Board Social Capital and Excess CEO Compensation

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 (1) ◽  
pp. 12567
Author(s):  
Steve Sauerwald ◽  
Zhiang (John) Lin ◽  
Mike Peng
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Board Social Capital

The influence of board social capital on corporate social responsibility reporting

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuria Reguera-Alvarado ◽  
Francisco Bravo-Urquiza
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Resource Dependence ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Dynamic Panel Data ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Csr Reporting ◽  
Multiple Directorships ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Board Social Capital

PurposeThe main objective of this paper is to analyze the influence of multiple directorships, as a critical component of board social capital, on CSR reporting. This study also explores the moderating effect of certain board attributes on multiple directorships.Design/methodology/approachThe authors’ sample is composed of Spanish listed firms in the Madrid Stock Exchange for the period 2011–2017. A dynamic panel data model based on the Generalized Method of Moments (GMMs) is employed.FindingsRelying on a resource dependence view, the authors’ results highlight an ambiguously positive association between multiple directorships and the level of CSR reporting. In particular, this relationship is positively moderated by both board size and gender diversity.Research limitations/implicationsThese findings contribute to academic debates concerning the value of board members intellectual capital. In particular, the authors emphasize the importance of board social capital, as well as the need to consider the context in which directors make decisions.Practical implicationsThis evidence may prove helpful to firms when configuring the board of directors, and for regulators and professionals when refining their legislations and recommendations.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that empirically analyzes the impact of an important element of board social capital, such as multiple directorships, on CSR reporting, which has become crucial in financial markets.

Social Capital at the Top: Effects of Social Similarity and Status on CEO Compensation

1996 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 1568-1593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maura A. Belliveau ◽  
Charles A. O'Reilly ◽  
James B. Wade
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Ceo Compensation

scholarly journals Does Board Supervisory Quality Enhance Corporate Social Performance?-Evidence from Taiwanese Listed Firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 68
Author(s):  
Yaying Mary Chou Yeh ◽  
Wen-Chi Hsieh
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Corporate Social Performance ◽  
Social Performance ◽  
Attendance Rate ◽  
Board Meeting ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Social Agenda ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
Board Social Capital

This study uses Taiwanese public firms as a sample to examine if board supervisory quality enhances CSP. The present study uses four proxies for supervisory quality of board at group level: board meeting attendance rate, number of board meetings, social capital of the board and average training hours of directors. We obtain 348 CSR data from an international CSR rating agent and match them with double size non-CSR firms. We find that CSR firms exhibit significantly higher board attendance rate, board meeting frequency and board social capital than non-CSR firms. For CSR firms, board attendance rate and board meeting frequency positively impact CSR ratings, implying that board diligence is essential to monitoring management to achieve higher social objectives. However, board social capital and training significantly but negatively impact CSP, implying busy board and inexperienced board detriments CSP.Board success in CSR means directors must be passionate about the issues on CSR. Additionally, firms that are behind social agenda need to recruit resourceful directors to diversify information base for advises about stakeholder issues and trends. Firms that have taken steps in CSR activities should not recruit overly busy directors or inexperienced directors. Our paper provides both theoretical and practical implications.

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