scholarly journals The Federal Constitutional Court Decisions: „The Right to be Forgotten I” and „The Right to be Forgotten II” – The Expectation of Increased Cooperation with the Concurrent Need to Maintain Independence

2020 ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Magdalena Jaś-Nowopolska ◽  
Daniel Mengeler
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
Eu Fundamental Rights

The article discusses the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II” of 6 November 2019 by the Federal Constitutional Court, which redefine the relationship of cooperation between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in the area of fundamental rights. The Court has decided for the first time that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself can directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. In the first part, the article presents the previous system, including the precedence of application of EU law and its exceptions (ultra-vires review; identity review), as well as the controversial question of the interpretation of Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is decisive for the applicability of the fundamental rights under the Charter. The focus is on the constitutional background of the German Basic Law for the protection of fundamental rights in the European multi-level system. Against this background, the second part of the article presents the facts and reasons for the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II”. This is followed by an analysis of the consequences of these decisions for the protection of fundamental rights and cooperation between the European Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court. In particular, the way in which fundamental EU rights can now be enforced before the Federal Constitutional Court is described in greater detail. The concluding part provides an overview of the open questions, risks and opportunities of this approach. Here the article illustrates the significant impact of the two decisions on dogmatic and procedural matters.

scholarly journals Recht auf Vergessen? Ethik der zweiten Chance?

2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Abbt
Keyword(s):  
Personal Data ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right ◽  
Second Chance

AbstractThe notion of ‘forgetting’ has assumed a new dimension in the digital age. Here I will examine a particular kind of forgetting as reflected in a ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). What the ruling of the ECJ of May 13, 2014 (C-131/12) formulates and invokes as a “right to be forgotten” encompasses the right to co-determine whether certain personal data in the Web should immediately show up or not when a first name and surname is entered as part of a search. When a user has invoked the “right to be forgotten”, and it is determined that it applies, information is, however, not made irretrievable. It continues to remain possible to find this information in a roundabout way, i.e., by means of more precise search queries, although the information should not immediately become visible the moment a person’s full name is typed into a search engine. I will argue that this ruling can be seen as corroborating the fundamental rights of the individual. The idea of the “right to be forgotten” is to give a person a second chance in society. Not all forms of forgetting and remembering can be subsumed under this idea. As will be expounded, this court decision offers a useful normative fundament for the distinction between (1) legitimate attempts at reintegration, (2) legitimate attempts at rehabilitation and (3) unjustified recourse to a right to be forgotten.

The unexpectedly talkative ‘dumb son’: the Italian Constitutional Court’s dialogue with the European Court of Justice in protecting temporary workers’ rights in the public education sector

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-524
Author(s):  
Barbara Guastaferro
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Italian Legislation

Judicial cooperation – Italian Constitutional Court – National Constitutional Courts’ attitude towards preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice – First and second preliminary reference of the Italian Constitutional Court inindirectproceedings – Constitutional review of national legislation inconsistent with EU law – Relationship between EU law and constitutional concerns – Added value of Constitutional Courts in protecting constitutional identity – Multilevel protection of fundamental rights – EU Framework agreement on fixed-term work and European Court of Justice case law – Italian legislation on fixed-term work – Italian legislation on recruitment in State schools – Abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts – Judicial defence of workers’ rights – Cooperation between judges and legislators – Balancing between social rights and budgetary constraints –Mascolocase –Tariccocase

scholarly journals Some Kind of Right

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 40-44
Author(s):  
Jud Mathews
Keyword(s):  
German Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
Specific Reason

AbstractThe Right to Be Forgotten II crystallizes one lesson from Europe’s rights revolution: persons should be able to call on some kind of right to protect their important interests whenever those interests are threatened under the law. Which rights instrument should be deployed, and by what court, become secondary concerns. The decision doubtless involves some self-aggrandizement by the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which asserts for itself a new role in protecting European fundamental rights, but it is no criticism of the Right to Be Forgotten II to say that it advances the GFCC’s role in European governance, so long as the decision also makes sense in the context of the European and German law. I argue that it does, for a specific reason. The Right to Be Forgotten II represents a sensible approach to managing the complex pluralism of the legal environment in which Germany and other EU member states find themselves.

