Aquinas on Consciousness and the Human Soul

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (12) ◽  
pp. 3-4
Author(s):  
Edward J. Furton ◽  

The materialistic premise supposes that a patient’s reduced brain activity indicates that the mind is beginning to approach nonexistence. Such persons may not be brain dead, but they have a life that is close enough to death to allow us to treat them with a certain disregard. For the Catholic, this overlooks the enduring presence of the soul and its two spiritual powers of intellect and will. St. Thomas Aquinas is our best guide to exploring the implications of this view for patients in states of diminished consciousness. The externally observable activity of the brain, even when dramatically lessened, does not represent any loss of the powers of the soul, which continue to function through a combination of natural and divine influences.

Author(s):  
Frank Jackson

We know that the brain is intimately connected with mental activity. Indeed, doctors now define death in terms of the cessation of the relevant brain activity. The identity theory of mind holds that the intimate connection is identity: the mind is the brain, or, more precisely, mental states are states of the brain. The theory goes directly against a long tradition according to which mental and material belong to quite distinct ontological categories – the mental being essentially conscious, the material essentially unconscious. This tradition has been bedevilled by the problem of how essentially immaterial states could be caused by the material world, as would happen when we see a tree, and how they could cause material states, as would happen when we decide to make an omelette. A great merit of the identity theory is that it avoids this problem: interaction between mental and material becomes simply interaction between one subset of material states, namely certain states of a sophisticated central nervous system, and other material states. The theory also brings the mind within the scope of modern science. More and more phenomena are turning out to be explicable in the physical terms of modern science: phenomena once explained in terms of spells, possession by devils, Thor’s thunderbolts, and so on, are now explained in more mundane, physical terms. If the identity theory is right, the same goes for the mind. Neuroscience will in time reveal the secrets of the mind in the same general way that the theory of electricity reveals the secrets of lightning. This possibility has received enormous support from advances in computing. We now have at least the glimmerings of an idea of how a purely material or physical system could do some of the things minds can do. Nevertheless, there are many questions to be asked of the identity theory. How could states that seem so different turn out to be one and the same? Would neurophysiologists actually see my thoughts and feelings if they looked at my brain? When we report on our mental states what are we reporting on – our brains?


1912 ◽  
Vol 58 (242) ◽  
pp. 465-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivy Mackenzie

In bringing forward some evidence which would point to the biological course followed by some forms of nervous disease to be considered, I would first of all accept as a working hypothesis two generalisations which apply to all forms of disease. The first of these generalisations is that there is essentially no difference in kind between a physiological and a pathological process. The distinction is an arbitrary one; the course of disease is distinguished from that of health only in so far as it tends to compromise the continuation of a more or less perfect adaptation between the organism and its surroundings. There is no tendency in Nature either to kill or to cure; she is absolutely impartial as to the result of a conflict between organisms and a host; and it is a matter of complete indifference to her as to whether toxins are eliminated or not. In the same way diseases of the mind are the manifestation of a perfectly natural relation of the organism, such as it is, to the environment. If the mental processes are abnormal, it goes without saying that the brain must be acting abnormally whether the stimuli to abnormal action originate in the brain itself or in some other part of the body. For example, if a child with pneumonia be suffering from delirium and hallucinations, as is not infrequently the case, this must be considered a perfectly natural outcome of the relation of the brain to its environmental stimuli outside and inside the organism. The actual stimuli may originate in the intestine from masses of undigested food and the stimuli may play on the brain rendered hypersensitive by the toxins from the lungs; the process and its manifestations, as well as the final outcome, are matters in which nature plays an impartial part. It cannot be admitted that there is any form of nervous disease which does not come under this generalisation. It has been argued by some authorities that because insidious forms of insanity are marked only by the slightest variation from the normal course of mental life, and that because the mental abnormalities are only modifications, and often easily explainable modifications, of normal mental processes, that the so-called insanity originates in these processes, and not in the material substratum of the organism. The fallacy of such an interpretation is obvious; it is tantamount to saying that slight albuminuria is the cause underlying early disease of the kidneys, or that a slight ódema may have something to do with the origin of circulatory disease. It is only natural that in the milder forms of mental disease the abnormal manifestations of brain activity should resemble normal mental processes; and even in the most advanced forms of mental disease there must be a close resemblance between abnormal ideation and conduct and perfectly normal ideation and behaviour. Even in advanced cases of Bright's disease the urinary elimination is more normal than abnormal; the abnormal constituents do not differ so much in kind as in degree from those of urine from healthy kidneys. It is not to be expected that in kidney disease bile or some other substance foreign to the organ would be the chief constituent of the eliminated fluid. The signs of insanity in any given case are the natural products of normal brain action mingled with the products of abnormal action. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that under certain circumstances these abnormal products, such as delusions, hallucinations and perverted conduct, may not themselves be the direct stimuli to further abnormalities. The suicidal character of pathological processes is well seen in other organs of the body. A diseased heart, for example, is its own worst enemy; it not only fails to supply sufficient nutrition to the rest of the organism, but it starves itself by its inability to contract and expand properly, thereby increasing its own weakness. In the same way, certain phenomena of abnormal brain processes are in all probability due to the recoil on the brain of its own abnormal products in the matter of ideation and conduct.


