The Problem of Epistemic Luck for Naturalists

Philo ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76
Author(s):  
R. Zachary Manis ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck

scholarly journals Correction to: Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nilanjan Das
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Original Publication ◽  
Section Heading

In the original publication of the article, on page 20, the section heading should be “Gaṅgeśa on Testimony and Epistemic Luck” instead of “Testimony and Epistemic Luck”.

scholarly journals “Absent Contrary Indication”: On a Pernicious Form of Epistemic Luck, and its Epistemic Agency Antidote

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfonso Anaya
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Epistemic Agency

AbstractIt is widely accepted that knowledge is incompatible with the presence of non-neutralized defeaters. A common way of addressing this issue is to introduce a condition to the effect that there are no non-neutralized defeaters for the belief that p (i.e. a “no-defeaters condition”). I argue that meeting this condition leaves open a possibility for defeaters to squander our knowledge. The no-defeaters condition can be fortuitously met, and as a result it can be met luckily. I shall argue that this kind of luck is inconsistent with knowledge. In order to prevent this pernicious form of luck I introduce a “defeaters-responsiveness” condition, according to which subjects ought to be disposed to adequately address defeaters if they were to arise (even if they in fact do not arise).

Scepticism and Epistemic Luck

2005 ◽  
pp. 202-221
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck

Epistemic Luck - By Duncan Pritchard

2006 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 372-374
Author(s):  
brian ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Duncan Pritchard

Scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemicangst

2005 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck

Epistemic Luck

2004 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 191-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck

FOLK ATTRIBUTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING: IS THERE A ROLE FOR EPISTEMIC LUCK?

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Wilkenfeld ◽  
Dillon Plunkett ◽  
Tania Lombrozo
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Folk Knowledge ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractAs a strategy for exploring the relationship between understanding and knowledge, we consider whether epistemic luck – which is typically thought to undermine knowledge – undermines understanding. Questions about the etiology of understanding have also been at the heart of recent theoretical debates within epistemology. Kvanvig (2003) put forward the argument that there could be lucky understanding and produced an example that he deemed persuasive. Grimm (2006) responded with a case that, he argued, demonstrated that there could not be lucky understanding. In this paper, we empirically examine how participants' patterns of understanding attributions line up with the predictions of Kvanvig and Grimm. We argue that the data challenge Kvanvig's position. People do not differentiate between knowing-why and understanding-why on the basis of proper etiology: attributions of knowledge and understanding involve comparable (and minimal) roles for epistemic luck. We thus posit that folk knowledge and understanding are etiologically symmetrical.

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