scholarly journals La tutela judicial de los derechos fundamentales en el ámbito de aplicación nacional del derecho de la Unión Europea : recientes acotaciones del Tribunal de Justicia y del Tribunal ConstitucionalEspañol = The judicial protection of fundamental rights in the sphere of the national application of EU law : recent remarks by the Court of Justice and by the Spanish Constitutional Court

2013 ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Juan Ignacio Ugartemendia Eceizabarrena
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Standards ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Judicial Protection ◽  
The Eu

Este artículo es un estudio relativo a la tutela judicial de los Derechos Fundamentales cuando se aplica Derecho de la Unión en el ámbito interno, y a cuáles son los principales problemas con los que se topa el Juez nacional que aplica el Derecho de la Unión al llevar a cabo dicha función protectora. El trabajo, dicho de forma más concreta, se centra en el examen de una serie de recientes y decisivas resoluciones jurisdiccionales, dictadas tanto por parte del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea como por parte del Tribunal Constitucional Español, que analizan problemas y señalan soluciones relativas a esas cuestiones, además de mostrar cuál es la evolución y el estado de la situación al respecto. Se trata de resoluciones que abordan cuestiones de fondo, como, por ejemplo: ¿hasta qué punto es posible utilizar estándares nacionales de protección de los Derechos Fundamentales en situaciones conectadas con el Derecho de la Unión o con su aplicación, en lugar de utilizar el sistema de protección de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea? Y asimismo, resoluciones que atienden a cuestiones de dimensión más procesal como la de dirimir hasta qué punto tiene autonomía el Juez nacional a la hora de plantear una petición prejudicial (se entiende a la hora de tutelar derechos reconocidos por normas de la Unión) en relación a las normas procesales nacionales.This article deals with the judicial protection of fundamental rights when EU Law is applied at national level and the main problems national judges have to deal with when applying EU Law as protectors of rights. More precisely, the work is focused on the examination of some recent and decisive judicial decisions, both by the European Court of Justice and by the Spanish Constitutional Court which analyze the problems and address the solutions to those questions besides showing the evolution and current situation in that regard. They are decisions that deal with the merits as for example to which extent it might be possible to use national standards of protection of fundamental rights in situations connected to EU Law or to its application instead of using the system of protection of EU human rights. Likewise, they are decisions which handle with more procedural questions as for example to what extent national judges are autonomous to file a preliminary question (it is understood that when it comes time to protect rights acknowledged by the EU) relative to national procedural rules.

Effectiveness of EU law and protection of fundamental rights

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosaria Sicurella
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Critical View ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Significant Step ◽  
Principle Of Legality

The decision of the Court of Justice in the M.A.S. and M.B. case marks a very significant step forward in the Taricco saga. It clearly shows the intention of the European Court to tone down the confrontation with the Italian Constitutional Court, while at the same time maintaining the most relevant achievement of the decision in the Taricco case, that is to say the fact to consider Article 325 TFEU as having direct effect. The author expresses quite a critical view on the solution adopted by the ECJ which finally results in a sort of “flexibilization” of the principle of legality at EU level in order to meet some of the claims by the Italian Constitutional Court. In the author's opinion, such a solution risks to undermine the overall coherence and soundness of the protection of fundamental rights at EU level, although it can appear at a first glance to boost the legality principle. A better solution could have been to develop a different reasoning relying on rights in the Charter other that the nullum crimen principle, and avoid to touch at the well-established scope of this principle as established in Article 49 Charter and also in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

scholarly journals The Randstad Case: Melki Reloaded? The Fundamental Right to Effective Judicial Protection as Battleground for Judicial Supremacy in European Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-68
Author(s):  
Orlando Scarcello
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
European Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Judicial Supremacy ◽  
Judicial Protection ◽  
The Eu

