Truth-seeking Versus Confirmation Bias

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-68
Author(s):  
Amanda Hiner ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Confirmation Bias

745: Confirmation Bias in Prostate Cancer Grading

2007 ◽  
Vol 177 (4S) ◽  
pp. 250-250
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Fandel ◽  
Maria Pfnuer ◽  
Claudia Corinth ◽  
Michael Ansorge ◽  
Sebastian W. Melchior ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Prostate Cancer ◽  
Confirmation Bias ◽  
Cancer Grading

Confirmation bias in decision making for fingerprints, DNA and eyewitness evidence cannot be explained by cognitive style or thinking dispositions.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Edgcumbe
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Confirmation Bias ◽  
Criminal Case ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
Legal Proceedings ◽  
Thinking Dispositions ◽  
Evaluation Of Evidence ◽  
Facial Composite

Pre-existing beliefs about the background or guilt of a suspect can bias the subsequent evaluation of evidence for forensic examiners and lay people alike. This biasing effect, called the confirmation bias, has influenced legal proceedings in prominent court cases such as that of Brandon Mayfield. Today many forensic providers attempt to train their examiners against these cognitive biases. Nine hundred and forty-two participants read a fictional criminal case and received either neutral, incriminating or exonerating evidence (fingerprint, eyewitness, or DNA) before providing an initial rating of guilt. Participants then viewed ambiguous evidence (alibi, facial composite, handwriting sample or informant statement) before providing a final rating of guilt. Final guilt ratings were higher for all evidence conditions (neutral, incriminating or exonerating) following exposure to the ambiguous evidence. This provides evidence that the confirmation bias influences the evaluation of evidence.

Open-mindedness as a Corrective Virtue

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-97
Author(s):  
Hassan Alsharif ◽  
John Symons
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Confirmation Bias ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Shed Light

AbstractThis paper argues that open-mindedness is a corrective virtue. It serves as a corrective to the epistemic vice of confirmation bias. Specifically, open-mindedness is the epistemically virtuous disposition to resist the negative effects of confirmation bias on our ability to reason well and to evaluate evidence and arguments. As part of the defense and presentation of our account, we explore four discussions of open-mindedness in the recent literature. All four approaches have strengths and shed light on aspects of the virtue of open-mindedness. Each mentions various symptoms of confirmation bias and some explore aspects of the corrective role of open-mindedness. However, ours is the first to explicitly identify open-mindedness as a corrective virtue to the specific epistemic vice of confirmation bias. We show how the corrective account also permits a response to the concern that open-mindedness might not actually count as a virtue.

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