Die Staatstheorie des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und Europa

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Chr. van Ooyen

With the Treaty of Lisbon, the Second Senate of the German Constitutional Court intensified its judgements with regard to Europe and in its recent rulings on rescuing the euro and the electoral threshold in EU elections emphasised its belief in a form of democracy based on the idea that the nation and the state supersede everything else, a standpoint which it has adopted since the Treaty of Maastricht. With the right to be forgotten I and II, the First Senate has now also reacted to the European Court of Justice by suddenly committing itself to being the ‘guardian’ of European fundamental human rights and even threatening to revert to its old ‘European-friendly’ Solange II rulings. This book’s principal argument is that all this reveals the Europhobic nature of the German Constitutional Court’s state theory, which results from outdated traditions in the German doctrine of constitutional law and from a lack of democratic theory. The recent rulings on the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Human Rights from November 2019 are just some of new additions to the eighth edition of this book.

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-131
Author(s):  
Andrej Lang

Der Beitrag diskutiert die Konsequenzen des PSPP-Urteils für das Kooperationsverhältnis zwischen dem BVerfG und dem EuGH. Dabei wird für eine nüchternere Perspektive statt martialischer Zuspitzungen und gegen einseitige Schuldzuweisungen plädiert. Vielmehr sind wechselseitige Kooperation und Konfrontation in der netzwerkartigen Struktur der Gerichtsbeziehung angelegt. Deshalb markiert das Urteil zwar eine Krise, aber noch nicht das Ende des „Kooperationsverhältnisses“. Die Vorstellung, der Gerichtskonflikt lasse sich nur durch Dritte lösen, sei es in Form eines Vertragsverletzungsverfahrens, sei es durch eine spezielle Gerichtskammer für Kompetenzkonflikte, unterschätzt die fein ausbalancierte Funktionsweise des Gerichtsdialogs und birgt ein bedenkliches Eskalationspotenzial. Der Impuls, die Wiederherstellung der europäischen Rechtseinheit trotz grundlegendem Dissens rechtlich zu erzwingen, kann den Gerichtskonflikt auch eskalieren und eine Lösung zusätzlich erschweren. The article analyzes the consequences of the PSPP ruling for the cooperative relationship between the German Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice. It argues for a sober perspective instead of martial exaggerations and against apportioning one-sided blame. Rather, reciprocal cooperation and confrontation are inherent in the network structure of the judicial relationship. Although the ruling creates a crisis, it does not yet mark the end of the “cooperative relationship”. The idea that the judicial conflict can only be resolved by third parties, whether in the form of infringement proceedings or by a Mixed Grand Chamber for the delimitation of EU competences, underestimates the delicately balanced functioning of the judicial dialogue and harbors a worrying potential for escalation. The impulse to legally enforce the restoration of European legal unity despite fundamental dissent may end up escalating the judicial conflict and making a solution even more difficult.


2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Thym

German Federal Constitutional Court's dialogue with the European Court of Justice – Background, trigger, contents and context of the FCC's reaction to the Åkerberg Fransson judgment – The FCC's Counter-Terrorism Database judgment – Constitutional control standards – theoretical repercussions of the judicial dispute – Underlying conceptual differences – The ‘fusion thesis’ versus the ‘separation thesis’ – Pragmatic approximation of divergent positions


Author(s):  
Peter HILPOLD

Abstract The judgment by the German Constitutional Court (‘BVerfG’) of 5 May 2020 has caused a stir all over Europe. The relationship between the BVerfG and the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) has never been an easy one, especially after the Solange judgment of 1974. The Solange jurisprudence has, however, not only been synonymous with conflict and rivalry but also for dialogue and, eventually, mutual respect. With the PSPP judgment, this dialogue seemed to have found an end, while by the order of 29 April 2021 the BVerfG appears to have returned to a more conciliatory tone. Nonetheless, the disruption between Karlsruhe and Luxembourg persists. In this article, the PSPP judgment will be examined in detail, presenting it as the last step of long, contorted jurisprudence. It will be shown that the rupture that occurred in May 2020 was technically unnecessary and rather the result of deep-rooted cultural conflict with a clear economic background. The legal reasoning on both sides—that of the BVerfG and that of the PSPP judgment's most outspoken critics—is problematic at best. While for the time being the BVerfG seems to have learnt the lesson from the conflict provoked by its own judgment, the underlying, substantive conflict is still unresolved. It will be shown that this conflict can only be solved on a political level. Thereby, cultural pre-concepts will have to be overcome. Uncompromising reliance on a national ‘popular spirit’ (Volksgeist) will not offer a way out but neither will, for the time being, exclusive reference to a European Volksgeist ignoring Member State realities. The ‘weighing and balancing’ the BVerfG has missed in the previous Weiss ECJ preliminary ruling (again on the PSPP programme) will have to take place on a far broader scale.