Philosophy ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 60 (234) ◽  
pp. 477-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Cockburn

‘Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious’.1 ‘The human body is the best picture of the human soul’. Anyone who believes that Wittgenstein's remarks here embody important truths has quite a bit of explaining to do. What needs to be explained is why it is that enormous numbers of people, people who have never had the chance to be corrupted by reading Descartes or Dennett, are willing, with only the slightest prompting, to speak in ways which appear to conflict dramatically with Wittgenstein's thought. Many people appear to find no difficulty at all in the idea that we could ascribe thoughts, sensations, emotions and so on to things which in no way resemble or behave like a living human being—for example to disembodied ‘minds’ or ‘souls’ or disembodied brains floating in tanks. And with a little more pressing many will agree that it is never to the living human being that these states are, strictly speaking, correctly ascribed; but, rather, to one part of the living human being—the brain, for example. Now if this incredibly widespread tendency is the expression of confusion then we need an explanation of its existence. We need this partly because without it it will be difficult to undermine the tendency; and partly because we might expect that such a widespread tendency is a distortion of some truth.


Author(s):  
Michael Potts ◽  

This paper considers the possibility of a disembodied conscious soul, arguing that a great deal of current research converges in a direction that denies the possibility of a bodiless consciousness for human beings. Contemporary attacks on Cartesianism also serve as attacks on the view of some hylomorphist Catholics, such as Thomas Aquinas, that there can be a disembodied consciousness between death and resurrection, a view that violates the Catechism of the Catholic Church. However, there may be a way out for the Catholic hylomorphist which was suggested by Dante—the possibility of a temporary body. The first section of the paper will summarize the contemporary attack against both the Cartesian soul and physicalist systems that reduce the mind to the brain. The alternative position proposed is that the human being is a psychosomatic unity at the level of the organism as a whole, and that both mind-body and brain-body dualism should be avoided. Such a position, I will argue, supports the notion that a disembodied soul, including a disembodied consciousness, is not possible for human beings. Finally, I will discuss Dante’s views on temporary bodies and explore three ways of understanding a temporary body, any of which can preserve a conscious intermediate state between death and resurrection.


Author(s):  
A. G. Ganiev, Z. Sh. Abdunazarova

The article provides information about the human brain, including its energy consumption, the functional functions of its parts, the biophysics of the sensory channels of the visual mechanism. The channels of movement of information through the neural fibers of the brain, the description of "unusual" ideas that lead to new and "creative thinking", the importance of the method of "comparative learning" in the development of "imagination" and "creative thinking" were discussed. The “specialty-related” mind map of the cerebral hemispheres serves to visualize and develop the activity of the right hemisphere of the brain, which is responsible for “creative thinking”. To activate the right hemisphere of the brain, it is recommended to use emotional "mind map", Uzbek folk tales, folk sports, folklore. The "mind map" of the sensory channels encourages feedback on the functioning of the human sensory organs, the mechanism of information reception, and opportunities to increase the efficiency of this process. It serves to visualize the mechanism by which ‘imagination’ is formed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-77
Author(s):  
Himayatul Izzati

The verses of the Al-Quran which talk about the potential of learning and neuroscience, describe the activity of the mind and the brain as a learning instrument to understand, study and analyze, these signals can be traced through key terminology related to human brain activity. The terms tafakkur, tadabbur, ta'aqqul are theological foundations that describe the potential for human learning in a Neouroscience perspective. The brain is the center of human intelligence which controls the entire nervous system in capturing learning activities. with the power of the human brain can find various things that can facilitate human life. Cues of potential learning by maximizing brain nerve function (Neuroscience) can be traced to, QS Asy-Shams Verses 7-9, QS. An-Nahl 78, QS Ar-Rum 8, QS Al-Baqarah 219 and QS. Muhammad 24. The potential for human learning that is implemented in Islamic education, must develop a variety of potentials, so that the implementation of Islamic education can maximize the development of a comprehensive potential, such as Tarbiyah Imaniyah, Khuluqiyah, Tarbiyah, Jismiyah, Tarbiyah Aqliyah, Nafsiyah Ijtima'iyah. By maximizing the development of the potential, it will produce quality Islamic education output.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anira Escrichs ◽  
Ana Sanjuan ◽  
Selen Atasoy ◽  
Ane López-González ◽  
César Garrido ◽  
...  

