatable things about human individuals whose capacities for rational activity are seriously diminished. Donald Davidson, for example, takes the interdependence of the concepts of thought and language to entail that thoughts may only be attributed to an individual who is an interpreter of others’ speech. And John McDowell's account of human experience as the involuntary exercise of conceptual capacities can be applied easily only to individuals who make some reasonable judgments, because conceptual capacities are paradigmatically exercised in judgments. In both cases, we seem forced towards an error theory about any ordinary understanding of impaired human individuals as minded, or as undergoing human experience.


Dialogue ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Kernohan

In a recent series of papers, Donald Davidson has put forward a challenging and original philosophy of mind which he has called anomalous monism. Anomalous monism has certain similarities to another recent and deservedly popular position: functionalist cognitive psychology. Both functionalism, in its materialist versions, and anomalous monism require token-token psychophysical identities rather than type-type ones. (Token identities are identities between individual events; type identities represent a stronger claim of identities between interesting sorts of events.) Both deny that psychology can be translated into, or scientifically reduced to, neurophysiology. Both are mentalistic theories, allowing psychology to make use of intentional descriptions in its theorizing. Anomalous monism uses a belief/desire/action psychology; cognitive science makes use of information-bearing states. But these similarities must not be allowed to conceal an essential difference between the two positions. Cognitive psychology claims to be a science, making interesting, lawlike generalizations for the purpose of explaining mental activity. Anomalous monism denies that psychology is a science by denying that psychological laws can be formulated. Davidson has other ideas for psychology connected with his work on meaning and truth. Hence, the title of one of his essays on anomalous monism is “Psychology as Philosophy”.


2021 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 174-187
Author(s):  
Paul Goldberg ◽  

The dominant interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy of science in Being and Time is that he defines science, or natural science, in terms of presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). I argue that this interpretation is false. I call this dominant view about Heidegger’s definition of science the vorhanden claim; interpreters who argue in favor of this claim I call vorhanden readers. In the essay, I reconstruct and then refute two major arguments for the vorhanden claim: respectively, I call them equipmental breakdown (Section 1) and theoretical assertion (Section 2). The equipmental breakdown argument, stemming mainly from Hubert Dreyfus, advances a vorhanden reading on the basis of three other interpretive claims: I call them, respectively, the primacy of practice claim, the decontextualization claim, and the breakdown claim. While I remain agnostic on the first claim, the argument fails because of decisive textual counterevidence to the latter two claims. Meanwhile, the theoretical assertion argument, which I reconstruct mainly from Robert Brandom, premises its vorhanden claim on the basis of some remarks in Being and Time indicating that theoretical assertions, as such, refer to present-at-hand things. Since science is taken to be a paradigmatic case of an activity that makes theoretical assertions, the vorhanden claim is supposed to follow. I refute this argument on the grounds that it equivocates on Heidegger’s concept of “theoretical assertion” and cannot account for his insistence that science does not principally consist in the production of such assertions. I conclude that, with the failure of these two arguments, the case for the vorhanden claim is severely weakened.


1975 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 287
Author(s):  
John L. Stewart ◽  
John Tyree Fain ◽  
Thomas Daniel Young ◽  
Lewis P. Simpson
Keyword(s):  

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