Author(s):  
I. S. Iksanov

The article discusses the role of the European Court of Justice, the specifics of its activities, and its goals. The author also touches upon the historical aspect of the development of the European Court. According to the author, the European Court of Justice has had a beneficial effect on the development of the rights granted by Union citizenship. The actions of the European Court of Justice have created new ground for persons with Union citizenship, increasing access to social benefits beyond the rights of economic migrants, for all those who exercise their European rights. The European Court of Justice sought to allow students to travel for their education, looking for new ways to ensure their free movement and learning with funding in the event of unforeseen events. It is essential that the court focuses on three core values so that citizenship does not become a limitation: nondiscrimination, the right to freedom of movement and the right to family life. The European court of human rights is an international judicial body; its jurisdiction extends to all member States of the Union. The main thing for the European Court of Justice is to ensure compliance with and enforcement of the Convention by the States parties. Also, when considering cases, the Court can point to gaps in legislation and issues concerning law enforcement practice, positively influencing law enforcement policy and legal proceedings, and, as a result, contribute to the improvement of the law enforcement system. This article reflects the activities of the European Court of Justice aimed at identifying the problematic aspects of the legislation of the European Union.


2020 ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Magdalena Jaś-Nowopolska ◽  
Daniel Mengeler

The article discusses the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II” of 6 November 2019 by the Federal Constitutional Court, which redefine the relationship of cooperation between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in the area of fundamental rights. The Court has decided for the first time that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself can directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. In the first part, the article presents the previous system, including the precedence of application of EU law and its exceptions (ultra-vires review; identity review), as well as the controversial question of the interpretation of Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is decisive for the applicability of the fundamental rights under the Charter. The focus is on the constitutional background of the German Basic Law for the protection of fundamental rights in the European multi-level system. Against this background, the second part of the article presents the facts and reasons for the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II”. This is followed by an analysis of the consequences of these decisions for the protection of fundamental rights and cooperation between the European Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court. In particular, the way in which fundamental EU rights can now be enforced before the Federal Constitutional Court is described in greater detail. The concluding part provides an overview of the open questions, risks and opportunities of this approach. Here the article illustrates the significant impact of the two decisions on dogmatic and procedural matters.


Teisė ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 80-107
Author(s):  
Paulius Griciūnas

The judicial dialogue between the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania and the European Court of Justice is analyzed in this article. The variety of opinions, arguments, and the evolution of the approaches regarding the right or obligation of the Constitutional Court to refer for a preliminary ruling are researched. Major events in the evolution were two referrals by the Constitutional Court in 2007 and 2017; both of these decisions to refer for the preliminary ruling are compared, and the similarities and differences analyzed. The potential of a preliminary ruling in the constitutional jurisprudence is demonstrated, with an emphasis on the indirect control of the legality of EU acts and the national identity clause.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1003-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini

This article analyzes the recent judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) inGauweiler, answering the first preliminary reference ever by the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG), on the legality of the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program of the European Central Bank (ECB). As the article explains, the ECJ rejected any possible claim of illegality of a key program devised by the ECB at the height of the Euro-crisis. However, because the BVerfG had defined the OMT program as ultra vires, and had threatened to strike it down if the ECJ did not reach the same result, the article defends the principle of the supremacy of European Union (EU) law, indicating that a possible nullification of the OMT program by the BVerfG would be clearly unlawful. To re-affirm the supremacy of EU law, the article argues that this principle is functional to ensure the equality of the member states before the law, preventing each country of the EU from cherry-picking which provisions of EU it likes or not. As the article suggests, respect of the principle of the supremacy of EU law – including by the BVerfG – is ultimately in the interest of every EU member state, including of Germany.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udo Di Fabio

On 7 February 2014 in the OMT Case, the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe referred a question about the interpretation of Treaty law to the European Court of Justice for the first time. The question was whether the European Central Bank exceeded its mandate when it declared, in September 2012, that it was prepared to make emergency, unlimited purchases of specific states' bonds. Some view the referral as a genuflection acknowledging the judicial superiority of European Union jurisprudence. Has the Karlsruhe Court relinquished its role as “the final arbiter” and thereby surreptitiously bid farewell to the German sovereignty that the same Senate of the Constitutional Court so vigorously endorsed in the Lisbon Treaty Case in 2009?


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-190
Author(s):  
Raphael Lorenzo A. Pangalangan ◽  
Gemmo Bautista Fernandez ◽  
Ruby Rosselle L. Tugade

The Philippines resoundingly cried ‘never again’ to the horrors of the Marcos dictatorship through the People Power revolution of 1986. Thirty years later, the Filipino people have come to realise that success is indeed fleeting. On 18 November 2016, the remains of Philippine dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos were buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani—the Heroes’ Cemetery. While the Philippine Supreme Court insists that the hero’s burial conferred to the author of the nation’s darkest chapter is a political question, from established doctrines here and abroad, the authors seek to derive the political answer. This article will look at the legitimacy of memory laws within the Philippine Constitutional framework. Finding guidance from the Auschiwtz lie case of the German Constitutional Court, the article seeks to combat historical revisionism and prohibit the Marcosian lie. Our research begins by looking at the resurgence of authoritarianism as seen through the populist presidency of Rodrigo Roa Duterte. We will then proceed to address the threshold issue of state-sanctioned narratives. Recognising that the duty to establish the truth involves the power to determine the narrative, the authors will reconcile the conflicting demands of the freedom of thought and the right to the truth. We will then proceed by utilising the fact-opinion distinction to demonstrate how the Marcosian lie may be the valid subject of regulation. The last phase of the research looks into the approaches adopted by the United Nations (un) Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights in dealing with negationism and historical revisionism.


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