Outreach at the time of the pandemic: an online public good game with punishment

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lory Barile
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Public Good Game

scholarly journals Social Pressure in Networks Induces Public Good Provision

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 4
Author(s):  
David Jimenez-Gomez
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Small Group ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Network Topology ◽  
Social Pressure ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Good Provision

I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being punished, and this generates contagion in the network. In contrast to earlier models in the literature, contagion happens fast, as part of the best response of fully rational individuals. The network topology has implications for whether contagion starts and the extent to which it spreads. I find conditions under which an agent decides to be the first to contribute in order to generate contagion in the network, as well as conditions for contribution due to a self-fulfilling fear of social pressure.

scholarly journals Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Rocio Botta ◽  
Gerardo Blanco ◽  
Christian E. Schaerer
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Phase Portrait ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Group Project ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
State Evolution ◽  
Public Good Games ◽  
Full Cooperation

Improving and maintaining cooperation are fundamental issues for any project to be time-persistent, and sanctioning free riders may be the most applied method to achieve it. However, the application of sanctions differs from one group (project or institution) to another. We propose an optional, public good game model where a randomly selected set of the free riders is punished. To this end, we introduce a parameter that establishes the portion of free riders sanctioned with the purpose to control the population state evolution in the game. This parameter modifies the phase portrait of the system, and we show that, when the parameter surpasses a threshold, the full cooperation equilibrium point becomes a stable global attractor. Hence, we demonstrate that the fractional approach improves cooperation while reducing the sanctioning cost.

More Talk, Less Need for Monitoring: Communication and Deterrence in a Public Good Game

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 88-106
Author(s):  
David C. Kingsley ◽  
Daniel Muise
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Central Authority ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Endogenous Selection ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThis paper investigates the impact of communication in a public good game with a central authority. The central authority includes a fixed cost that increases with the level of monitoring which in turn determines the level of deterrence. The level of monitoring is both exogenously and endogenously determined. Across three treatments subjects either have no opportunity to communicate, communicateonlywhen the level of monitoring is exogenously imposed, or communicateonlywhen the level of monitoring is endogenously selected. Results suggest that, in both treatments, average earnings are significantly higher with the opportunity to communicate. Most significantly, with the opportunity to communicate prior to endogenous selection, groups practically eliminate monitoring (imposing a low cost, non-deterrent, central authority), while maintaining a high level of contributions. Communication appears to make groups less dependent on institutional deterrence and allows them to reduce the costs of central authority.

scholarly journals Playing with the good guys. A public good game with endogenous group formation

2011 ◽  
Vol 95 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 1111-1118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjell Arne Brekke ◽  
Karen Evelyn Hauge ◽  
Jo Thori Lind ◽  
Karine Nyborg
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Group Formation ◽  
Public Good Game

scholarly journals Mill ownership and farmer's cooperative behavior: the case of Costa Rica coffee farmers

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 623-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
ASTRID HOPFENSITZ ◽  
JOSEPA MIQUEL-FLORENSA
Keyword(s):  
Costa Rica ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Costa Rican ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Self Selection ◽  
Private Market ◽  
Coffee Farmers ◽  
Privately Owned

AbstractWe analyze how Costa Rican coffee farmer's behavior in an experimental public good game depends on the institutional structure of the farmers buying point (cooperativevs.privately owned mills), and on the background of their game partners (partners selling to the same type of mill or not). We find that cooperative farmers do not display more public good orientation than private market farmers when playing with partners from the same type of mill. However, though farmers selling to private mills make no difference with respect to the background of partners, farmers selling to cooperatives significantly decrease contributions when paired with non-cooperative members. Finally, we study how self-selection into a mechanism that punishes the lowest contributors effects contributions both inside the group and with partners of the opposite background, and we show that it increases contributions by cooperative farmers interacting with non-cooperative farmers by more than 100%.

Contributing for Myself, but Free riding for My Group?

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshio Iida ◽  
Christiane Schwieren
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Real World ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Or Groups ◽  
Series Of Experiments ◽  
General Difference

Abstract Many real-world decisions are made by individuals as representatives of groups. Most research, however, studies either individuals or groups as decision-makers. This paper explores whether there is a general difference between a decision made as an individual and as a representative of a group in the context of a public good game. We conducted a series of experiments to test this question and to understand mechanisms contributing to potential differences. We found that representatives contributed less than individuals when they could not communicate with their constituency. However, when they could discuss their strategy before playing, they contributed at least as much as individual decision-makers. Furthermore, when they could justify their decision after playing, they contributed even more than individual decision-makers. We discuss potential reasons for this and directions for future research.

scholarly journals Representing Others in a Public Good Game

Games ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Hauge ◽  
Ole Rogeberg
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Public Good Game

scholarly journals The Circulation of Worthless Tokens Aids Cooperation: An Experiment Inspired by the Kula

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Danese ◽  
Luigi Mittone
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Traditional Societies ◽  
Control Study

Many anthropological records exist of seemingly worthless tokens exchanged in traditional societies. The most famous instances of such tokens are probably the Kula necklaces and armbands first described by B. Malinowski. In our experiment, each participant can send a token to another participant before each round of a repeated public good game. We use as examples of tokens a bracelet built by the participants in the lab, a simple piece of cardboard provided by the experimenter, and an object brought from home by the participants. Notwithstanding the cheap-talk nature of the decision to send the token, both sending and receiving the token are associated with a significant increase in contributions to the public good. Regression analysis shows that contributions to the public good in the treatments featuring a bracelet and a cardboard piece are higher than in a control study. The home object appears not to have been equally useful in increasing contributions.

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