Moral Vegetarianism

2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-249
Author(s):  
Brian G. Henning ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 661-668
Author(s):  
L. W. Sumner

Since philosophers began thinking seriously about the moral status of non-human animals, many of the practices we once took for granted have come to be condemned as unjustifiable, among them our reliance on animals as a food source. While the arguments which have been adduced in support of moral vegetarianism invoke quite different (indeed incompatible) moral frameworks, they begin with a common concern for the welfare of animals. In the real world of practising vegetarians, this concern tends to be subordinated to considerations of health or food scarcity. Philosophical vegetarians need not deny, and have not denied, the importance of these further considerations. But among philosophers the case for moral vegetarianism has rested primarily on arguments from animal welfare.


1986 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 277
Author(s):  
Edward Johnson ◽  
R. G. Frey

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 177-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Loren Lomasky

AbstractEating meat appeals, but the cost is measured in millions of slaughtered animals. This has convinced many that vegetarianism is morally superior to a carnivorous diet. Increasingly, those who take pleasure in consuming animals find it a guilty pleasure. Are they correct? That depends on the magnitude of harm done to food animals but also on what sort of a good, if any, meat eating affords people. This essay aims to estimate both variables and concludes that standard arguments for moral vegetarianism are significantly misplaced. That is because the contribution of meat eating to lives of excellence is underestimated and overall harms to animals consequent on practices of meat eating are overestimated. The answer to the question posed in the title is, therefore, “No.”


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-72
Author(s):  
C.J. Oswald

Most arguments for moral vegetarianism rely on thepremise that non-human animals can suffer. In this paper I evaluateproblems that arise from Peter Carruthers’ Higher-Order Thoughttheory of consciousness. I argue that, even if we assume that theseproblems cannot be overcome, it does not follow that we should notsubscribe to moral vegetarianism. I conclude that we should act as ifnon-human animals have subjective experiences for moral reasons,even if we cannot be certain that they do.


Appetite ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M.T Fessler ◽  
Alexander P Arguello ◽  
Jeannette M Mekdara ◽  
Ramon Macias

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document