Is the Romanian Market for Corporate Control Atypical? Empirical Evidence on Takeover Bids: 1998-2002

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana Pop
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Takeover Bids

The Market for Corporate Control: Value, Stakeholders, and Governance

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kershaw
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Short Term ◽  
The Public ◽  
Analysis And Evaluation ◽  
Control Value ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Empirical Context ◽  
The Uk

This Chapter introduces the market for corporate control and provides theoretical and empirical context about the functioning and effects of the market for corporate control. Ideally such context should inform the analysis and evaluation of the Takeover Code’s regulation of the UK market for corporate control. However, as the Chapter shows, neither our understanding of the likely effects of the market for corporate control on companies, boards, shareholders and stakeholders, nor the state of empirical evidence provide clear cut guidance on how to regulate the market for corporate control. The Chapter considers evidence on the value effects of takeovers and shows that evidence from the short term market response to announced takeovers supports claims that takeovers in aggregate generate value, but the longer term evidence is more mixed and inconclusive. It also considers the methodological limitations of both the short term and long term evidence. The Chapter then proceeds to consider the effect of the market for corporate control on stakeholders. It explores the commonly held view that takeovers are detrimental for employees but finds again that the empirical evidence is inconclusive, although the theoretical case that takeover activity may undermine employee investment in the business remains compelling. The Chapter then explores the role of the market for corporate control as a governance device. It is often assumed that the market for corporate control acts as a disciplinary device holding managers to account, but as the Chapter shows the disciplinary effects work differently and less precisely than regulators and the public debate commonly assume. The Chapter also shows that such indirect effects may also mould management and board behaviour in economically suboptimal ways, which the Chapter considers in the context of the debate about the possible short term orientation of UK boards.

The Economic Consequences of Financial Restatements: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amir Amel-Zadeh ◽  
Yuan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Control ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Economic Resources ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
Main Driver ◽  
Takeover Bids ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether and how financial restatements affect the market for corporate control. We show that firms that recently filed financial restatements are significantly less likely to become takeover targets than a propensity score matched sample of non-restating firms. For those restating firms that do receive takeover bids, the bids are more likely to be withdrawn or take longer to complete than those made to non-restating firms. Finally, there is some evidence that deal value multiples are significantly lower for restating targets than for non-restating targets. Our analyses suggest that the information risk associated with restating firms is the main driver of these results. Overall, this study finds that financial restatements have profound consequences for the allocation of economic resources in the market for corporate control. JEL Classifications: D82; G14; G34; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

scholarly journals The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980

1988 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregg A Jarrell ◽  
James A Brickley ◽  
Jeffry M Netter
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Hostile Takeovers ◽  
Market Activity ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Academic Researchers

In the 1980s, the market for corporate control has been increasingly active, and the quantity of output of academic researchers studying corporate control questions has mirrored the market activity. This review examines the returns to bidders and targets, and the effects of defending against hostile takeovers.

scholarly journals Director Appointments: Expressing Board Care and Diligence

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thea Voogt ◽  
Martie-Louise Verreynne
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Analytical Techniques ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Legal Duty

Shareholders’ rights to appoint directors in widely-held companies are effectively held by the incumbent board as ‘agents’. This article advocates for the adoption of an integrated instrument designed to enhance accountability for the composition of the board, which sits at the apex of the board’s autonomous corporate control. Formulated as a focused numbered checklist, the instrument was developed through textual and statistical analytical techniques, drawing on empirical evidence from director skills matrices disclosed by large listed Australian companies. The instrument acts as an expression of the legal duty of care and diligence that the directors discharge in selecting board members, and relies on disclosure to make the market for corporate control more efficient: if the board is more accountable, shareholders are better able to monitor and discipline the directors.

The Political Dynamics of Marketizing “Corporate Control”

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Callaghan
Keyword(s):  
Market Failure ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Background Information ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Dynamics ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Case Selection ◽  
Political Struggles ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Takeover Bids

Chapter 2 provides background information pertaining to the regulation of takeover bids, to clarify how political struggles surrounding shareholder rights elucidate the political dynamics of marketization. Four considerations motivated the case selection. First, the so-called market for corporate control cannot arise spontaneously and is prone to market failure, because corporate control is a fictitious good in need of commodification by means of market-enabling rules. Second, the rules governing this market are politically contentious because they have significant distributional implications. Third, struggles surrounding these rules pit different kinds of equally well-endowed profit-oriented opportunists against one another. Fourth, the process started a long time ago and played out differently in different countries, partly due to variation in the political salience of hostile bids.

Raiders Activity on the Market for Corporate Control as a Product of Coercive Entrepreneurship Evolution

2007 ◽  
pp. 80-92
Author(s):  
A. Kireev
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Control ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Basic Characteristics

The paper studies the problem of raiders activity on the market for corporate control. This activity is considered as a product of coercive entrepreneurship evolution. Their similarities and sharp distinctions are shown. The article presents the classification of raiders activity, discribes its basic characteristics and tendencies, defines the role of government in the process of its transformation.

The Value of SOX 404 in the Market for Corporate Control

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masako N. Darrough ◽  
Rong Huang ◽  
Emanuel Zur
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Control ◽  
Market For Corporate Control
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