Searching for the Justification of Realism

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 217-231
Author(s):  
Petr S. Kusliy ◽  

This critical analytical review examines the ways in which realism can be justified in epistemology and philosophy of science and which are presented in the collection of papers “Perspectives of Realism in Modern Philosophy” (M., 2017). The exposition of areas in which the authors of this book study the problems of realism, as well as those arguments in its defense that they offer, is given. A criticism of these arguments is presented, according to which all of them are not able to convince an antirealist to abandon their views in favor of realism. The question of whether realists and anti-realists have the same object of discussion and what could become a common ground for them is explored. The author suggests that an appeal to language can become such a common ground and reproduces Frege’s argument against skeptics and idealists as a possible methodological justification for realism.

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa M. Osbeck

The article draws from historical and contemporary resources to articulate the enduring or persistent responsibilities of general psychology, suggesting “common ground” and “point of view” as useful concepts in line with these. It then explores three important developments in the discipline over the past several decades—big data analytics, methodological proliferation, and critical psychology—and considers the role of general psychology in relation to these developments. The point of the article is to claim and illustrate that general psychology includes a philosophy of science from within, and that it has lasting importance to the broader discipline, even as the discipline itself transforms.


1963 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerd Buchdahl

SummaryI. Reputed shortcomings of Descartes as philosopher of science.II ‘Knowledge’ in mathematics and in physics. The ‘ontological’ postulates of Descartes's philosophy and philosophy of physics.III. The ‘foundations of dynamics’: ‘Newton's First Law of Motion’ and its status.IV. Descartes's conception of ‘hypothesis’: the competing claims of the ideal of the a priori in physics and the conception of retroductive inference. (The status of the mechanistic world picture.)V. Descartes's notion of ‘analysis’. The distinction between ‘procedure’ and ‘inference’. The notion of ‘induction’ and ‘understanding through models’: ‘Snell's Law of Refraction’.


Nature ◽  
1960 ◽  
Vol 186 (4724) ◽  
pp. 503-504
Author(s):  
HERBERT DINGLE

1960 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 409
Author(s):  
Wesley C. Salmon ◽  
Hans Reichenbach ◽  
Maria Reichenbach ◽  
Rudolf Carnap

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-28
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Kandic

There are almost irreconcilable differences between Plato?s notion of science (episteme) and the modern notion, but also certain similarities. In the late dialogues such as The Theaetetus, The Philebus, and The Timaeus, Plato redefines his own notion of knowledge developed in The Republic to some extent. Genuine knowledge does not refer solely to the unchangeable aspects of reality. Plato?s characterization of cosmology as an eikos logos (?likely story?) in The Timaeus is an anticipation of the concept of falsifiability that dominates modern philosophy of science. Experience and observation, as well as mathematical, psychological and biological concepts, occupy a significant, indispensable place within the structure of Timaeus? cosmological model.


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