AbstractOver the past 2,500 years, contemplative traditions have explored the nature of the mind using meditation. More recently, neuroimaging research on meditation has revealed differences in brain function and structure in meditators. Nevertheless, the underlying neural mechanisms are still unclear. In order to understand how meditation shapes global activity through the brain, we investigated the spatiotemporal dynamics across the whole-brain functional network using the Intrinsic Ignition Framework. Recent neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that different states of consciousness differ in their underlying dynamical complexity, i.e., how the broadness of communication is elicited and distributed through the brain over time and space. In this work, controls and experienced meditators were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during resting-state and meditation (focused attention on breathing). Our results evidenced that the dynamical complexity underlying meditation shows less complexity than during resting-state in the meditator group but not in the control group. Furthermore, we report that during resting-state, the brain activity of experienced meditators showed higher metastability (i.e., a wider dynamical regime over time) than the one observed in the control group. Overall, these results indicate that the meditation state operates in a different dynamical regime than the resting-state.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arturo Tozzi ◽  
Colin James ◽  
James F Peters

ABSTRACTExperimental procedures in neuroscience rely on the standpoints that the mind is a functional state of the brain and a clear subdivision among different mental faculties does exist in the cortex. According to cognitive neuroscientists, the term "mind" encompasses just the "cognitive" faculties, such as consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, memory, leaving apart the "emotional" states. Here, taking into account the powerful tools of the first-order predicate logic, we evaluated whether: a) the mind is a function on the physical brain activity; b) different mental faculties can be reduced to a more general one; c) the division of mental faculties in cognition and emotion holds true. We demonstrated that nervous activity is equivalent to mental faculties and that emotions and cognition do not stand for two separated functions of the mind. This means that, counter to our common-sense belief, cognition and emotions are splitted and every faculty of the mind necessarily displays a counterpart in other ones. We point out how it is possible for condensed mind faculties to be unglued in order to become apparently different functions. Therefore, seemingly different mind faculties turn out to be equivalent, because the same logical framework holds for all the types of brain activities, independent of their boundaries and magnitude.


2019 ◽  
pp. 4-11
Author(s):  
Alan J. McComas

This chapter is concerned with definition and the monism–dualism debate. It first deals with two major issues—a definition of consciousness and the mind–brain problem. The former is simply stated as “consciousness is an organism’s awareness of itself.” After arriving at a clear working definition, the chapter turns to the mind–brain problem. It pays particular attention to the monism–dualism debate, the former of which argues that there is only one unifying reality. From here, the chapter jump-starts a discussion on consciousness as an epiphenomenon of brain activity, ultimately with a conclusion in favor of epiphenomenalism, in the sense that the mind is a product of the working of the brain.


2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veena Kumari

Background:An area of recent interest in psychiatric research is the application of neuroimaging techniques to investigate neural events associated with the development and the treatment of symptoms in a number of psychiatric disorders.Objective:To examine whether psychological therapies modulate brain activity and, if so, to examine whether these changes similar to those found with relevant pharmacotherapy in various mental disorders.Methods:Relevant data were identified from Pubmed and PsycInfo searches up to July 2005 using combinations of keywords including ‘psychological therapy’, ‘behaviour therapy’, ‘depression’, ‘panic disorder’, ‘phobia’, ‘obsessive compulsive disorder’, ‘schizophrenia’, ‘psychosis’, ‘brain activity’, ‘brain metabolism’, ‘PET’, ‘SPECT’ and ‘fMRI’.Results:There was ample evidence to demonstrate that psychological therapies produce changes at the neural level. The data, for example in depression, panic disorder, phobia and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), clearly suggested that a change in patients' symptoms and maladaptive behaviour at the mind level with psychological techniques is accompanied with functional brain changes in relevant brain circuits. In many studies, cognitive therapies and drug therapies achieved therapeutic gains through the same neural pathways although the two forms of treatment may still have different mechanisms of action.Conclusions:Empirical research indicates a close association between the ‘mind’ and the ‘brain’ in showing that changes made at the mind level in a psychotherapeutic context produce changes at the brain level. The investigation of changes in neural activity with psychological therapies is a novel area which is likely to enhance our understanding of the mechanisms for therapeutic changes across a range of disorders.


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