Moral Vegetarianism and the Philosophy of Mind

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 67-72
Author(s):  
C.J. Oswald ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-72
Author(s):  
C.J. Oswald

Most arguments for moral vegetarianism rely on thepremise that non-human animals can suffer. In this paper I evaluateproblems that arise from Peter Carruthers’ Higher-Order Thoughttheory of consciousness. I argue that, even if we assume that theseproblems cannot be overcome, it does not follow that we should notsubscribe to moral vegetarianism. I conclude that we should act as ifnon-human animals have subjective experiences for moral reasons,even if we cannot be certain that they do.


1869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Columbus Graham
Keyword(s):  

In contrast to other helping professions, social work does not currently define itself as scientific, or as a scientific discipline. Starting with the work of John Brekke, this volume considers what a science of social work might look like. These ideas have developed from an extended collaboration among the chapter authors and others. Aspects of the framework described here include approaches to ontology and epistemology (scientific and critical realism); science and the the identity of social work; the context of Grand Challenges for social work; the place of values in a science of social work; the importance of theory in social work science; and how ideas from the philosophy of mind can also inform what a social work science should be. The volume then describes the application of social work science to social work practice, managing the tensions between rigor and relevance, and ways to educate future scholars. The concluding chapter suggests some ways in which this framework might affect social work practice and education in the future.


Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan

This book weaves together themes from natural ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and information, areas of inquiry that have not recently been treated together. The sprawling topic is Kant’s how is knowledge possible? but viewed from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. The assumption is that we are evolved creatures that use cognition as a guide in dealing with the natural world, and that the natural world is roughly as natural science has tried to describe it. Very unlike Kant, then, we must begin with ontology, with a rough understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, only later developing theories about the nature of cognition within that world and how it manages to reflect the rest of nature. And in trying to get from ontology to cognition we must traverse another non-Kantian domain: questions about the transmission of information both through natural signs and through purposeful signs including, especially, language. Novelties are the introduction of unitrackers and unicepts whose job is to recognize the same again as manifested through the jargon of experience, a direct reference theory for common nouns and other extensional terms, a naturalist sketch of uniceptual—roughly conceptual— development, a theory of natural information and of language function that shows how properly functioning language carries natural information, a novel description of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, a discussion of perception as translation from natural informational signs, new descriptions of indexicals and demonstratives and of intensional contexts and a new analysis of the reference of incomplete descriptions.


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