Possible-Worlds Metaphysics and the Logical Problem of Evil

2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-29
Author(s):  
Joseph L. Lombardi ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Logical Problem

scholarly journals Moral Imaginative Resistance to Heaven: Why the Problem of Evil is so Intractable

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67
Author(s):  
Chris A. Kramer
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
Imaginative Resistance ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Tamar Gendler

The majority of philosophers of religion, at least since Plantinga’s reply to Mackie’s logical problem of evil, agree that it is logically possible for an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God to exist who permits some of the evils we see in the actual world. This is conceivable essentially because of the possible world known as heaven. That is, heaven is an imaginable world in a similar way that logically possible scenarios in any fiction are imaginable. However, like some of the imaginable stories in fiction where we are asked to envision an immoral act as a moral one, we resist. I will employ the works of Tamar Gendler on imaginative resistance and Keith Buhler’s Virtue Ethics approach to moral imaginative resistance and apply them to the conception of heaven and the problem of evil. While we can imagine God as an omnibenevolent parent permitting evil to allow for morally significant freedom and the rewards in heaven or punishments in hell (both possible worlds), we should not. This paper is not intended to be a refutation of particular theodicies; rather it provides a very general groundwork connecting issues of horrendous suffering and imaginative resistance to heaven as a possible world.

Plantinga's version of the free-will argument: the good and evil that free beings do

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH EINAR HIMMA
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Christian Ethics ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
The World ◽  
Evidential Problem Of Evil ◽  
Good And Evil

AbstractAccording to Plantinga's version of the free-will argument (FWA), the existence of free beings in the world who, on the whole, do more good than evil is the greater moral good that cannot be secured by even an omnipotent God without allowing some evil and thereby shows the logical compatibility of God with evil. In this essay, I argue that there are good empirical and moral reasons, from the standpoint of one plausible conception of Christian ethics, to doubt that Plantinga's version of the FWA succeeds as a theodicy. In particular, I argue that, given this understanding of Christian ethics, it seems reasonable to think it false that free beings are doing more good than evil in the world. While there are surely possible worlds in which free beings do more good than evil, this material world seems clearly not one of those. Thus, while Plantinga's version might succeed as a defence against the logical problem of evil, it will neither rebut the evidential problem of evil nor, without more, ground a successful theodicy that reconciles God's existence with the evil that occurs in this world.

scholarly journals Doing Theology in the Context of the Gift and the Promise of Nostra Aetate

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Terrence W. Tilley
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Interreligious Dialogue ◽  
Christian Theology ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
The Gift ◽  
The Way

This article addresses three problems and suggests ways to address these problems. First, Christian theology has often been supersessionist, especially in Christology and Mariology. Claims about Jesus and Mary being exceptional (in different ways) often involve forms of supersessionism. I report on two theological works that attempt to be orthodoxly Catholic and to avoid supersessionism. Second, I address the conflict between affirming the irrevocable covenant God made with Israel and the universality of salvation God wrought in Jesus. I argue herein that the key problem is logical, not theological. Hence, we should not seek to resolve this problem theoretically, but to dissolve it logically in a manner analogous to the way philosophers of religion have dissolved the logical problem of evil. Third, some have suggested that a commitment to true interreligious dialogue should weaken our commitment to our own tradition. I disagree and show that interreligious dialogue can, in practice, strengthen, not weaken, our commitments to our home tradition. 

The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense

Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Maller
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
Free Will Defense

Abstract Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.

The Logical Problem of Evil

God and Evil ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 17-32
Author(s):  
Michael L. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Logical Problem

scholarly journals Intentionality, evil, God, and necessity

2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-446
Author(s):  
AMIR HOROWITZ
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
Self Consistent

AbstractIn an article in this issue, Kenneth Pearce suggests a novel solution to the ‘logical problem of evil’. That is, he defends the consistency of the obtaining of evil with the existence of an omnipotent and good creator. The basic idea of Pearce's solution to the logical problem of evil is that according to the teleological theory of intentionality, which is self-consistent and consistent with the claim that God exists, some evil is necessary for the existence of created minds, and this evil is outweighed by the good that is involved in the existence of created minds. The present article argues that this suggestion fails to solve the problem.

Free Will and the Problem of Evil

1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Mason Myers
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Reason ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Traditional Theist

Hume after arguing for the compatibility of liberty and necessity, a view now known as soft determinism or compatibilism, noted that it is not ‘possible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cause of the actions of sin and moral turpitude’. It seems that Hume is correct if the explanation must show specifically why an omnipotent and omnibenevolent deity must permit certain actions that to human reason seem to be unnecessary evils. On the other hand if such specifity is not required, the soft determinist who also happens to be a theist can argue that it is possible that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds even though the reason for any specific apparent evil cannot be known. If seemingly evil choices are free in the soft determinist's sense but determined by an omnipotent and omniscient deity, then either that deity is not omnibenevolent or that deity has determined the world to have the maximum possible goodness through including seemingly evil choices in the scheme of things. Consequently if, as the traditional theist believes, the creator is omnibenevolent as well as omnipotent and omniscient, the occurrence of seemingly evil choices are necessary for maximizing the goodness of the whole.

scholarly journals The Problem of Evil, Skeptical Theism and Moral Epistemology

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Scott M. Coley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

This paper argues that skeptical theism isn’t susceptible to criticisms of the view presented in James Sterba’s new book on the logical problem of evil. Nevertheless, Sterba’s argument does serve to underscore the unpalatable moral-epistemological consequences of skeptical theistic skepticism (STS): for precisely the reasons that STS doesn’t succumb to Sterba’s critique, STS threatens to undermine moral knowledge altogether.

scholarly journals The Thomistic Dissolution of the Logical Problem of Evil

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 268
Author(s):  
Edward Feser
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
The World ◽  
James Sterba

In his book ‘Is a Good God Logically Possible?’, James Sterba argues that the existence of much of the evil to be found in the world is logically incompatible with the existence of God. I defend the Thomistic view that when one properly understands the nature of God and of his relationship to the world, this so-called logical problem of evil does not arise. While Sterba has responded to the version of the Thomistic position presented by Brian Davies, I argue that his response fails.

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