This paper will examine the recent preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice issued by the Italian Court of Cassation in the Randstad case, aimed at rearranging the internal constitutional separation between ordinary and administrative courts (article 111(8) of the Constitution). I will first provide some context on both the relations between Italian and EU courts (2.1) and on the confrontation between the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court in interpreting article 111 (2.2). I will then specifically examine the referring order to the Court of Justice of the EU (3), focusing on the role of general clauses of EU law as articles 4(3) and 19 TEU and 47 of the Charter in it. Finally, I will consider the instrumental use of EU law made by the Cassation to overcome an unpleasant constitutional arrangement. This aligns Randstad with previous cases such as Melki or A v. B and may foster constitutional conflict in the future. 

scholarly journals Prawo do prywatności osób prawnych podczas kontroli przedsiębiorstwa dokonywanej przez Komisję Europejską

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 11-25
Author(s):  
Marta De Bazelaire De Ruppierre
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Right To Privacy ◽  
The Right To Privacy ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF LEGAL PERSONS DURING THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S INSPECTIONSThe paper aims to discuss the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the EU institutions in competition law proceedings, showing as an example the respect for the right to privacy of undertakings during the inspections carried out by the European Commission. Although exercising the control powers of the Commission potentially collides with a number of fundamental rights expressed in the Charter, it is the analysis of Art. 7 CFR that allows to depict the evolution of the EU’s approach to privacy of legal persons, showing the accompanying judicial dialogue, or lack thereof, between the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU. The article short-defines the dawn raids, examines the application of Article 7 CFR to legal persons, highlighting the aspects of protection of domicile and secrecy of correspondence, compares the standards provided by ECHR and EU law, pondering also on how the CFR guarantees can be provided and effectively controlled. It also reflects on the issue whether the Court of Justice has a forerunner role in promoting fundamental rights of undertakings in matters of competition law.

scholarly journals The Principle of Mutual Trust in EU Law and Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 106 (6) ◽  
pp. 144-154
Author(s):  
Vadim Voynikov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Eu

Mutual trust is one of the central principles of the area of freedom, security and justice and the whole EU. Despite the fact, that mutual trust is not stipulated in founding treaties, this principle has been widely developed by the European Court of Justice. The purpose of this article is to identify the legal and political components of mutual trust in the EU, as well as the approaches to its implementation. The author comes to the conclusion that the principle of mutual trust originated from the internal market, however its development is mostly associated with the area of freedom, security and justice. Mutual trust in the EU presupposes that a member state does not need additional verification that another member state respects Union law and fundamental rights. Initially, the principle of mutual trust was given the absolute character, but in the post-Lisbon period, “blind trust” was replaced by the “earned trust”, which implies the possibility, in exceptional cases, to refuse mutual trust to another member state if the latter violates fundamental rights. Despite the development of the concept of mutual trust by the European Court of Justice and other EU institutions, recently there has been a serious deficit of interstate trust within the Union. In this regard, the principle of mutual trust is becoming declarative.

scholarly journals The Constitutional Status of Karlsruhe’s Novel “Jurisdiction” in EU Fundamental Rights Matters: Self-inflicted Institutional Vulnerabilities

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 19-26
Author(s):  
Karsten Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Binding Effect ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Eu Fundamental Rights ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

AbstractThe First Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has recently introduced the express promise that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself could directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. There are, however, differences between the Basic Law as the relevant standard of review and other standards of review that are dangerous to ignore. The constitutional status of the FCC’s jurisdiction depends crucially on whether the Court relies on the constitution or on EU fundamental rights. If the constitutional status of the novel jurisdiction covered any binding-effect, and that is a big if, the FCC still would not safeguard the unity and coherence of Union law. Leaving aside the fact that the First Senate is confined to reversing and remanding (unable to enforce anything directly), no beneficial effect on legal certainty grows apparent. Any binding-effect of the novel jurisdiction only provides for consistency without finality. And to venture further into the question: Even if anyone welcomed this novel kind of consistency without finality (virtually “provisional consistency”), this oddish consistency would still be a localized consistency, i.e. in German courts only.

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