Conception and Philosophy of Science

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-141
Author(s):  
Dmitry M. Koshlakov ◽  
Alexander I. Shvyrkov ◽  

The authors try to show that even Wittgensteinian definition of concept is not always sufficient to analyze what really happens in science. As a result, in addition to “concept” we propose “conception” as a new promising tool for philosophy of science. We provide a brief historical analysis of this term and reveal two main interpretations of “conception” in philosophy and scientific disciplines. In accordance with the first view, conception appears as either a “twin” of the concept, or a pair entity to the concept. According to the second view, conception is a kind of “strange concept” that exists among “normal” concepts. Since conception is understood differently in sciences and philosophical systems, it is not possible to give a generalized definition of conception. That is, it is impossible to formulate this definition, so to speak, inductively. Moreover, even if it was possible, such a definition would not necessarily have to be automatically accepted by philosophy of science. That is why the introduction of a concept of conception was carried out through the analysis of a global process associated with the return of metaphysics to science. We define conception as a semantic construction denoting the unknown (and, possibly, fundamentally unknowable) and ensuring the possibility of working with this unknown (unknowable). By virtue of the way conception was introduced (conception is not a “generalization” of the interpretations available in specific sciences) many conceptions that are considered as conception in specific sciences turn out to not to be conceptions within this definition. Thus, the article interprets conception as a new possible tool of philosophy of science, which is aimed at understanding how specific sciences develop.

Author(s):  
Renato Coletto

Any discussion about transdisciplinarity presupposes some sort of recognition of the scientific disciplines and some agreement on how they are or should be grouped or classified. This article supplies a demarcation criterion to distinguish science from non- science and discusses the way the sciences should be grouped. The first issue can be summarized by the question: (how) can scientific disciplines be distinguished from non- scientific ones? To answer this question it is necessary to sketch what in philosophy of science is called a “demarcation criterion” to distinguish between scientific and non- scientific activities. Secondly, does it make sense to recognise groups of sciences and which disciplines should be placed in each group? Does it make sense to use categories like social, hard, soft, exact, applied sciences and so forth? To answer these questions it is necessary to assess the plausibility of some of the categories traditionally used to classify the sciences. The purpose of the article is to provide an initial (yet philosophically grounded) orientation in an area in which many academics seem to wander, and sometimes to accept simplistic answers.Keywords: Demarcation criterion, groups of sciences, natural sciences, social sciences, human sciences, groups of sciences, general sciences, special sciences, transdisciplinarity, 9Theory of) modal aspects, multi-modal sciencesDisciplines: Philosophy, Philosophy of science, (Basically, all sciences are interested)


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ole Wæver

Waltz's 1979 book, Theory of International Politics, is the most influential in the history of the discipline. It worked its effects to a large extent through raising the bar for what counted as theoretical work, in effect reshaping not only realism but rivals like liberalism and reflectivism. Yet, ironically, there has been little attention paid to Waltz's very explicit and original arguments about the nature of theory. This article explores and explicates Waltz's theory of theory. Central attention is paid to his definition of theory as `a picture, mentally formed' and to the radical anti-empiricism and anti-positivism of his position. Followers and critics alike have treated Waltzian neorealism as if it was at bottom a formal proposition about cause—effect relations. The extreme case of Waltz being so victorious in the discipline, and yet being so consistently misinterpreted on the question of theory, shows the power of a dominant philosophy of science in US IR, and thus the challenge facing any ambitious theorising. The article suggests a possible movement of fronts away from the `fourth debate' between rationalism and reflectivism towards one of theory against empiricism. To help this new agenda, the article introduces a key literature from the philosophy of science about the structure of theory, and particularly about the way even natural science uses theory very differently from the way IR's mainstream thinks it does — and much more like the way Waltz wants his theory to be used.


Horizons ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-99
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Casey

AbstractAs theologians are increasingly employing the social sciences in their work, it is incumbent upon them to examine the way the term religion is employed in these disciplines. This paper explains the common types of definition employed (the substantive and functional varieties) and critiques each from the perspective of contemporary theology. Both are found deficient in ways highly significant for theologians. This paper argues that it is inappropriate to attempt to establish any single definition of religion as normative. While the posture adopted appears to lay to rest any attempt to generate “grand theory” about religion it is not inconsistent with the canons of science as understood in current philosophy of science discourse.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 166-182
Author(s):  
Iryna Tsiborovska-Rymarovych

