scholarly journals The Problem of Evil, Skeptical Theism and Moral Epistemology

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Scott M. Coley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

This paper argues that skeptical theism isn’t susceptible to criticisms of the view presented in James Sterba’s new book on the logical problem of evil. Nevertheless, Sterba’s argument does serve to underscore the unpalatable moral-epistemological consequences of skeptical theistic skepticism (STS): for precisely the reasons that STS doesn’t succumb to Sterba’s critique, STS threatens to undermine moral knowledge altogether.

The Ethics of the Anselmian Being II (Respect)

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
William Rowe

Prior formulations of the problem of evil, for example, by J. L. Mackie, William Rowe, and Paul Draper, assume that God must have requiring reasons to prevent evils to creatures, and use that assumption as the basis for claiming that the existence (or types, or amount, or distribution) of evils in this world is either incompatible with or gives strong prima facie evidence against the existence of God. But given that God’s reasons with respect to preventing evils are justifying, not requiring, reasons, no such arguments can get off the ground. This account, which is based on a first-order theory of divine ethics, differs from skeptical theism, which is based on moral epistemology. This difference makes the account developed here immune from the most serious criticisms that have made trouble for skeptical theism.

Anti-theodicy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. N. Trakakis
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Model ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Alternative Models ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Methodological Considerations

First, the nature of ‘anti-theodicy’ is outlined, and some indication is provided as to how this position differs from both theodicy and skeptical theism, and how the anti-theodicy view can be supported on the basis of moral and methodological considerations. Secondly, a possible metaphysical basis for anti-theodicy is sought, and this is achieved by abandoning anthropomorphic conceptions of God in favour of alternative models of divinity that might make possible new and more fruitful perspectives on the problem of evil. The alternative model advanced here for special attention is the Absolute Idealism of F. H. Bradley. The chapter concludes by showing how the problem of evil can be answered from a Bradleian perspective.

scholarly journals Has God Indeed Said? Skeptical Theism and Scriptural Hermeneutics

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 45-66
Author(s):  
Michelle Panchuk
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Commands

This paper demonstrates that the skeptical theist’s response to the problem of evil deprives the analytic theologian of theoretical resources necessary to avoid accepting as veridical merely apparent divine commands that endorse cruelty. In particular, I argue that the same skeptical considerations that lead analytic theologians to endorse skeptical theism also lead to what I call “divine command skepticism”—an inability to make certain kinds of judgements about what a good God would or would not command. The danger of divine command skepticism is not that it generates new reasons to think that God has commanded horrors, but, rather, that it undercuts the defeaters we might otherwise have for thinking that God has commanded those horrors.  It does so both by rendering illicit certain theological and hermeneutical methodologies employed within liberatory frameworks (i.e., various kinds of liberation theologies) and by depriving the theologian of some of the more “traditional” mechanisms for resolving such apparent conflicts.

Conclusion

2021 ◽  
pp. 214-226
Author(s):  
Laura W. Ekstrom
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Character Building ◽  
Made In

This chapter summarizes the case that has been made in the book in defense of the argument from pointless evils and the argument from the facts about evil in support of atheism. It highlights important claims about agency and claims about value that have been brought out by close examination of the punishment theodicy, the free will theodicy, the character-building theodicy, the divine intimacy theodicy, and the position of skeptical theism. The chapter also points toward directions for further work on the problem of evil in the philosophy of religion.

scholarly journals Moral Imaginative Resistance to Heaven: Why the Problem of Evil is so Intractable

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67
Author(s):  
Chris A. Kramer
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
Imaginative Resistance ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Tamar Gendler

The majority of philosophers of religion, at least since Plantinga’s reply to Mackie’s logical problem of evil, agree that it is logically possible for an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God to exist who permits some of the evils we see in the actual world. This is conceivable essentially because of the possible world known as heaven. That is, heaven is an imaginable world in a similar way that logically possible scenarios in any fiction are imaginable. However, like some of the imaginable stories in fiction where we are asked to envision an immoral act as a moral one, we resist. I will employ the works of Tamar Gendler on imaginative resistance and Keith Buhler’s Virtue Ethics approach to moral imaginative resistance and apply them to the conception of heaven and the problem of evil. While we can imagine God as an omnibenevolent parent permitting evil to allow for morally significant freedom and the rewards in heaven or punishments in hell (both possible worlds), we should not. This paper is not intended to be a refutation of particular theodicies; rather it provides a very general groundwork connecting issues of horrendous suffering and imaginative resistance to heaven as a possible world.

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