Epistemic Luck

2004 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 191-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck

scholarly journals Correction to: Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nilanjan Das
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Original Publication ◽  
Section Heading

In the original publication of the article, on page 20, the section heading should be “Gaṅgeśa on Testimony and Epistemic Luck” instead of “Testimony and Epistemic Luck”.

scholarly journals “Absent Contrary Indication”: On a Pernicious Form of Epistemic Luck, and its Epistemic Agency Antidote

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfonso Anaya
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Epistemic Agency

AbstractIt is widely accepted that knowledge is incompatible with the presence of non-neutralized defeaters. A common way of addressing this issue is to introduce a condition to the effect that there are no non-neutralized defeaters for the belief that p (i.e. a “no-defeaters condition”). I argue that meeting this condition leaves open a possibility for defeaters to squander our knowledge. The no-defeaters condition can be fortuitously met, and as a result it can be met luckily. I shall argue that this kind of luck is inconsistent with knowledge. In order to prevent this pernicious form of luck I introduce a “defeaters-responsiveness” condition, according to which subjects ought to be disposed to adequately address defeaters if they were to arise (even if they in fact do not arise).

Scepticism and Epistemic Luck

2005 ◽  
pp. 202-221
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck

Epistemic Luck - By Duncan Pritchard

2006 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 372-374
Author(s):  
brian ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Duncan Pritchard

Scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemicangst

2005 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck

FOLK ATTRIBUTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING: IS THERE A ROLE FOR EPISTEMIC LUCK?

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Wilkenfeld ◽  
Dillon Plunkett ◽  
Tania Lombrozo
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Folk Knowledge ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractAs a strategy for exploring the relationship between understanding and knowledge, we consider whether epistemic luck – which is typically thought to undermine knowledge – undermines understanding. Questions about the etiology of understanding have also been at the heart of recent theoretical debates within epistemology. Kvanvig (2003) put forward the argument that there could be lucky understanding and produced an example that he deemed persuasive. Grimm (2006) responded with a case that, he argued, demonstrated that there could not be lucky understanding. In this paper, we empirically examine how participants' patterns of understanding attributions line up with the predictions of Kvanvig and Grimm. We argue that the data challenge Kvanvig's position. People do not differentiate between knowing-why and understanding-why on the basis of proper etiology: attributions of knowledge and understanding involve comparable (and minimal) roles for epistemic luck. We thus posit that folk knowledge and understanding are etiologically symmetrical.

scholarly journals Collective Epistemic Luck

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moisés Barba ◽  
Fernando Broncano-Berrocal
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Bottom Line ◽  
Deliberative Methods ◽  
Collective Beliefs ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
Group Belief ◽  
Collective Belief

AbstractA platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic luck. This paper argues, first, that the dominant view of epistemic luck in the literature, the modal view, does not yield a satisfactory account of lucky collective beliefs. Second, it argues that collective epistemic luck is better explained in terms of groups lacking (suitably defined) forms of control over collective belief formation that are specific to the different procedures for forming collective beliefs. One of the main implications of this, we will argue, is that groups whose beliefs are formed via internal deliberation are more vulnerable to knowledge-undermining collective luck than groups that form their beliefs via non-deliberative methods, such as non-deliberative anonymous voting. The bottom line is that the greater exposure to knowledge-undermining luck that deliberation gives rise to provides a reason (not a conclusive one) for thinking that non-deliberative methods of group belief formation have greater epistemic value.

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