scholarly journals Gerichtsstandsklauseln in der privaten Durchsetzung des EU-Kartellrechts

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Polina Westerhoven

This book explores the issues surrounding cartel damage claims from an EU law perspective. It follows an analysis of the existing EU legal framework for private competition law enforcement with a thorough examination of the relevant rules on international jurisdiction. Against this background, the author focuses on the role of jurisdiction agreements in the area of private enforcement. The study covers both the choice of Member State courts as well as the prorogation of third state forums and provides an interesting perspective on the various questions that arise in this context. With regard to the highly debated issue of the interpretation of choice-of-court clauses, it highlights the need to observe the guidelines deriving from the Brussels I Regulation itself. It furthermore outlines the system applicable to third state prorogations and examines how to deal with situations in which the choice of a third state forum may lead to the circumvention of EU competition rules.

Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco

This chapter explains the contents and goals of the Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive 2014/104/EU), the corollary of the EU’s policy towards the promotion and facilitation of private enforcement of competition law. It first traces the evolution in EU competition law enforcement and policy that led to the adoption of the Directive before considering the goals of the Directive in more detail, namely to provide rules for the effective compensation of victims of antitrust infringements and to harmonize some rules concerning damages claims. It then examines the Directive’s legal basis under EU Law as well as substantive provisions, including those relating to compensatory principles, quantification of harm, and consensual dispute resolution. The chapter goes on to highlight neglected issues, limitations, and inherent biases regarding the scope and nature of the Directive’s rules and concludes with an analysis of issues arising from implementation of the Directive in Member States.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Kadar

AbstractWhat is the role of European competition policy in the digital economy? Even if it cannot deal with all perceived issues in digital markets, competition law enforcement is the appropriate tool to remedy distortions to competition caused by market power, without the introduction of pervasive ex-ante sector-specific regulation being required. Whilst some of the proposals for reform of the European competition law legal framework recently brought may have some merit in principle, the current regime appears to be suitable and sufficiently flexible to allow the Commission to intervene effectively and remedy competitive distortions in digital markets.


Author(s):  
Frederic Jenny

Abstract The paper analyzes the challenges faced by competition authorities with respect to the digital sector. Borrowing insights from the business policy literature and from the economic literature, the paper first analyzes the specificities of digital firms (multi-sided platforms and ecosystems) with respect to their development and competitive strategies. Building on this foundation the paper explores some of the challenges of applying traditional competition analysis to competition in the business sector. We then discuss a number of issues relevant to competition law enforcement in the digital sector starting with the role of data, competition within ecosystems and between ecosystems, consumer biases, and the role of gatekeepers. We conclude with a research agenda for economists and competition authorities.


Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi

‘What is the optimal level of enforcement?’ focuses on competition law enforcement. All competition jurisdictions acknowledge the central and crucial role of economic analysis in shaping competition prosecution. Greater economic understanding has improved the structure of competition law through legal presumptions and thresholds, enforcement guidelines, and a greater understanding of the gravity and consequences of anti-competitive activities. Indeed, there has been an ever-increasing ‘economization’ of antitrust, as more jurisdictions rely on economic analysis to determine whether intervention is needed. When markets work well, competition enforcers are better off adopting a ‘laissez-faire’ approach (leaving the market to take its own course). Distinguishing pro-competitive activities from anti-competitive activities poses a challenge.


Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This chapter examines the role of industrial policy in developing countries. On the one hand, industrial policy is arguably the antithesis of competition law and policy. Industrial policy substitutes government planning for competition and is vehemently opposed if not maligned by adherents of free market economics. Industrial policy as practiced in some countries such as Japan and Korea have entailed government-organized cartels and the grooming of national champions, both of which are direct affronts to the notion of competition. On the other hand, to the defenders of industrial policy, it has successfully lifted a number of Asian countries out of poverty and turned them into industrial and technological powerhouses. However, even the extent to which the success of these economies can be attributed to industrial policy is highly contested. There are hence two layers to the controversy. The first is whether industrial policy worked at all. The second is even if it did, whether a growth strategy relying on competition is superior to industrial policy, and if not, how competition law enforcement should accommodate industrial policy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-103
Author(s):  
Andrew Leitch

Claimants in private damages actions following on from European Commission cartel decisions are often faced with a choice of jurisdiction in which to pursue their claims. However, seising jurisdiction in the national court of a desired Member State can require the claim to be pursued against an anchor defendant that is not an addressee of a Commission decision. This may, in the English courts, give rise to various disputes as to the role of that non-addressee defendant in the cartel and, accordingly, whether a claim can in fact be sustained as against that defendant. The Court of Justice's recent judgment in Vantaan Kaupunki v Skanska Industrial Solutions potentially relieves claimants from the burden of having to establish that the non-addressee defendant participated in, or implemented, the cartel in order to sustain a claim against it, by holding that it is entire undertakings that are liable for compensation in private damages actions. The Skanska judgment harmonizes the scope of liability under the public and private spheres of EU competition law enforcement and has potentially significant ramifications for competition litigation in the English courts.


Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.


Author(s):  
Ioannidou Maria

This chapter examines how the Antitrust Damages Directive has been transposed in Cyprus. It begins with a discussion of the transposition procedure, focusing on the Cypriot competition regime as well as the state of private enforcement in Cyprus. In particular, it provides an overview of the law currently in force against anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominant position, the Protection of Competition Law of 2008 (13(I)/2008), as amended in 2014 (Law 41(I)/2014) (Cypriot Competition Act), and the provisions relevant to private competition law enforcement. The chapter then considers the history and the different steps of the transposition process before describing the scope of the transposition measure. It also analyses the different provisions of the Cypriot Damages Act and issues that arose during the transposition, such as parent company liability, the binding force of decisions of competition authorities of other Member States, and presumption and quantification of damage caused by cartels or other antitrust infringements.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Kit Barker

Achieving a workable, hybrid model of competition law enforcement that is sensitive to both instrumental and non-instrumental ends and which commands broad, cross-jurisdictional support always struck me as a tall order. For one thing, it required a keen understanding of the nature of competition law wrongs, which sit awkwardly at the turnstile between public and private law. The enforcement processes of competition law have also evolved in very different social and historical contexts, the United States being an environment in which regulatory agencies have historically been regarded with scepticism (if not downright distrust) and Europe being a centralised bureaucracy in which they have tended to be regarded as the paradigm. Most challengingly of all, the project required a theory of ‘holism’ capable of explaining how it is possible to reconcile complex moral, economic and social objectives within a singular enforcement system, or (more accurately) within a linked network of distinct law enforcement systems.


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