scholarly journals Director Appointments: Expressing Board Care and Diligence

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thea Voogt ◽  
Martie-Louise Verreynne
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Analytical Techniques ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Legal Duty

Shareholders’ rights to appoint directors in widely-held companies are effectively held by the incumbent board as ‘agents’. This article advocates for the adoption of an integrated instrument designed to enhance accountability for the composition of the board, which sits at the apex of the board’s autonomous corporate control. Formulated as a focused numbered checklist, the instrument was developed through textual and statistical analytical techniques, drawing on empirical evidence from director skills matrices disclosed by large listed Australian companies. The instrument acts as an expression of the legal duty of care and diligence that the directors discharge in selecting board members, and relies on disclosure to make the market for corporate control more efficient: if the board is more accountable, shareholders are better able to monitor and discipline the directors.

The Market for Corporate Control: Value, Stakeholders, and Governance

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kershaw
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Short Term ◽  
The Public ◽  
Analysis And Evaluation ◽  
Control Value ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Empirical Context ◽  
The Uk

This Chapter introduces the market for corporate control and provides theoretical and empirical context about the functioning and effects of the market for corporate control. Ideally such context should inform the analysis and evaluation of the Takeover Code’s regulation of the UK market for corporate control. However, as the Chapter shows, neither our understanding of the likely effects of the market for corporate control on companies, boards, shareholders and stakeholders, nor the state of empirical evidence provide clear cut guidance on how to regulate the market for corporate control. The Chapter considers evidence on the value effects of takeovers and shows that evidence from the short term market response to announced takeovers supports claims that takeovers in aggregate generate value, but the longer term evidence is more mixed and inconclusive. It also considers the methodological limitations of both the short term and long term evidence. The Chapter then proceeds to consider the effect of the market for corporate control on stakeholders. It explores the commonly held view that takeovers are detrimental for employees but finds again that the empirical evidence is inconclusive, although the theoretical case that takeover activity may undermine employee investment in the business remains compelling. The Chapter then explores the role of the market for corporate control as a governance device. It is often assumed that the market for corporate control acts as a disciplinary device holding managers to account, but as the Chapter shows the disciplinary effects work differently and less precisely than regulators and the public debate commonly assume. The Chapter also shows that such indirect effects may also mould management and board behaviour in economically suboptimal ways, which the Chapter considers in the context of the debate about the possible short term orientation of UK boards.

scholarly journals CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF CYBERBULLYING POLICIES IN SOUTH AUSTRALIAN SCHOOLS

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peta Spyrou
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Civil Liability ◽  
School Community ◽  
Legal Liability ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Australian School ◽  
Multifaceted Approach ◽  
Whole School ◽  
Legal Duty

Cyberbullying is a form of covert bullying that affects the lives of young people and adults alike. Empirical evidence suggesting that the effects of cyberbullying may lead to protracted mental harm highlights the need for schools to take a proactive stance against this form of bullying. This article looks specifically at the effectiveness of the anti-bullying policies implemented by South Australian school authorities in order to comply with their legal duty of care in negligence. Part I introduces the topic of cyberbullying, while Part II explains a school’s legal liability for instances of cyberbullying and identifies the requisite need for anti-bullying polices. In addition, Part III highlights the need for a multifaceted approach to reduce the occurrence of cyberbullying that recognises the important roles played by parents and student bystanders. This section concludes by providing specific recommendations on how anti-bullying policies should be implemented. The article argues that while school authorities may bear legal liability for instances of cyberbullying, schools cannot effectively implement anti-bullying policies without forming a partnership with the whole school community.

scholarly journals The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980

1988 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregg A Jarrell ◽  
James A Brickley ◽  
Jeffry M Netter
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Hostile Takeovers ◽  
Market Activity ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Academic Researchers

In the 1980s, the market for corporate control has been increasingly active, and the quantity of output of academic researchers studying corporate control questions has mirrored the market activity. This review examines the returns to bidders and targets, and the effects of defending against hostile takeovers.

Raiders Activity on the Market for Corporate Control as a Product of Coercive Entrepreneurship Evolution

2007 ◽  
pp. 80-92
Author(s):  
A. Kireev
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Control ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Basic Characteristics

The paper studies the problem of raiders activity on the market for corporate control. This activity is considered as a product of coercive entrepreneurship evolution. Their similarities and sharp distinctions are shown. The article presents the classification of raiders activity, discribes its basic characteristics and tendencies, defines the role of government in the process of its transformation.

The Value of SOX 404 in the Market for Corporate Control

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masako N. Darrough ◽  
Rong Huang ◽  
Emanuel Zur
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Control ◽  
Market For Corporate Control
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