Wittgenstein’s Distinction between Primary and Secondary Sense Reconsidered

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 259-274
Author(s):  
Cato Wittusen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Secondary Sense

VII.—Recent Roman Discoveries in London

Archaeologia ◽  
1915 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
pp. 225-274
Author(s):  
Frank Lambert
Keyword(s):  
Old Evidence ◽  
Secondary Sense

The material dealt with in the first section of this paper can only be called ‘recent’ in a secondary sense. It is not so much a discovery as a rediscovery of old evidence long overlooked.

“Secondary Sense”

1983 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 537-537
Author(s):  
Sandra Plaskon
Keyword(s):  
Secondary Sense

The Nature of Political Representation, I

1940 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Fairlie
Keyword(s):  
Political Representation ◽  
Literal Meaning ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Representative Government ◽  
Secondary Sense

Much has been written on the origin, development, and characteristics of representative government; and in recent years there has been a revival of interest in this subject, and a further analysis of the evidence and criticism of views formerly accepted. In this extensive literature, considerable attention has been given to the nature of political representation and representative government, and to the relation between the representative and his constituents, with important differences in the definitions and meanings ascribed to these terms. Many writers have assumed that their views on these matters are the only correct statements; but some of the more recent writers have recognized, to some extent, the need for a closer analysis of the different senses in which these terms may be employed. An examination of different views may be of service in leading to a clearer understanding of the problems involved.Etymologically, the literal meaning of represent is to “present again,” and from this it has come to mean to appear in place of another. In this secondary sense, a representative has been defined as “an agent, deputy, or substitute, who supplies the place of another or others.”

Ovid, Metamorphoses 8.476

1989 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 562-562
Author(s):  
Katie E. Gilchrist
Keyword(s):  
Julius Caesar ◽  
Word Play ◽  
Primary Meaning ◽  
Secondary Sense

In these lines Ovid introduces Althaea's debate whether or not to kill her son Meleager by burning the brand which was his life, because he had killed her two brothers during the Calydonian boar hunt. A. S. Hollis (Oxford, 1970) says of line 476 that it contains ‘a forced and almost pointless word-play’. If sanguis is taken in its primary meaning, ‘blood’, this condemnation is quite justified. However, if one takes into account a secondary sense, the word-play acquires more strength. This sense is that of ‘offspring’ or ‘descendant’. Examples of this usage (see Lewis and Short s.v. Bib and Oxford Latin Dictionary s.v. 10) include Virgil, Aeneid 6.835 ‘sanguis meus’ (Julius Caesar), Horace, Carmen Saeculare 50 ‘clarus Anchisae Venerisque sanguis’ (Aeneas), Odes 3.27.65 ‘regius sanguis’ (Europa), and, in the Metamorphoses itself (5.514–15) ‘pro…meo veni supplex tibi, Iuppiter, …sanguine’. It may well be that Ovid was intending implications of both meanings in his choice of the word.

scholarly journals ¿EN QUÉ SENTIDO MI CUERPO ES MÍO? EL “CUERPO PROPIO” EN IDEEN II Y PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIE DE LA PERCEPTION

2021 ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Esteban A. García
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Self ◽  
The Body ◽  
Sense Of Ownership ◽  
Para Determinar ◽  
Secondary Sense

El artículo confronta el análisis merleau-pontiano de los cuatro caracteres del “cuerpo propio” en Phénoménologie de la Perception (I.2) con el tratamiento original que Husserl realizó de los mismos puntos en Ideen II (II.3). Se examinan sus respectivos análisis de la permanencia absoluta, las sensaciones dobles, las cenestesias y las cinestesias para determinar el diferente significado que comporta el “cuerpo propio” para cada autor. Se observa así que las “ubiestesias” no desempeñan para Merleau-Ponty el rol constitutivo del cuerpo propio que tienen para Husserl. Esto conduce a distinguir, siguiendo a Husserl, dos sentidos diferentes de propiedad. Mientras que Husserl asocia el cuerpo propio con un sentido secundario de propiedad, derivado de un sentido yoico originario, para Merleau-Ponty la experiencia más básica del yo y de lo propio es vivida por un sujeto cor-poral al percibir y moverse.The article confronts the MerleauPontyan analyses of the four features of the “body proper” in Phénoménologie de la Perception (I.2) with the original Husserlian consideration of the same issues in Ideen II (II.3). I examine their analyses of absolute permanency, double sensations, cenesthesis and kinesthesis, to determine the different meaning that the “body proper” acquires for each author. It is thus observed that “localized sensations” do not play for Merleau-Ponty —as they do for Husserl— the constitutive role of the body proper. This leads to distinguish, following Husserl, two different senses of ownership. Whereas Husserl associates the “body proper” with a secondary sense of ownership deriving from an originary sense of self, for Merleau-Ponty the most basic experience of myself and of ownership is lived by a corporeal subject in perception and movement

XIII—Secondary Sense

1967 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cora Diamond
Keyword(s):  
Secondary Sense

The Construction of P.Bodmer viii and the Bodmer “Composite” or “Miscellaneous” Codex

2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 394-410
Author(s):  
Brent Nongbri
Keyword(s):  
High Resolution ◽  
New Testament ◽  
Digital Images ◽  
The Other ◽  
The New Testament ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
Secondary Sense

The construction of the so-called Bodmer Composite or Miscellaneous codex has been an ongoing problem since the publication of its constituent parts began in the 1950s. A recent inspection of high resolution digital images of P.Bodmer viii shows compellingly that this portion of the codex had more than one phase of use, was originally part of a separate codex, and was only later removed and joined to the other sections of the Bodmer “composite” codex. The New Testament manuscript known as P72 (P.Bodmer vii + P.Bodmer viii) is thus a codicological unity only in a secondary sense.

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