Rational Responsibility for Preferences and Moral Responsibility for Character Traits

2007 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 191-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald W. Bruckner ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman

Abstract:Solomon argues that, although recent research in social psychology has important implications for business ethics, it does not undermine an approach that stresses virtue ethics. However, he underestimates the empirical threat to virtue ethics, and his a priori claim that empirical research cannot overturn our ordinary moral psychology is overstated. His appeal to seemingly obvious differences in character traits between people simply illustrates the fundamental attribution error. His suggestion that the Milgram and Darley and Batson experiments have to do with such character traits as obedience and punctuality cannot help to explain the relevant differences in the way people behave in different situations. His appeal to personality theory fails, because, as an intellectual academic discipline, personality theory is in shambles, mainly because it has been concerned with conceptions of personality rather than with what is true about personality. Solomon’s rejection of Doris’s claims about the fragmentation of character is at odds with the received view in social psychology. Finally, he is mistaken to think that rejecting virtue ethics implies rejecting free will and moral responsibility.


2021 ◽  
pp. 140349482199025 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist

Aim: Not only is the coronavirus pandemic about science and facts, it also raises a number of ethical questions. Some of the most important questions in this context are related to responsibility. First, what is a government’s primary responsibility? Second, how should both the government and individuals consider personal moral responsibility in this context? Method: This paper uses conceptual and normative analysis to address responsibility in the context of the pandemic. The paper also refers to reports published by the German Ethics Council, the Malaysian Bioethics Community and the Swedish National Council on Medical Ethics. Results: The primary responsibility of governments is to create a balance between individual values and rights, one hand, and the health of the population, on the other. There are good reasons to conceive of individual responsibility as a virtue, having to do with the development of crucial character traits and habits. The responsibility of governments is connected to individual responsibility through the values of trust and solidarity. Conclusions: Governments need to communicate clearly (a) how they balance conflicts between collective health and individual rights and values and (b) what the chosen strategy entails in terms of collective and individual responsibility. Success requires attention to ethical values from all involved. Individuals will need to develop new character traits to help manage this pandemic and to prevent new ones. Governments must facilitate the development of such character traits by building trust and solidarity with and among citizens.


DeKaVe ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arief Agung Suwasono

Television is a medium that delivers meaning through various type of text television conveys information that promotes moral responsibility and social solidarity. In spite of the fact that television is one of capitalism product, its programs can generate social commitment and solidarity reflecting human moral values.Keyword : Television, Fetisme


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vitalii Shymko

<p>This paper presents the results of testing the hypotheses concerning the connection between some phenotypic bodily features and such individual psychological characteristics as aggressiveness, impetuosity, pedantry, passivity, etc. In particular, studied the validity of using appropriate representations of phenotypology to predict respective character traits. The results obtained disprove the possibility of a direct use of the phenotypic approach for reliable characterological profiling.</p>


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe

If a person requires a tissue donation in order to survive, many philosophers argue that whatever moral responsibility a biological relative may have to donate to the person in need will be grounded at least partially, if not entirely, in the biological relations the potential donor bears to the recipient. Such views tend to ignore the role played by a potential donor’s unique ability to help the person in need and the perceived burden of the donation type in underwriting such judgments. If, for example, a sperm donor is judged to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue to a child conceived with his sperm, we argue that such judgments will largely be grounded in the presumed unique ability of the sperm donor to help the child due to the compatibility of his tissues with those of the recipient. In this paper, we report the results of two main studies and three supplementary studies designed to investigate the comparative roles that biological relatedness, unique ability to help, and donation burden play in generating judgments of moral responsibility in tissue donation cases. We found that the primary factor driving individuals’ judgments about the moral responsibility of a potential donor to donate tissue to someone in need was the degree to which a donor was in a unique ability to help. We observed no significant role for biological relatedness as such. Biologically related individuals were deemed to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue only when they are one of a small number of people who have a relatively unique capacity to help. We also found that people are less inclined to think individuals have a moral responsibility to donate tissue when the donation is more costly to make. We bring these results into dialogue with contemporary disputes concerning the ethics of tissue donation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe

If a person requires an organ or tissue donation to survive, many philosophers argue that whatever moral responsibility a biological relative may have to donate to the person in need will be grounded at least partially, if not entirely, in biological relations the potential donor bears to the recipient. We contend that such views ignore the role that a potential donor’s unique ability to help the person in need plays in underwriting such judgments. If, for example, a sperm donor is judged to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue to a child conceived with his sperm, we think this will not be due to the fact that the donor stands in a close biological relationship to the recipient. Rather, we think such judgments will largely be grounded in the presumed unique ability of the sperm donor to help the child due to the compatibility of his tissues and organs with those of the recipient. In this paper, we report the results of two studies designed to investigate the comparative roles that biological relatedness and unique ability play in generating judgments of moral responsibility in tissue donation cases. We found that biologically related individuals are deemed to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue only when they are one of a small number of people who have the capacity to help.


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