The article has as its object the elucidation of the history of the Vyshnivetsky Castle Library, definition of the content of its fund, its historical and cultural significance, correlation of the founder of the Library Mychailo Servaty Vyshnivetsky with the Book.The Vyshnivetsky Castle Library was formed in the Ukrainian historical region of Volyn’, in the Vyshnivets town – “family nest” of the old Ukrainian noble family of the Vyshnivetskies under the “Korybut” coat of arm. The founder of the Library was Prince Mychailo Servaty Vyshnivetsky (1680–1744) – Grand Hetman and Grand Chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Vilno Voievoda. He was a politician, an erudite and great bibliophile. In the 30th–40th of the 18th century the main Prince’s residence Vyshnivets became an important centre of magnate’s culture in Rich Pospolyta. M. S. Vyshnivetsky’s contemporaries from the noble class and clergy knew quite well about his library and really appreciated it. According to historical documents 5 periods are defined in the Library’s history. In the historical sources the first place is occupied by old-printed books of Library collection and 7 Library manuscript catalogues dating from 1745 up to the 1835 which give information about quantity and topical structures of Library collection.The Library is a historical and cultural symbol of the Enlightenment epoch. The Enlightenment and those particular concepts and cultural images pertaining to that epoch had their effect on the formation of Library’s fund. Its main features are as follow: comprehensive nature of the stock, predominance of French eighteenth century editions, presence of academic books and editions on orientalistics as well as works of the ideologues of the Enlightenment and new kinds of literature, which generated as a result of this movement – encyclopaedias, encyclopaedian dictionaries, almanacs, etc. Besides the universal nature of its stock books on history, social and political thought, fiction were dominating.The reconstruction of the history of Vyshnivetsky’s Library, the historical analysis of the provenances in its editions give us better understanding of the personality of its owners and in some cases their philanthropic activities, and a better ability to identify the role of this Library in the culture life of society in a certain epoch.


Proceedings ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Sebastiano Trevisani

Modern Earth Scientists need also to interact with other disciplines, apparently far from the Earth Sciences and Engineering. Disciplines related to history and philosophy of science are emblematic from this perspective. From one side, the quantitative analysis of information extracted from historical records (documents, maps, paintings, etc.) represents an exciting research topic, requiring a truly holistic approach. On the other side, epistemological and philosophy of science considerations on the relationship between geoscience and society in history are of fundamental importance for understanding past, present and future geosphere-anthroposphere interlinked dynamics.


Author(s):  
Simon Deakin ◽  
David Gindis ◽  
Geoffrey M. Hodgson

Abstract In his recent book on Property, Power and Politics, Jean-Philippe Robé makes a strong case for the need to understand the legal foundations of modern capitalism. He also insists that it is important to distinguish between firms and corporations. We agree. But Robé criticizes our definition of firms in terms of legally recognized capacities on the grounds that it does not take the distinction seriously enough. He argues that firms are not legally recognized as such, as the law only knows corporations. This argument, which is capable of different interpretations, leads to the bizarre result that corporations are not firms. Using etymological and other evidence, we show that firms are treated as legally constituted business entities in both common parlance and legal discourse. The way the law defines firms and corporations, while the product of a discourse which is in many ways distinct from everyday language, has such profound implications for the way firms operate in practice that no institutional theory of the firm worthy of the name can afford to ignore it.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162097477
Author(s):  
David Kellen ◽  
Clintin P. Davis-Stober ◽  
John C. Dunn ◽  
Michael L. Kalish

Paul Meehl’s famous critique detailed many of the problematic practices and conceptual confusions that stand in the way of meaningful theoretical progress in psychological science. By integrating many of Meehl’s points, we argue that one of the reasons for the slow progress in psychology is the failure to acknowledge the problem of coordination. This problem arises whenever we attempt to measure quantities that are not directly observable but can be inferred from observable variables. The solution to this problem is far from trivial, as demonstrated by a historical analysis of thermometry. The key challenge is the specification of a functional relationship between theoretical concepts and observations. As we demonstrate, empirical means alone cannot determine this relationship. In the case of psychology, the problem of coordination has dramatic implications in the sense that it severely constrains our ability to make meaningful theoretical claims. We discuss several examples and outline some of the solutions that are currently available.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-128
Author(s):  
Elliott Karstadt

Many scholars argue that Hobbes’s political ideas do not significantly develop between The Elements of Law (1640) and Leviathan (1651). This article seeks to challenge that assumption by studying the way in which Hobbes’s deployment of the vocabulary of ‘interest’ develops over the course of the 1640s. The article begins by showing that the vocabulary is newly important in Leviathan, before attempting a ‘Hobbesian definition’ of what is meant by the term. We end by looking at the impact that the vocabulary has on two key areas of Hobbes’s philosophy: his theory of counsel and his arguments in favour of monarchy as the best form of government. In both areas, Hobbes’s conception of ‘interests’ is shown to be of crucial importance in lending a new understanding of the political issue under consideration.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 717-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID DWAN

Intellectual historians often invoke “romanticism” to account for the origins and conceptual shape of nationalism. In an Irish context, however, this approach has yielded false genealogies of influence and an impaired political understanding. Cast through a “romantic” prism, nationalism is divorced from its conditions of intelligibility, becoming unhelpfully isolated from questions about sovereignty, democratic legitimacy and the nature of modern citizenship. Thus all too often the irrationality that is made part of the definition of “romantic nationalism” is a function of the way that it is interpreted.


1992 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cynthia L. Miller ◽  
A. Gaye Cummins

Historically, theoretical and popular conceptions about power have not included or addressed women's experiences. This study adds to the growing body of knowledge about women by examining women's perceptions of and relationship to power. One hundred twenty-five women, ranging in age from 21 to 63, were asked to define and explore power through a variety of structured and open-ended questions. The results showed that women's definition of power differed significantly from their perception of society's definition of power, as well as from the way power has traditionally been conceptualized. More theoretical and empirical attention should be given to understanding the role of personal authority in both women's and men's experience of power.


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